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CONTENTS

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH,

1942

	PAGE
Freedom and Vocation By Christopher Dawson	1
Japan and the Worship of Emperors By W. E.	12
Economics and Ethics By the Master of Balliol	24
The Watershed By Dr. David Mathew	35
The Mass-Army By J. Schleiter	43
The Social Status of the Mediaeval Abbots By Alban Léotaud, O.S.B.	55
Isabelle Rivière By Mrs. George Norman	62

Some Recent Books - - - - - 69

MAN ON HIS NATURE. MAN'S SUFFERING AND GOD'S LOVE. POVERTY AND PROGRESS. THE THEOLOGY OF POLITICS. BENEDICT XV. THE VATICAN AND WAR IN EUROPE. JAPAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS. BERLIN DIARY (THE JOURNAL OF A FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT). SCUM OF THE EARTH. SECOND WIND. BETWEEN THE ACTS. AT ODD MOMENTS. THE DRY SALVAGES. POEMS OF A DECADE. THE DICKENS WORLD. I TOO HAVE LIVED IN ARCADIA: A RECORD OF LOVE AND CHILDHOOD. TUDOR CORNWALL—PORTRAIT OF A SOCIETY. HISTORY OF THE SCHOOLMEN. THE HERESY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS. FIVE CENTURIES OF POLISH LEARNING.

CONTENTS

APRIL, MAY, JUNE,

1942

	PAGE
The Papacy and the New Order	
By Christopher Dawson	109
The Natural Law and Human Rights	
By Jacques Maritain	116
The History and Significance of the Conception of Natural Law	
By A. J. Carlyle	124
Dynamism True and False	
By E. I. Watkin	130
Constantin Frantz, Champion of the "Other Germany"	
By Nicolas Sollohub	141
Authority and Democracy	
By Luigi Sturzo	151
Dante and the New Style	
By Walter Shewring	164
Old English: A Revaluation	
By W. J. Blyton	175

Some Recent Books — — — — — 183

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION. VOL. I. HUMAN NATURE. LA GUERRE, CETTE REVOLUTION. THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. THE HIGH CHURCH TRADITION: A STUDY IN THE LITURGICAL THOUGHT OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND: EDWARD VI. THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF SAINT BERNARD. ESSAYS IN CRITICISM AND RESEARCH. MICHAEL DRAYTON AND HIS CIRCLE. THE STARLIT DOME. THE POEMS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON. A CHOICE OF KIPLING'S VERSE. STREET SONGS. SEVEN TEMPEST. LOST FIELDS. TALKING AT RANDOM.

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FREEDOM AND VOCATION

THE new crisis which has threatened the existence of the English-speaking world in the last weeks forces us once more to face the question: Is it any longer possible for a free society to survive in the modern world? For it is becoming tragically clear that all the safeguards for individual and social freedom that the Western peoples have built up so laboriously during the last three centuries are, judged at least on a short view, handicaps in the struggle for national existence, just as courtesy and kindness and altruism are handicaps to a man's success in a society of man-eating tigers.

While the democracies debate and negotiate, the dictatorships strike and kill. We are therefore obliged to make a tremendous effort of disciplined organization, which inevitably runs counter in many ways to the traditions and habits of a free and peace-loving society. If we do this in an external superficial way we run the risk of causing an internal conflict between our military policy and the deeper traditions of our society which will divide and weaken our effort. Hence the task of mobilizing our spiritual resources and reconciling our social conscience with the new obligations that are imposed on us by total war is no less important than our military and economic effort. In a sense it is more important, for the immense sacrifices that are called for can only be made if the whole people is convinced with its whole heart and its whole mind that the effort is worth the cost, unless they know what they are fighting for and are convinced of the supreme value of the issues that are at stake.

The important thing to realize is that we are not fighting for any partial end or any party ideology, but in order to preserve the values of our entire social and spiritual tradition against forces that threaten to destroy it. From this point of view the use of the term Democracy as the definition of our cause is not completely satisfactory. For democracy has a restricted political significance which by no means covers the whole field of values that has to be defended, and the confusion of democracy as a general term for our tradition of social freedom, and its more limited but more accurate political meaning, is apt to produce misunderstanding and disagreement.

For the cause that we are defending is far more fundamental

than any form of government or any political creed. It is bound up with the whole tradition of Western and Christian culture—the tradition of social freedom and citizenship on the one hand, and that of spiritual freedom and the infinite value of the individual human person on the other. No doubt democracy as an ideal does stand for those things and is the outcome of this tradition. But in practice modern democratic culture often represents only a debased and secularized version of this ideal and in many respects, as de Tocqueville saw more than a century ago, it prepares the way for the coming of the new mass order which achieves political form in the totalitarian State. What we are defending, in short, is not democracy but humanity. The basis of our unity—the common ground on which we are all agreed—is not a matter of political opinions, it is our resistance to a system which we feel to be inhuman and opposed to everything that Christian men hold dear. We can no longer, alas! say “civilized men”, for we are faced with the grim fact to which the Liberal optimism of the last century shut its eyes—the fact that a society can become inhuman while preserving all the technical and material advantages of an advanced scientific civilization.

And in order to meet this inhuman thing we have got to adapt our life to total war and to the inhuman conditions that this involves. But how can this be done without sacrificing the very things for which the sacrifice is made? In other words, is it possible to save our lives without losing our souls? At first sight it seems easy to answer these questions in the affirmative, for this country has already gone through the experience of modern warfare and endured for four years the long-drawn-out agony of Flanders and the Somme without undergoing any revolutionary transformation or losing its traditional values of humanity and fair play and personal freedom. But today the question is posed in a much more fundamental form. The loss of the peace, the failure of political democracy in post-war Europe, the rise of the totalitarian States and their successful development and the new techniques of power—all point to the insufficiency of a purely defensive policy and the necessity of a fundamental re-orientation of our society and culture to meet the challenge of the new conditions of an age of scientifically organized mass power. The survival of free society is only possible if it can become as fully organized and as scientifically planned as the despotic mass order of the totalitarian States. And thus in the midst of the turmoil of war and the immediate pressure of an intensive concentration of national effort, we are forced at the same time to face the fundamental long-range issue

of how it is possible to plan a modern mass society without destroying social freedom and the values which Christian and Western culture has hitherto accepted as the foundation of human life.

In the first place we must recognize that it is not enough to secure religious freedom in the technical sense of the right to hold religious beliefs and to practise some kind of religious worship, for it is easy for a planned society to incorporate the least vital elements of organized Christianity at its lowest level of spiritual vitality while at the same time destroying the roots of personality without which both religion and social freedom wither and die. The totalitarian solution is to safeguard physical vitality and to sacrifice spiritual freedom. The democratic compromise is to preserve individual freedom on the superficial level of political and economic life, while disregarding both the physical and the spiritual roots.

The most important thing, therefore, is to ensure the minimum conditions that are essential for the preservation of spiritual liberty—one might even say for the survival of the human soul; for without this neither Christian values nor the traditional values of "Western" or democratic society can be preserved.

The great danger here is that the development of the new techniques of social control (or rather perhaps the new awareness of them) has outstripped the moral and religious development of modern culture. The negative and regressive effect of this tendency on culture has been clearly stated by Karl Mannheim in *Man and Society*, but he writes from the standpoint of the planner or ruler, whereas the religious problem is best seen from the opposite standpoint—that of the subject.

If freedom is to be preserved it is necessary also to give the individual some freedom of association and some choice of vocation. This is equally true of spiritual freedom. There must be freedom of communication or communion and freedom of vocation—especially of contemplative vocation. How are these freedoms related to one another?

In the past personal freedom has always been grounded on private property. The citizen was a man of property, and consequently the franchise was restricted to those who were either freeholders or men who possessed some kind of a material status in society and some social stability. The right of property brought with it the right of freedom in the choice of an occupation. But although this right was personal it was not completely individualistic. It was bound up with the existence of a small primary group—the family—which had its possessions in common under the rule of the father—a minute communist

monarchy. Thus the base of the social edifice was constituted by the family as the primary social and economic unity. Beneath and upholding politics—the Law of the city—there was economics—the Law of the household.

It was in such a social environment that the spiritual freedom of the past existed. In contrast to social and political freedom it was, however, always regarded as independent of economic relations. In fact spiritual freedom was often conceived as freedom from the bonds of property so that the vow of poverty was the normal fulfilment of the spiritual vocation. Yet political and spiritual freedom were never regarded as mutually exclusive. Indeed, the latter in a sense presupposes the right of property, apart from which it loses its moral value and significance.

The fundamental and revolutionary change in modern society has been the destruction of the old personal and individual conception of property by the coming of the new order of industrial capitalism and socialism which has mechanized and depersonalized the economic basis of social life. The economic unit has grown larger and larger and has become increasingly assimilated to the organized public services which have always existed (e.g. army, civil service, government workshops and engineering departments), but which in the past were exceptional and sharply contrasted with the sphere of private economic activity.

Property is increasingly separated from work and becomes above all the right to receive income from large-scale enterprises that are administered by salaried professionals.

In such a society it is clear that there is far less room for personal choice than under the earlier system. In the days of mercenary armies a man was free to take service in the Austrian or the Hanoverian or the Swedish forces and he was free to choose also the form of service and the regiment he preferred. Under universal conscription, on the other hand, he became a number in a register, a piece of raw material which is measured and classified before it is put into the machine.

And the same is true of men's work, in the socialist and totalitarian State. The individual is drafted into his place in the economic machine when he leaves school. The more perfectly the system is planned, the more completely will the individual be conditioned and adapted to perform his economic function. But while there is no room for individual freedom which would interfere with the working of the machine, it is equally undesirable that there should be a sense of restraint which would generate resistance or inefficiency. It will therefore be the pur-

pose of society to condition the individual for total service to the community, and in fact the totalitarian systems have gone a long way to achieving this aim.

Nevertheless this solution is so opposed to the whole tradition of Western and Christian culture that it is almost inconceivable that it can be accepted by our civilization. In fact, we may well ask whether the present crisis from which the world is suffering is not due to instinctive reaction of Western society against a system which is destructive of its innermost being and the roots of its spiritual vitality. And the reason this is not more obvious is because the disease has gone so far. Already in the nineteenth century the capitalist order admitted the triumph of economic man and the subordination of the spiritual elements in Western culture to material ends, so that it was no longer morally in a position to withstand the attack of the totalitarian revolution. Marx was perfectly right when he claimed that the capitalist bourgeoisie was cutting the ground from under its feet and producing its own grave-diggers. Where he went wrong was in his prophecy of the inevitable victory of the proletariat. The same grave was destined to receive them both, and the victorious power was not the brotherhood of free workers, but the impersonal tyranny of the machine order, which is an order of destruction no less than of production—an order of production for destruction which finds its supreme expression in mechanized warfare and in total world war.

The monstrous nature of this development renders it intolerable to every sane mind. Everybody agrees in principle that the machine order must be humanized if civilization is to survive. It is not enough to socialize it—to equalize its pressure on the classes and individual members of the community, for that simply means equality in slavery. It is necessary to recognize the dangers of dehumanization that are inherent in a mechanized order and to take deliberate measures to protect human nature from the impersonal forces that tend to overwhelm it. In other words, civilization must be replanned from the opposite end to that from which the capitalist and communist and totalitarian organization has proceeded. The elements in society that have hitherto been left to take care of themselves must become the elements most carefully protected and most highly valued.

What are these elements? First, freedom of association, the principle which has always distinguished the free citizen community of classical antiquity and modern Europe from the servile state in which the individual is regarded merely as subject.

Secondly, freedom of vocation which is the condition of

personal responsibility. This freedom is not the same as the competitive freedom of economic man, which usurped its place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—the freedom of trade and industry and the right of the individual to direct his activities to his private profit. On the contrary, vocation and profit are opposite motives, since the former involves a certain disinterestedness which subordinates the profit motive to a non-economic end. In the case of a religious vocation, this is so obvious that it is unnecessary to labour the point. And it is also clear in the case of the professions, which fulfil a recognized social function and possess a tradition of disinterested service.

The most famous example of this is the medical profession, which from the beginning has been inspired by the high ideal of disinterested service that finds classical expression in the formula of the Hippocratic oath. But a similar sense of vocation and professional honour has existed in the past to a greater or less degree among scientists and soldiers, scholars and lawyers, craftsmen and shepherds. It was the great evil of capitalist culture to weaken or destroy this spirit and to substitute the profit motive and the power of money as the supreme standards of social life. And now that the profit motive is being ousted by the ideal of technical efficiency and the power of money is being dethroned by the power of the State, the need for a restoration of the ethics of vocation has become the central problem of society. If Mammon is to be dethroned, in order that Moloch be set in his place, the new order will be more inhuman and more anti-Christian than the old. And this is what, in fact, we see in the totalitarian State.

The revolutionaries have not ignored the importance of the two social elements of which I write. Communism has founded itself upon the ideal of comradeship which is the principle of association. Fascism has founded itself on the ideal of leadership which is that of vocation. But both alike have denied freedom, and therefore the cult of leadership becomes a demonic worship of power and the cult of comradeship becomes an excuse for the subjection of the individual to the ruthless dictatorship of a party.

Our society still preserves a strong tradition of social and political freedom, and it is this, rather than equality or the divine right of majorities, which is the essence of what we call democracy. But we, no less than the totalitarian States, are undergoing the process of social and economic change from the unregulated freedom of nineteenth-century capitalism to the mechanized order of a planned society. Hitherto we have escaped the bitterness of class conflict and the revolutionary

violence that have accompanied the process elsewhere. It has been carried out by the gradual and constitutional extension of bureaucratic control in every field of social activity, and so long as the system is not shattered by the external catastrophe of military defeat there seems no reason why the process should not continue until our society is as completely planned as any totalitarian State.

Can freedom survive such a process? There is obviously a danger that bureaucratic planning may destroy freedom no less completely than totalitarian dictatorship. Nevertheless it is not necessary and inevitable, since the system is not in itself irreconcilable with the principle of freedom of vocation. Indeed, the civil servant is better fitted than the business man or the politician to represent the principle of disinterested service and professional honour in modern society as against the capitalist motive of profit and the dictatorial will to power. In the past, it is true, it has been the negative elements in bureaucracy that have been most evident with the result that it has become associated in the popular mind with red tape and formalism, with the avoidance of personal responsibility and the love of routine. But this was largely due to the cramped and narrowing conditions of the age of individualism when the public service was restricted by the Whig tradition of aristocratic privilege on the one hand and by the Liberal prejudice against State interference on the other.

There has been such an immense experience in the functions and power of bureaucracy that it is as far removed from what it was a century ago as the official hierarchy of the age of Diocletian was from the civil service of the early empire. Nevertheless, our society has not yet assimilated the change, and public opinion is still influenced by habits of thought which belonged to traditions that have long ceased to exist. The public servant has not yet fully realized the extent of his responsibility. It is not enough to be a competent and hard-working specialist. Nothing could be higher in that respect than the standard of the German bureaucracy. Yet for that very reason it was the obedient servant of whatever power happened by whatever means to gain control of the State.

The immense growth in the power of the administration which is characteristic of every modern State must be accompanied by a corresponding growth in the sense of personal responsibility on the part of the administrators, otherwise it will become an impersonal rule of slaves over slaves: the tyranny of the slaves of the bureau over the slaves of the machine. In other words, the public servant must himself be a freeman and

a citizen if he is to administer a free society. As we have seen, it is the tendency of the new order to treat both economic organization and politics as forms of public service, so that the civil service becomes the standard and pattern of the whole social structure. Consequently, if the principle of freedom of vocation is preserved at this point, it will secure spiritual freedom at the key point, whereas if it is lost here the whole of society will become mechanized and lifeless.

It is true that this is not the only principle at stake, since freedom of vocation without freedom of association is impossible or meaningless. But we still possess a large measure of freedom of this latter kind, even though it is increasingly restricted by the mechanization of economic life. We have not yet lost the sense of citizenship, and there are still wide tracts of social life in which the principle of free association can find expression: e.g. in the spontaneous creation of new groups and organizations to meet new social needs, as we have seen during the last year in our bombed cities.

This, however, only gives us the raw material of a free society. Left to itself, the principle of association may expend itself in an anarchic proliferation of rival and overlapping groups, or it may degenerate into an exploitation of group selfishness in which comradeship becomes an excuse for graft and corruption. It is only when it is informed by the spirit of vocation and individual responsibility that freedom of association becomes capable of serving the higher order of culture and creating the conditions under which man's freedom is spiritually fruitful, so that instead of a dead bureaucracy controlling a formless mass activity we have the organic form of a living community. In the capitalist age the profit motive was so overemphasized that society tended to become a soulless and heartless organization which was no more capable of evoking men's love and loyalty than a joint stock company. In the totalitarian State the power motive is so overemphasized that it swallows up everything else and destroys not only freedom but the elementary decencies of life. Both alike make for exploitation—the exploitation of the weak by the strong and the many by the few—whether the strong are represented by the holders of economic power, as in capitalist society, or by the holders of political power—the party bosses and the State police in the totalitarian system.

It is only by strengthening the element of vocation both in the State and in society generally that these evils can be avoided. It was the strength of the English political system in the past that in spite of its spirit of class privilege it did regard politics

as a form of public service and not as an opportunity to share out the spoils of power—that this attitude set the tone to the public services and the professions so that a high standard of personal integrity and responsibility was taken for granted. It is remarkable that when in the first half of the nineteenth century a great French writer set out to portray the principle of duty and disinterested service against the motive of power and ambition and military glory he chose an English admiral who was his country's enemy as the embodiment of his ideal.*

It is clear that if England is to adapt herself to the discipline of a planned society, it is this element, above all others, in the national tradition which provides the necessary moral dynamic. Our national temperament is naturally rebellious to the Prussian spirit of drilled obedience and methodical organization from above and still more to the mass mysticism which makes it easy for the Slav to abandon himself in ecstatic self-surrender to an impersonal collective power. But, on the other hand, it is easier for the English to accept the idea of social duty and disinterested service with a sense of personal responsibility. If this spirit can be applied to the new conditions of mass society it is conceivable that a planned society might be created without the destruction of freedom either by impersonal bureaucracy or by inhuman tyranny. But the task to be achieved is so great that it cannot be accomplished by political and social means alone. It involves the action of deeper spiritual forces which belong to the religious sphere. If our civilization is so completely secularized that the intervention of these forces is impossible, then, I believe, there is no hope of preserving freedom and the new order will be increasingly impersonal and inhuman. But if Christianity is still a living power in the world it must still form the ultimate basis of the restoration of human freedom and personal responsibility.

The capitalist order, which is based on the power of money and the motive of profit, was profoundly alien from Christian values and was the main cause of the secularization of our culture. The totalitarian order, which is based on the cult of power, marks a reversion to pre-Christian standards and finds its appropriate religious experience in some form of neo-paganism. But an order founded on the principle of vocation has a natural affinity with Christian ideals. In fact, it is in the Christian idea of spiritual vocation that the conception of social vocation finds its archetype and pattern. We see this affinity from the beginning in the relations between the Christian apostles and the

* I.e. the idealized portrait of Admiral Collingwood in Alfred de Vigny's *Servitude et Grandeur Militaires*.

representatives of the Roman order, so that Peter and Paul, the chosen of the Lord, seem to have felt for Cornelius the Centurion and Festus the Governor a kind of instinctive understanding which they did not feel either for the Jewish priests or the Greek philosophers. They saw them as men who were doing disinterested service in their own calling and therefore ministers of God even as they themselves, though on a lower plane of action.

It is in the religious sphere that the principle of freedom and vocation finds its fullest and most perfect development, as we see in the wonderful chapters of St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, in which he compares the difference of spiritual gifts and operations in the Church with the functions of the natural organism.*

Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all. And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit. To one, indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom: and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: To another, faith in the same Spirit: to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit: to another, the working of miracles: to another, prophecy: to another, the discerning of spirits: to another, diverse kinds of tongues: to another, interpretation of speeches. But all these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. For as the body is one and hath many members; and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body: so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether bond or free: and in one Spirit we have all been made to drink. For the body also is not one member, but many. If the foot should say: Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body: Is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear should say: Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body: Is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole body were the hearing, where would be the smelling? But now God hath set the members, every one of them, in the body as it hath pleased him. And if they all were one member, where would be the body? But now there are many members indeed, yet one body. And the eye cannot say to the hand: I need not thy help. Nor again the head to the feet: I have no need of you. Yea, much more those that seem to be the more feeble members of the body are more necessary. And such as we think to be the less honourable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honour: and those that are our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. But our comely parts have no need; but God hath tempered the body together, giving to that which wanted the more abundant honour. That there might be no schism in the body; but the members might be mutually careful one for another. And if one member suffer any thing, all the members suffer with it: or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it. Now you are the body of Christ and members of one another.

* 1 Cor. xii, 4-27 inc.

And St. Paul then goes on to show that beyond all the spiritual gifts, transcending and fulfilling them, there is the one universal and indispensable way of charity, the heart of the spiritual organism without which the highest and the most powerful spiritual gifts become worthless and lifeless.

Now the same conception of the organic life of the community and the same principles of order and vocation and functional differentiation were applied to the State and the social order by Christian thinkers, and became the basis of Christian social ethics in the Middle Ages, so that St. Thomas sees society as a cosmos of vocations in which every particular social and economic function finds its place in the universal order of ends. And this conception permeated Western culture so deeply that it was not entirely destroyed either by the Reformation or the individualism of the capitalist age, but retained its vitality until it was finally reasserted in the social encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.

It is true that the relevance of this conception has been to some extent obscured by the fact that it was first developed against the social background of feudalism with a patriarchal tradition of authority, so that it is always apt to be given a conservative and undemocratic bias. We have seen in our own days how the principles of organism and function have been exploited in the interests of Fascism and Nazism, though there can in reality be no reconciliation between the inhuman mechanism of the totalitarian State and the principle of freedom of vocation. For just as spiritual vocation in the religious sense presupposes the freedom of the Spirit and the bond of charity, so the principle of vocation in the temporal sphere demands personal freedom and the right of free association, without which the order of the State and the economic order, however highly organized they may be, become orders of slavery.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

JAPAN AND THE WORSHIP OF EMPERORS

CONFRONTED with the official beliefs of Japan, an Englishman tends to feel merely that the Japanese must be unique and unpredictable; even more than the citizens of republics do, he regards Emperor-worship with blank surprise or partial incredulity. Now that the official beliefs of Germany have been thrust firmly upon our attention, we are perhaps more ready to admit that the nations really do hold peculiar opinions sometimes, and that the Japanese are conceivable. It would be valuable to go further and get the beliefs of Japan into some perspective; to make some estimate of how fully they are likely to be acted upon, and whether they are likely to change, say, in the next ten years. This essay tries to show that, though there are seriously alarming features about the present Emperor-worship of Japan, the cult will probably have to be maintained and need not necessarily be harmful.

The present military imperialism of Japan seems to many Japanese a thing that was pushed on to them by world events, but this does not make them feel that Japan is in the wrong about China or Manchuria. It is the familiar German set-up with an extra factor. The divinity of the Emperor symbolizes a claim that the Japanese people and their traditions are greatly superior to those of other nations. This seems to most Japanese eminently just, and the view that they are now making holy sacrifices for their civilizing mission in Asia follows naturally. The kind of belief that an educated Japanese gives to the Imperial cult is of course largely a matter of finding that it suits the feelings which he has formed on other grounds. He, in fact, treats the dogmas as symbolic, but he need not tell himself so, and indeed had better not, since he dare not treat them so in public. Meanwhile, the feelings are intelligible enough. When I was teaching in Japan, my colleagues, in their expansive moments, would say politely that they liked the English because the English still had a certain traditional grimness; they were not so much corrupted as the rest of the modern world by the greed for pleasure and excitement. For that matter, Chinese colleagues under Japanese bombs would say just the same. The sort of thing that had shocked these traditionalist people, and which they were determined to keep out of their country if they could, was summed up in the Hollywood film. Of course such puritanism has nothing to do with the Christian ideas about sexual abstinence, though sex comes into it somehow; what was wrong with the film was its false ideals. Good Japanese observers tended to believe, as German ones did, that the Americans must be so

degenerate that one needn't worry about them. The divinity of the Emperor seemed Japan's best safeguard against contamination. Thus the abdication of King Edward did a good deal to remove the English from their pedestal in Japan. One might think that, as the claims of the Emperor are obviously unique, his worshippers would be offended at the spectacle of another Emperor on another island who could be supposed to have similar claims. So far from that, they regarded it as a real ground for friendship. Or they might have regarded a peaceful abdication as close to their own Imperial tradition. Actually they thought it a blow at the Imperial principle everywhere, and one implying that the English had become gravely Americanized. Japan was left to carry on her civilizing mission alone. It is the fact, though of course there were other forces at work, that she signed the Tripartite Pact in the following year. Thus one part of the complex is a general royalist position, not merely a theory of the uniqueness of Japan.

It is a striking fact that the Emperors of China, who within living memory seemed an immutable fact of Chinese politics and psychology, are now as dead as mutton.

The one thing that the Chinese could not be was insular. When they said that the Emperor was the ruler of all under heaven, that was really what he was meant to be, and for a long time he had as good reason as the Caesars to believe he was being it. It was hardly till the present century that the claim came to seem patently disproportionate, and then it was one reason why the Emperors "lost their mandate". The Japanese, to do them justice, have always known in their hearts that Japan is pleasanter to rule than the world; and that Japan is ruled through the one Imperial family.

The earliest expositions of the Shinto position, the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, date from the eighth century, and the descent of the Emperors from the Sun Goddess is there firmly laid down. We are told that the books were compiled from spoken tradition, probably ballads and suchlike, not from the written records which already existed for more practical matters. It appears that in A.D. 420 the Japanese Emperor asked for, and was allowed by the Emperor of China, the subordinate position of Governor-General of Japan. In A.D. 607 Prince Shotoku sent an embassy to China, and after a difficulty on the point opened his second letter 'From the Heavenly Ruler of the East to the Emperor of the West', perhaps inventing for this neat distinction the term subsequently used. It is hard to see just how much was involved in the claim to divine descent and personal divinity. It might have been felt to be a sort of metaphor; a splendid politeness

only. George II of England was still divine enough to be worth touching for the scrofula, and would say, "God give you better health, and more sense." We are told that the Emperor Meiko (71-130) admiring his son Yamatodake, said, "In outward form thou art our child, but in reality thou art a god." This does not imply that his son was a god *ex officio*. It is cheerfully recorded that the Emperor Yuriaku (457-479, a rather wicked Emperor) expected obedience from the Thunder God, but speedily had cause to repent his audacity. The ceremonies at the tombs for dead Emperors were very similar to those at the tombs of undeified ancestors, and in the tenth century the care of the tombs still did not belong to the Department of Shinto. Nor was the mere fact of divine ancestry unique. The Shojiroku, a Japanese *Debrett* dating from A.D. 715, traces the descent of many noble families to deities of the Shinto Pantheon. Finally, the word Kami, which was actually used for such a god, was much open to interpretation. In the important revival of Shinto during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which paved the way for the restoration of the Emperor, it was in fact much discussed. Motoori (1730-1801) said that when seas and mountains are called Kami "it is not their spirits which are meant. The word was applied directly to the mountains or seas themselves as being very awful beings." His disciple Hirata (1776-1843) seems to have gone to the opposite extreme, saying at one point "what we call Kami are all men". In short, the degree of divinity claimed for Japanese Emperors was not in itself a very startling thing.

What is more to the point is that the Imperial House had no family name. Here only it was unique. The implication was that all other great houses were cadet branches, even though to trace the division might involve going back to the peculiar methods of procreation employed by divinities. In this way the duty of loyalty to the Emperor invokes the more spontaneous duty of loyalty to the family, and though there is some doubt about the date of the claim, it is certainly an important one in the Japanese scene of today. One may doubt how lesser breeds, captured in war or what not, can be brought under its scope. Having been given clan-names as by the Emperor, they are held to be engrafted into the stock. But practice of adoption in Japan was till recently a genuine biological plan; in the ordinary way, a man could only adopt a near relative from within his clan, and only if he had failed to produce an heir. It would be difficult to say that the Formosans, for example, had been adopted into the family of the Emperor, and thus owed him loyalty. After the opening of the country, when the feeling of separate-

ness from other nations became more prominent if not stronger, the idea that the Imperial Ancestor is the ancestor of the whole nation came to be taken more seriously. The Empire was one great family; whether or not the rest of mankind were descended from monkeys, all the Japanese were descended from the Sun Goddess. But even this doctrine need not be an exclusive one. The Department of Education explained in 1938: "It is the ideal of the Japanese people that the whole world is one family. . . . This ideal was transmitted by the first Emperor, and the China affair is providential in giving an opportunity for all to function patriotically in their rightful places." It will be seen that a sentence which must strike the outsider as an entirely harmless and indeed enlightened piece of uplift has a startling meaning in its own context. The Chinese, and the Europeans, are not excluded from the ideal family, but their only way to join it is by submitting to the Imperial rule. This development is not entirely a novelty. Naturally the early texts tend to speak of all the earth when they mean all the Japanese islands, the only land in question, and a doctrine tends to grow like a snowball when interpreted by better informed commentators. But the Japanese "New Order in East Asia" is the elaboration of a doctrine held especially by the Satsuma and Choshu clans who brought about the Imperial Restoration in 1868. The doctrine of Kodo, the Kingly Way, much supported by General Araki, is that Japan has a world mission to lead the world to peace, and peacefully to furnish each nation with her proper place. The alarming claim made for the Japanese Emperor is not that he is a god. It is that he is the rightful head of the whole human family.

One might reasonably say that such a doctrine is intolerable, and that foreign diplomats ought not to give it formal respect. People with such a creed are by their own admission a permanent danger to their neighbours, no less than assassins or thugs. And we ought to have learned from the Germans by this time that it is no use adopting a mild, patient air, and supposing that such persons do not really mean what they say. These I think are important points. It is agreed that the doctrines of many Japanese and German militarists are a danger to the world. The question here is whether Japanese Emperor-worship can reasonably be expected to purge itself of those doctrines. It seems to me that the very extravagance of the Japanese claims, which were made because they wanted a career of conquest, and wanted a theory to justify it, proves that they found it hard to make any interpretation fit on to their own system. The extreme separatism of the Japanese, their feeling of racial unique-

ness, may be a bad thing. The notion of a family relationship between all Japanese and their Emperor may spoil their relations with foreigners. But these notions do not really make them in the least inclined to become missionaries of Shinto among lesser breeds. If the new Shinto ever really happened it would become as separate from the present one as Buddhism from Hinduism, or Christianity from Judaism; and it shows no sign of happening. So long as they worship the Emperor the Japanese will feel themselves a Peculiar People, but they will feel that for a long time anyway. No doubt it is an unfortunate thing. But such a cult does not impose any duty of conquest; indeed, nothing less than world conquest, if we take it as a coherent doctrine, is even attractive to it. The Japanese cannot make themselves believe in Pan-Asia. There are only two theories open to a Peculiar People about their Emperor, because they only put mankind into two groups. Either he is head of everybody, or he is merely head of them. No doubt Japan may want new colonies all the same, but that is not a question of theology. It would not be at all difficult for the Japanese leaders, if they wanted to turn over a new leaf, to have it made quite clear both at home and abroad that the Emperor was simply the divine head of the Japanese people.

It is difficult to decide, in the rapid changes of European history, whether the Japanese had bad luck in opening the country just when they did. We can only be sure that the accidents of the date were very important. When the country "opens" to outside influence, as it has done more than once, and may have to do again, it makes up its mind with great speed and an alarming finality. It is sometimes said that the Japanese would be better airmen if they sat on chairs, because you get a sense of balance in the air from the seat. The reason they don't sit on chairs is that they opened the country to China in the Middle T'ang period. What they took then they have kept: the kimono, the little separate food tables, the rice wine of the period (now only found in Szechuan because of a transplanting of population), the only surviving Middle T'ang music. The chair only became fashionable in China in Late T'ang, so it was touch and go whether the Japanese got it, but they were no longer open to influence in Late T'ang. They were open to Europe in 1870, and they got Herbert Spencer, the use of gold in dentistry, and the absolute nadir of European architecture. It so happened that the Higher Criticism was already strong in Germany, and the influence of Germany, then a very progressive nation, as Matthew Arnold well knew, has remained important to Japan. The Committee sent out to report on the religions of the world decided that Japan had better keep the religion she had already.

If she had opened as much as twenty years earlier she would almost certainly have got Christianity.

This would no doubt have given a convenient base for a later whittling away of the Imperial claims. It would probably not have prevented the growth of Japanese Imperialism during the last twenty years, which had other causes than the religious one. And it would almost certainly have meant a harsh suppression of the country pagan cults. It is difficult to feel that the country Shinto really ought to be suppressed. I have walked up a mountain all night with the local rice-farmers and waited for the sun at the top, and seen them react as they chose (bowing or throwing their hats in the air) to the great spectacle when it came; and it is difficult to see what fair ground of resentment Wordsworth would have had if the farmers of Westmorland, in his day, had still sometimes themselves viewed the tops of their mountains. And it is better for farmers, and indeed for farming (you have got to make your own amusements if you are to live contented in the country), to dance on a stated day before the local god rather than not dance at all. It is not an offensive dilettantism to say that the working farmer ought to be allowed to cheer himself up. And it is certainly a practical consideration that the Emperor-worship does not stand alone, as a wild nationalist claim which might be apparently discredited; it is strongly connected in the popular mind, though not in law, with a variety of sturdy customs and superstitions; and these are no more likely to be discredited by a defeat than Puck or Cupid.

The relations of Christian missions with the Japanese Government give a clear and rather shocking picture of the vast claims made for the Emperor-worship and the confusion or evasiveness in which they are wrapped. The restored Imperial Government made an early proclamation of religious liberty, and encouraged the entry of missionaries as teachers. It was not proclaimed till 1890 that there are two kinds of Shinto—State and Religious. Religious Shinto, of course, includes the country practices just described. State Shinto, the Emperor-worship itself, was not a religion at all, merely a recognition of patriotism. In 1899 it was ordered that religious instruction and the holding of religious services in schools, even outside the curriculum, was prohibited; this was not applied strictly, but could be invoked at need; and meanwhile could not possibly apply to State Shinto. The Catholic missions, and they only, were still agitating on this question in 1932, and the decision of Rome in favour of the Japanese Government reads as an entirely sensible argument. If the ceremonies are officially described as patriotic and not religious, and if the teacher is freely allowed to explain

this point to his pupils, there seems little more to demand. The trouble is that the pupils take very little interest in an explanation which is irrelevant to their ideas, since they see no reason why one religion need exclude another. The document which ordered the great persecution of Christianity in the sixteenth century classes it with two sects of Buddhism which had also come under suspicion of political activity; there is no reason to suppose that Christianity was ever viewed by its persecutors in Japan as anything but a Buddhist sect. About the end of the 'twenties the big Japanese department stores tried to take up Christmas as a further time for buying presents, and one of them, with a sincere desire to please foreign visitors, erected an enormous and fully appointed Christmas tree; at its summit, in the floodlights, stood a Teddy bear, crucified. It is only fair to realize that in the Japanese attitude to their own religions this would be natural enough—indeed, rather a graceful fancy.

Again military instruction was required at accredited schools; if the instructor refused to come to the mission school, the boys would suffer all the penalties of being officially educated; and he would refuse to come unless the boys attended the Shinto Shrine with him, bowed at the proper times, and heard his lectures on the subject. The only thing that could be established in the pupils' minds was a massive confusion between the two sets of dogmas, probably with the Emperor well in the lead.

The Japanese newspapers were naturally pleased at the decision of Rome, explaining that it was an admission that Shinto was much greater than any religion, and therefore could not be classified as one. This is not simply the view of excited and uneducated writers, nor an ingenious quip to score off the recalcitrant Christians. Dr. Kakehi, of the Law Department of the Tokyo Imperial University, had already written: "Shinto is the basis of all religion. It is the religion of religions. . . . The centre of this phenomenal world is the Imperial Country (Japan); from this centre we must expand this great spirit throughout the world." Dr. Kato Genchi, Associate Professor of the same leading university in charge of the Chair of Shinto, in effect challenged the official legal view, writing: "The Emperor is incarnate deity, and occupies in Japanese faith the position which Jehovah occupied in Judaism. . . . We cannot pass over the fact that these ceremonials are accompanied by a faith in the divine and of a great spiritual power." It is useless to deny that Emperor-worship could be built up, and partly has been built up, into a doctrine intolerably menacing to the outside world. Furthermore, the Japanese tend to regard their language as a secret code, which foreigners are sure not to understand, so

that they can easily use an official explanation for the outside world while teaching a far more rousing doctrine to the young at home. But all this is a commonplace of ambitious nationalism; the Germans could do it under Hitler, without a divine Emperor, and the Japanese Emperor is not committed to the present policy as Hitler is to Nazism. What we have to consider is whether Japan under Emperor-worship could develop into a working element of a world at peace.

The boastfulness of some Japanese is no doubt very irritating, but before regarding it as inherent you have to consider the peculiar strain that Japan's recent history has imposed. As G. K. Chesterton said some time ago, "The only moral beauty to be found in modern Japan is that she has humbled herself in order to be exalted." When the country was first opened there was an attitude of extreme humility towards the West; it was seriously discussed in the newly established Diet whether English should not be made the language of all Japanese, and there was an Imperial order that all Japanese in country districts should bow before any European they saw. The early Japanese diplomats, who went to America in Japanese dress, appear to have been received everywhere with squeals of laughter. It is not surprising that Japan carried with her into her era of success a greater "inferiority complex" than, say, the Americans did. And the boundless claims of the Emperor were the best emollient possible for this obscure inhibiting pain; however crazy they looked to an outsider, they were a source of sanity. Such a medicine is dangerous because it is also a habit-forming drug, painful to give up, but after all the moderate drinker may claim to be a normal civilized man. The technical term "inferiority complex" is rather dangerous in political discussion, but I should say that a nation which feels it has solid achievements behind it can get rid of this complaint, retaining only a normal amount of boastfulness, in about fifty years.

If we had among our war aims the total abolition of nationalist sentiment, we would have to make the end of the Japanese Imperial line, perhaps also of our own, a condition of the peace. We are not committed to such a plan, and nationalist sentiment will certainly continue. What we will be faced with having to secure, by any means that we can devise, is the caging of nationalist sentiment, so that it is not liable to enter a militant, or lunatic, phase. This is hard; but the mere presence of a divine Emperor in Japan does not add very much to the difficulty.

What we want is perhaps less interesting here than what the Japanese are going to want. This raises a typical Vansittart problem, as it may now be called. The view of Lord Vansittart

about Germany is that the Germans as a whole are so deeply poisoned by nationalist ambition that they must be supposed to be likely to remain in that condition—not, as he has now explained, literally for ever, in which case the only hopeful plan would be direct extermination, but for a very long time, so that what we have to envisage is a process of curing and healing all Germans for at least several generations. The second version is not crazy, as the first one appeared to be, and the controversy is only one of proportion. The quick answer is that some Anglo-Saxons helped Hitler to power, and that he had to kill a great many Germans to get it; hence we cannot reasonably assume that all Germans and no Anglo-Saxons have the mental disease that we must cure. One generation, yes, in view of the wholesale and eerie training of the Hitler Youth. Three generations, no; that would be a counsel of despair. Now the problem of Japanese Emperor-worship is exactly parallel to that of the worship of the German Reich. If the Japanese mind is inherently chauvinistic it must appear curious that the suppression of "dangerous thought" within the Japanese State had to assume such portentous forms. An important weeding-out of "liberals" in schools and universities was started in 1928 under the notorious Tanaka, and was continued under the liberal Hamaguchi in 1929. It is well known that a good gardener weeds almost incessantly, and a supporter of the Vansittart thesis would no doubt regard a sturdy opposition within a hopelessly evil nation as abnormal. He could not in any case deny that there appeared to be still a hearty crop of liberals in schools and universities at the last big weeding-out in 1939. Rationality in Japan has had many brave and hopeless martyrs, and undoubtedly has many other adherents who should not be regarded as weak merely because they have kept themselves alive.

On the other hand, it would be a grave delusion to suppose that only the crazy people support the Emperor-worship. The more prominent martyrs were driven over by the crises of their situation into Communism and therefore republicanism; but even they remained liable to feel themselves Japanese; and the normal "liberal" from whom a better Japan could be made is certainly not opposed to Shinto. It is perhaps somewhat hard to fit Japan into any picture of a reasonable world after this war, because she has got herself into a very tight corner. But I think one must conceive either a wasteful and dangerous disorder in Japan for a very long time or a Japan liberal at the top, much less ungenerous and tormented than at present, but still totalitarian at the bottom, noisy about its exports of art and goods, and firmly attached to its Emperor.

To say what the tradition about the Emperor is, or is supposed to be, does not explain how strong a hold it has on various groups or what shrubbery of variant opinion may grow beneath it. The four rebellions against the Emperor Meiji (Saga 1874, Higo 1876, Satsuma 1877, Saitama 1884) do not suggest that universal passion of loyalty for the restored throne that one would now gather to be normal. One great attraction of Emperor-worship at present is that the Japanese are drawn together by a painful sense of isolation from the rest of the world; the worse they behave in international affairs, the more they feel this. It seems to them a practical truth, needing to be expressed by a striking symbol, that they are "all one family" or at least all in the same boat. The conversions of Communist leaders in jail in 1933 were a striking example of this. Manabu Sano and Sadachika Nabeyama were the most prominent converts; men whose courage and conviction and strength of intellectual background would seem above question. Of course they were facing torture, maltreatment of relatives, and the mental effects of prolonged questioning; but even if they had collapsed you would not expect them to collapse in that way. It was all very like the Moscow treason trials. Apparently General Araki visited them in jail and pointed out that Communism was an international theory, whereas they were Japanese. They repudiated their political beliefs, prompted by "their duty to the Japanese nation and the realization that they had lost popular support at the time of their public hearings". There is nothing about Emperors here; the point is the prior sentiment that a Japanese really cannot be internationalist; if he thinks he is he cannot realize what he is working for. Probably no other nation feels this so strongly. Furthermore, to a remarkable degree, there is no coherent party or group in Japan. No group becomes consolidated. Young officers assassinate generals as well as politicians; one cannot simply say that the politicians have lost power, and the "militarists" taken it. The "period of party government" ended chiefly because the politicians could not produce a widely supported programme, and no more can the soldiers. On most questions the alignment is hopelessly complex. The very machinery of decision on a Japanese committee is always liable to be held up by a grotesque problem of seniority. All this makes a man feel that his only real loyalty is to the nation, something different from any programme; the Emperor, presumably. The Emperor stands out because the country is fluid, not because it is rigid. One might compare it to a crab; what functions as the bone is all on the outside. For example, once the soldiers have acted it becomes an iron duty of prestige to back them up.

Now this plan gives you armour for most of the time, but makes you dangerously weak at crucial periods. A crab can only grow when it is moulting; and it is then not only defenceless but unsupported; if a crab is too big it flattens under its own weight. But the process of putting all the bones on the outside, in recent history, or failing to grow bones anywhere else, seems to have occurred, both at the opening of the country and, more recently, because of a common Japanese belief that Japan was alone against the world.

It is a mistake, I believe, to regard this development as somehow inevitable, still more as "what the Japanese really wanted". The Tanaka Memorial tends to be spoken of as if it were a public monument, perhaps owing to its curious English name, so that English writers assume that all Japanese know all about it and are plotting to carry it out. It was, of course, a secret document, apparently a genuine one, taking a very chauvinistic line, and when it was written most responsible Japanese would have disapproved of it. The fact that the chauvinists have got their own way for the last ten years, and had to murder some of Japan's finest thinkers and statesmen to do it, ought not to make us feel that Japan as a whole has been carrying out one imperialist plot for the last eighty years. I was living in Japan during the Manchurian Incident, and a wide variety of Japanese were undoubtedly shocked and embarrassed by it; they were appalled at the world rebuke of the League, until they found that no country was willing to act on it. A year or so later the striking thing was the genuine innocence of this or that figure who had been drawn into the racket, and was disillusioned when he found what was going on. No doubt the attack on Manchuria would not have happened anyway unless some important Japanese figures had decided that the League and Collective Security were bogus. But even after it had happened I believe that if the League (or the Americans) had acted firmly the insult to Imperial Japan could have been accepted thankfully as a snub to the soldiers. All that is long past; we have no time for unavailing regrets; but that the fact that Japan has got into a situation where the hysterical persistence in known evil seems to her the only possible way to retain her national life is probably the largest error committed in the disastrous gap of the last twenty years.

The real problem is what can possibly happen in Japan. She is in a tragically false position. She has had no experience, as other countries have had, of accepting defeat. The extraordinary pace of her modernisation, jerry-built as it was on a religion of loyalty which her educated classes cannot but feel to be grotesque, has produced immense neurotic strain. Economically she is

bleeding to death. And any natural leader who might produce a rational programme is in immediate danger of murder by ignorant chauvinists. The spectacle of Germany at war, though more alarming, is not half so eerie; the Germans will either win or lose, and they know roughly what is happening to them. It is not clear what can happen to Japan anyway, and there is a sort of bold innocence about the Japanese that is horrible to watch. After all her monstrosities one is somehow afraid of her being hurt. The crater of Miharayama is or was a fashionable place of suicide; the police eventually put up notices saying, "Don't die here. Your country needs you"; but a simple calculation has shown that there would be room in that crater for all the Japanese. One imagines the crack of Japan as like the eventual break-up of the moon as it is drawn back to the earth; vast pieces suddenly flying out; an immense jostling in the air; lava pouring out of the interior. You would certainly have gangs going round murdering all the known leaders of the nation. But in the course of this moult it is not likely that the Emperor would be killed.

It seems likely that if Japan has ever to admit defeat there are two things on the cards: an abdication of the Emperor and a serious return of the Emperor to power. He can very well maintain that he has been blasphemously overruled by false advisers, and that he or (if you like) his more intimate advisers are well known to have had a saner policy. The only real thing to look forward to, if we can get through the crises of the moment, is a very gradual period of healing, not only in Japan, but especially there. Some of the most powerful weapons of the doctor are in no way means of healing the patient; they are means of keeping the patient alive till he can heal himself. It seems possible that this is one of the functions of the Japanese Emperor. To be sure, if you want to get rid of him, a crisis is the only time when you can do it; but it is just during the crisis that you may find you need him too badly. Certainly it would be very difficult for any group in Japan, and even if possible it would be intolerably embarrassing, to prevent the Emperor from reading a speech. Once he has known to have spoken he could not be disobeyed without a scandal fatal to the regime. It is natural if you realise the inherent dangers of the boundless pretensions of modern Shinto, and at the same time find Japan as your enemy, to wish to drive straight at the root and think up jokes against the Emperor. But nobody wants more chaos in Japan, and it should be remembered that the Emperor may yet prove the only centre who could gradually heal this packet of insanity and open the great virtues of that people to a better world.

W. E.

ECONOMICS AND ETHICS

IS there an intrinsic connexion between political and economic Liberalism? That there was an historical connexion is obvious. The democrats of the early-nineteenth century were almost all devoted to the doctrine of *laissez-faire* in economics: they tended to assume that the State ought not to interfere in economic activity at all. There were, of course, historical reasons for such an attitude. The United States was the first great modern democratic experiment, and it represented a society naturally independent and self-sufficing whose men were more inclined to restrict than to enlarge the scope of government.

It has, however, often been thought that the connexion is more than historical; that Liberalism and Socialism are opposites, and that a case for the freedom of ethical activities must be a case for the freedom of economic activities.

This view depends, I believe, on a failure to understand the fundamental difference between ethical and economic activities. In brief, the point is this: Liberalism is essentially an instrumental view of the State. It denies that the State is an end in itself. It holds that its power and compulsion are of no value, save in so far as they exist to protect and foster the free moral activities of individuals. It holds that compulsory goodness is a contradiction in terms: that the State can only "hinder hindrances to the good life". But economic activities, as I shall argue, are themselves only instrumental, and to put them on a level with ethical activities as ends which the State should serve, is to make one instrument—the State—serve another—economics.

Let us consider then the peculiar nature of economic activities, but first we should notice one very remarkable fact about the history of theory on the subject. Hobbes' account of human nature proved incapable of explaining the facts of politics. If men really were as he describes them to be political society could not exist; but his analysis of human nature which failed in politics seems to have worked in economics. Hobbes' account of human nature was taken over, and not much changed, by Bentham. Bentham built on it an ethical theory which is indefensible, but Bentham's account of human nature was the basis of the economic theories of the classical economists. We do not hear quite so much of the economic man nowadays, but he is still largely taken for granted in economic theory. Why does an assumption about the nature of man fit economic facts, though it clearly will not fit ethical or political facts?

It fits in with this that economics is more of a science than

politics or ethics. The attempt to make ethics a science on the analogy of physics is a disastrous failure. The more ingenious Bentham is in his attempts to make it one the more ridiculous he becomes. Similar attempts on politics are about equally unfortunate. Economics are here again different. If Kant is right in saying that an inquiry is scientific so far as it is mathematical, economics has a fair claim to be called a science. It revels in statistics, mathematical formulae and curves. Like a "proper science" it produces "scientific laws", necessary rules of how things happen. It has in other words the ordinary deterministic assumptions of the physical sciences. There are difficulties, as we shall see, in the supposed necessity of economic laws, but this deterministic assumption is not so silly in economics as it is in politics and ethics. It looks as if there were something in it. We shall indeed see that there is.

There must be something special in the nature of economic activity which gives success there to assumptions and methods which do not work in the other social enquiries. What is it?

The explanation is sometimes said to be that economics is concerned with what we vaguely call natural wants, with the satisfaction of our physiological desires, with what is necessary to keep our bodies alive and active as distinguished from our "higher" wants or activities, aesthetic, moral or religious, with what we may roughly call the bread-and-butter side of life. The economic and the materialistic interpretation of history are supposed to be interchangeable expressions for the same thing. When Marxians expound the predominance of economic activities they often obviously want to emphasize—*pour épater les bourgeois*—that in their belief food and drink and sex are the only things men really care about or will fight for, and all other things, religion and morality and art included, are only frills. The notion that economics is concerned with material wants is an old one. Plato gave the name of gainloving to that part of the soul which contained, in his view, the bodily desires of food and drink and sex. For those, he said, are ordinarily such that the means of their satisfaction can be bought with money.

But a little reflection shows that this notion, that economics is concerned with a special kind of wants called material, will not do. Readers of Marx will remember how fond he is of the illustration of the man who exchanges a Bible for brandy. A Marxian would, of course, notice that and would shut his eyes to the fact that the other man was exchanging brandy for a Bible. So that particular economic transaction, being like all exchanges a mutual affair, was not confined to the satisfaction of one kind of want. Economics is concerned with the exchange of all kinds

of services. There are business activities which depend on men having "higher wants", high-class publishing houses for example. These activities are as much the concern of economics as the activities of provision merchants or distilleries. When the economist is occupied with currency problems in a war it is all one to him whether this country gets "dollars" by exporting Clarendon Press Bibles and learned books or Scotch whisky. "Higher" or "lower", "material" or "spiritual", these distinctions do not help us to define economic activities.

The Italian philosopher Croce makes an illuminating distinction between economic and ethical good, which is helpful in pointing a way through these difficulties. (Economic good is concerned, he says, with finite, ethical with infinite, ends.) This may sound an explanation of the obscure by the still more obscure. But his illustrations show that he is concerned with something like the distinction between efficiency and goodness. When we call a person efficient or capable we mean to praise his readiness in doing what he sets out to do whatever that may be. Efficiency is entirely concerned with the means to an end, not with the desirability or otherwise of the end. In all actions, Croce says, there is an economic side, an aspect of skill or cleverness or efficiency which can be considered apart.

The distinction between the economic and the moral aspect of action may perhaps be seen most clearly in games. It is a moral question whether we ought at a certain time to be playing lawn tennis. We ought perhaps to be working or doing acts of charity. But if we *are* playing lawn tennis, it is not a moral question as to whether both partners should or should not come up to the net. That is a question of technique or "economy"; whether in that way we are more likely to win the game. A moral question *might* be involved in the decision. Our partner might fancy himself at the net though really he would do better if kept at the back of the court, and we might think it better to indulge him even if it lessened the chances of winning. Even if we did that the technical answer would still be the same. (The two aspects, of course, affect one another. For the technical answer as to the best arrangement of the activities of individuals may affect their wills and what is called their morale; and vice versa.) In asking the technical or economic question we take the moral aspects of the situation for granted, and we may find that one answer to the technical question affects men's willingness in performing the activity as another answer does not. I remember hearing a railway guard describe the effect on morale of a reorganization of a railway. The changes meant that guards no longer had their own van, but were transferred from one van

to another. The problem of organization had been considered solely as a problem of the most efficient distribution of railway stock and personnel, as if men's willingness to work could be taken for granted and would not be affected by the way in which the question of organization was answered. Actually, he explained, it made a lot of difference if a guard kept his own van. He made it comfortable in his own way and took a pride in it. The fact that the management asked only the technical or "economic" question and ignored personal questions made the men feel that they were being treated as machines and not as human beings and reacted on their efficiency and so really was uneconomic. The injunction to treat human beings as ends and not only as means was being disregarded. The tendency of modern industrialism to treat human beings only as means and not as ends is one of the great sources of bitterness in industrial relations.

Nevertheless it remains true that economic questions are not moral questions. There may be different answers to an economic question which are morally indifferent. This is normally the case in a game. There has been in the last forty years a development in the tactics of Rugby football involving changes in the distribution of human activities directed towards a certain end. There used to be nine forwards and three three-quarters. Then there were four three-quarters, two halves at the scrum and eight forwards. Now there are four three-quarters and a stand-off half, a scrum half and eight forwards. The technical results are obvious. These changes may have a moral relevance. They may imply more unselfishness in co-operation, for all I know, but it is, to say the least, not obvious.

So much for the distinction between ethical and economic questions in the wide use of the term economic. In economic questions we are concerned with the means to our end, the end and any effects of economic answers on ends not being considered. The economist in the ordinary and narrow sense of the term considers how the distribution of human activities affects the satisfaction of human wants—the wants being taken for granted. It is not the concern of the economist whether men want what they ought to want. It is not even his business to ask whether the satisfaction men's wants will satisfy *them* or to say, "Wherefore do ye spend money for that which is not bread and your labour for that which satisfieth not?" Those things are the concern of the moralist. The economist is concerned with questions which are in themselves not immoral, but morally indifferent; and he is concerned with men in so far as they are occupied with such questions.

(In modern times the distinction between economic and moral questions has been greatly increased by the predominance of exchange or contract and most of the difficulties about the relation between economics and ethics come from the peculiar moral features of the relation of exchange. The relation *is* a peculiar one. In it A gives B what B wants in return for B giving A what A wants. Money makes the relation more complicated, but keeps it essentially the same. If A buys something from B, B gives A what A wants in return for money, i.e. power to induce C or D to give B what B wants. If we think of exchange as an exchange of services, A does what B wants in return for B doing what A wants. A does not do what he wants to do, but what B wants to be done, and vice versa. Moral responsibility has not disappeared. A is responsible for his wants, but B satisfies them and B is responsible for *his* wants, but A satisfies them. A is not responsible for B's wants nor B for A's; and therefore—in this curious relation not A but B decides what A should do: and not B but A decides what B should do. Exchange is a relation between men who have not a common purpose except that of serving each his own purposes more effectively. The parties involved in an exchange need not be acting selfishly. Their wants, which each gets the other to serve, may be most unselfish. One may be spending his last penny on another's needs. But so far as the exchange only is regarded A is concerned to get A's purposes served, and he serves B's purposes only because he thereby gets his own purposes served more effectively: i.e. A serves B because his doing so serves A better. He may therefore be benevolence itself towards other people: towards B he is an economic man.

From the development of exchange there arises an economic system in which men are predominantly concerned with satisfying other people's wants in return for power to get their own satisfied. The organization of the system is directed by economic considerations—questions of more efficient satisfaction of wants whatever within limits the wants may be.) Of course there are limits. Since the whole process normally takes place within a system of rights, there are obligations upon everyone who takes part in economic exchange to see that certain purposes may not be served at all. The fact that someone wants to buy cocaine does not allow you to say that that is his business and not yours. The law says that except under strict conditions cocaine must not be bought or sold. But in this respect the rights of exchange are like all other rights. They are liberties within prescribed conditions.

Liberty within conditions means that it is not other people's

business within these conditions how a man behaves. Freedom of economic exchange is only an application of this general principle. It has led to such evils that it is as well to realize its advantages before we ask what has gone wrong. There are great advantages in the looseness of the exchange relations. If it was A's business what B wanted, and vice versa, A could refuse to serve B unless he approved of what B was purposing to do, and vice versa. That would be incompatible with freedom and involve quite intolerable interference in our conduct of our own lives. When men act strictly on this principle, that they will have no economic relations with those whose purposes they do not approve, we regard it as a crime and call it boycotting. There is quite a strong *prima facie* case for regarding economic activities, and especially exchange activities, as ethically and politically irrelevant.

The assumption that exchange only increases men's power of satisfying their wants and otherwise leaves their political and moral relations as they were before depends on certain assumptions about the facts which are never completely realized, and were less and less realized as industrialism developed. It assumes in the first place that the parties to the exchange are equally free to make or refuse a bargain. To be that they must be roughly equal in resources, at least equally able to hold out if the bargain is not made. It is a complaint as old as the practice of buying and selling that the rich come off better than the poor in bargaining. The inequality is accentuated with the rise of what Marx called the proletariat. In earlier economic systems the economic foundations of society depended on the possession of land. A landed peasantry, however poor, has some power of independent economic life. But in modern society most men depend for their livelihood on selling their labour, on finding a place in the general exchange of services. If they have no capital or private savings, no "independent income" as it is significantly called, they have as individuals no power at all to hold out in bargaining. Fair exchange means, further, that both parties are equally acquainted with the state of the market. This is not at all impossible in simple economic circumstances. It is quite impossible in the modern complex economic world.

Secondly, this *laissez-faire* theory assumes that economic relations will remain purely instrumental. Our analysis showed that while they may be purely instrumental—different economic choices may have no political or moral relevance, but they very often have. The economic development described as industrialism profoundly changed the whole manner of social life, and had the most profound political and moral consequences. This is so

obvious that it would not need saying if it were not that the *laissez-faire* justification of the view that free exchange necessarily leads to more liberty ignores these obvious facts.

Thirdly—and perhaps that is the most important of all the facts which made nonsense of *laissez-faire* theory—any developed economic activities such as we find in modern industrialism involve the organization and management of men as an instrument of production. The units of economic activity in industrialism—the buyers and sellers—are mostly not individuals but companies, organizations of men. The ways in which men are organized and managed cannot possibly have no political or moral relevance.

The first and third of these considerations may be summed up by saying that the theory we are criticizing assumes that there is no such thing as economic power over men. Though Marx sometimes seems to imply that there is in society nothing else but economic power, it was his great contribution to point out the existence of economic power and to show how far-reaching and powerful are its effects. No one, whether Marxian or not, would nowadays deny the existence of economic power. The modern fashion, until very lately, has been if anything to exaggerate its importance. But power relations between men are, and must be, the concern of politics. "Real politics," says Lady Montfort in Disraeli's *Endymion*, "are the possession and distribution of power." The failure of nineteenth-century democratic theory to recognize the political relevance of economic power did much to discredit democratic theory. Even Bryce in *Modern Democracies*, published as late as 1929, seems to hold that democratic theory may neglect the problem created by economic power. For such an attitude there is an explanation: those who held it were rightly insistent on how important it is for liberty that economic relations should not be absorbed into political relations. They saw that exchange can be a free relation. They forgot how equally necessary it is to ensure conditions in which it has the virtues of which it is capable.

Of course there are some solid facts behind the belief in economic necessity. It is indeed one of the obvious weaknesses of the Marxian theory of economic determinism that it does not explain why the theory arose when it did. If economic determinism is always true, and if theories are but the "ideological reflexion" of economic facts, the theory of economic determinism should always have been held by men. But it arose at a definite time and for quite definite historical reasons. It was the result of the facts produced—paradoxically enough—by the great increase in economic freedom. Men in the first part of the

nineteenth century saw the face of England changing before their eyes as it had never changed before; they saw all the confusion and mess of the Industrial Revolution, all its misery and degradation. The great achievements of the Revolution they could explain. They knew the forceful enterprising men who had built factories, canals and railways, invented steam-engines, spinning and weaving machinery. These were achievements largely brought about by the freedom given to these bold *entrepreneurs*. On the other hand the social transformations which these inventions brought about—nobody had willed. No one had determined to transfer a large part of the population to the north, to make the Black Country, or the ugliness of industrial Lancashire or Clydeside. Those things just happened: they were due to the inevitable working out of economic law.

The explanation of this paradoxical combination of freedom and necessity is simple. Hobbes, the "father of them all", should have made them understood it. He had pointed out that a number of independent individuals seeking peace but seeking it individually brought about war—a result the opposite of what they desired, but brought about by the action of their independent wills.

If men are in a system of relations with one another, with no purpose controlling the system, the general result of their actions has not been willed. The men only will partial and limited actions within the system, but because the effects of those actions go out beyond the range of their willing they bring out something which they have not willed. That something is determined by the general conditions within which the limited willing takes place and it is discoverable and predictable.

Economic laws are statements of what will under certain circumstances happen because of the accidental concomitance of the effects of men's actions. If men were really economic men and nothing else; if they were incapable of having any care for the general results of their actions; if, in short, they were like Hobbes' human beings, nothing could be done about it. Their case would be as hopeless as the case of Hobbes' men really is. We unfortunately all know by this time that we may look on at disasters being brought about by the independent action of men or nations. Only general control could save the situation, and the necessary intelligence to co-operate for the general control may be lacking. The insecurity and the economic depressions of the years preceding the second Great War were largely brought about by separate nations independently seeking security and thereby producing insecurity. The economists saw what was happening. No one paid much attention to them because their

remedies implied a power of world-wide organization and control of which men did not believe the world to be capable. In principle those blind unwilling results which we deplore are controllable, and as men's power of organized control gradually grows, will and purpose, or, as the modern phrase goes, organized planning, can and do take the place of economic necessity.

Economic determinism then is only a special case of a necessity which is always overcoming the Frankenstein man. To carry out the immediate purpose which he wills he performs actions or invents instruments which have consequences which are not in his control. They may react upon his environment and himself till they seem to hold him hopelessly in their grip, until his renewed will and inventiveness gain the upper hand again. This is always happening in some degree. It is a constant feature of an age of mechanical inventions. The peculiar nature of economic exchange accentuates the situation, just because exchange is a relation which is possible between men with no common purpose. Economic relations can spread and in the modern world have spread over wide areas of society which cannot yet be organized by any common will or purpose. The more wonderful men's technical inventions, the more they stretch in intricate filaments all over the world, the more they enslave their inventors till the challenge of their apparent necessity is met.

There are thus important differences between ethics and economics in their relation to politics in the modern world. The freedom of ethical and of economic relations both seemed to follow from the new assumption of rights. It was now the State's business to maintain rights and therefore to ensure liberties. The Puritans first conceived this strictly instrumental view of the State because they held that the good life is essentially free. The State, as we saw, is to act as a wall or fence within which the really precious things of society are to have room to grow. The free moral life lived in voluntary fellowships is the end: the organization and enforcement of law an instrument. But economic activity is not an end of society. It is instrumental. Because it is instrumental it is amoral. Because it is not in itself informed by a common purpose its general results are blind, its workings deterministic. Finally, because it is essentially an instrument it must not be treated as an end.

If the right to free economic activity is treated as if it were a moral right, then the State is to be an instrument for the sake of another instrument, economic activity. When the two servants strive for mastery there is no right on either side. Much English theory from Locke onwards, with its insistence on

property as the typical right, did seem to treat the State as an instrument to give free room for economic activity, which was regarded as an end. That is what Bentham comes to, and Marx's sneering remark is not unjustified: "Bentham is a purely English phenomenon. . . . In no time and in no country has the most homespun commonplace ever strutted about in so self-satisfied a way. With the direst *naïveté* he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful."*

Hegel found a place in his state for "the economic society", *die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, but he made it not the end, but the instrument, of the State. The State, which is power, is the concrete embodiment of morality, and in the oft-quoted words "the march of God upon earth". This conception has ever since dominated German political theory, and English thinkers have held it up as a reproach to Germany ever since.

A reproach it undoubtedly is, but Germans could reasonably say that Mammon was rebuking Mars. We say Tyranny and Germans say Plutocracy, and so long as the issue simply is "shall power or business be the end of the state?" pots and kettles are calling one another black. When Louis Philippe said to his citizens "*Enrichissez-vous*" he was saying something as evil as when Nietzsche said, "They say that a good cause justifies any war, but I say that a good war justifies any cause." The one represents the evil side of nineteenth-century democracy as the other the evil side of the Germany militarist state.

Economic activity wants to be free because it wants to be a rival in power to the State. Ethical activity wants to be free just in order to be free; because liberty and spontaneity are the breath of its life. Here perhaps we see most clearly the essentials of the modern problem of politics. We say that the modern world abandoned the mediaeval doctrine of the supremacy of morality. We might and do put the same thing by saying that it abandoned the supremacy of law. Any large-scale organization of morality must be legal. It must eventually be interpreted by lawyers. The moving speeches we make about the supremacy of law in the world would not sound so well if we had to say the supremacy of lawyers. The revolt against the mediaeval order represented the revolt of personality against law: the determination to find room for the freedom of the individual within the system of large-scale organizations which the modern world was beginning to find necessary. It is of fundamental importance that those large-scale organizations

* Marx *Kapital*, Cp. XXIV, par. 5.

should be informed by and subject to moral law, but they will not continue to be so unless they are leavened by the free moral activity of ordinary men and women.

"The consciences of common men," writes Professor Woodhouse in the introduction to *Puritanism and Liberty*, "were a new phenomenon in politics and one that has never since disappeared."* They were and are an alarming phenomenon. Established authority can always point to men mistaking liberty for lawlessness. The freedom of Grace, as St. Paul noted, "easily degenerates into antinomianism, the repudiation of lifeless law into a repudiation of all law altogether". Can Grace inspire law and divine law school and discipline Grace? Was Ivan Karamazov's Grand Inquisitor right when he prophesied that ordinary men and women would despair of the results of freedom and come asking authority to take it away again? Can common men and women, not as cogs in a machine, nor as classified A's, B's and C's in this *Brave New World* of Aldous Huxley's scientific nightmare, but as persons with living creative consciences—can such find room to live in the presence of Leviathan? That is the real modern experiment.

A. D. LINDSAY.

* *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

THE WATERSHED

THE reign of Charles I witnessed the crystallization of that oligarchic polity based on the land which was to endure with little change until the coming of the Industrial Revolution. Much of the social custom which is held to characterise the mid-Victorian scene can be traced back to this reign with its notes of domesticity and privilege. The Elizabethan Age had passed away as had that overlaid Jacobean interlude. The feudal conceptions of social relationship had at long last vanished. The possibility of the whole entourage of some great figure coming to political power, the dream behind the Essex Rising of 1601, had gone for ever. The new nexus was that of patron and client. Already it had something of that Augustan calm with which the eighteenth century would endow it. Such a relation was cool and profitable; above all it was not hereditary.

There had come into social relationships a quality of fluidity. This is seen in the greater freedom of movement and in a relative liberty. It is really rather strange to find on the eve of the Civil Wars such a widespread stability. One of the first examples of the new attitude towards landed property is seen in the case of Lord Cottington, who was at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer. The following extract from a letter to Lord Deputy Wentworth will convey the quality of the new type of purchaser, moneyed and a planner, anchored to the land only by preference.

It is* [wrote Mr. Garrard in an account of Fonthill House which Cottington had lately bought] a noble place both for seat and all things about it, downs, pasture, arable, woods, water, partridge, pheasant, fish; a good house of freestone, much better for some additions he hath lately made to it. For he hath built a stable of stone, the third in England, Petworth and Burleigh-on-the-Hill only exceed it. £2000 land a year he hath (purchased) about it, and whilst I was there his park wall of square white stone, a dry wall only coped at the top, was finished, which cost him setting up £600 a mile, but it is but three miles about.

This surely approaches to the Victorian type of property, the stone stabling and the great park wall which carried with it the first rudimentary conception of the demesne. There now emerges that combination of new unestablished wealth with luxury and privacy.

Such a fortune was fluid and gave liberty to the investor. The Elizabethan courtier with prospects would seek out an heiress and make his country home on his wife's acres. Sir Dudley Carleton had re-purchased his grandfather's small property in

* Letter from George Garrard to Lord Deputy Wentworth, dated 9 October, 1637, *Strafford Letters*, ed. W. Knowler, ii, p. 118.

Oxfordshire. Throughout the Tudor period a great man would enter into the inheritance of some foundered statesman. In Cottington's case there was neither an hereditary link, nor did he benefit from a political catastrophe. It was just the commercial bargain and the quality of the sport which had led him to the Wiltshire downland, to Fonthill "the finest hawking-place in England and a wonderful store of partridge". It was a tranquil England in which this new custom had sprung up by which a great property with a rent roll of £2,000 could be purchased as an investment for capital.

There was another aspect of the transference of ownership in the case of estates passing *en bloc*. Sometimes a fine house would change hands with only so much land as would assure the maintenance of dignity. This practice was, however, chiefly found within a certain radius from the capital. Formerly such mansions were seldom purchased save for reconstruction. Thus Buckingham bought Newhall to rebuild the house on a palatial scale; but Lord Antrim acquired Bramshill in 1637 in order to live in it unchanged. Appreciation of the work of earlier generations was developing. The raw piled-up grandeur of the Elizabethan building fashions was left behind. Bramshill cost £14,000 and just sufficient land was bought to yield a rental of £400. The Bedford Accounts, which have been edited so ably, show that an era had been reached marked in its essentials by providence and management. The mist in the park at Bramshill slipped into the long gallery, wreathing the suits of armour and the tall sober portraits and all that Jacobean tamed magnificence.

The domestic and patrician character of the way of life of the English ruling class was now setting in a mould which would remain unbroken for at least two centuries. The picture gallery was emerging, not the collection of some magnifico like Lord Arundel, but the gathering together of portraits of kinsmen and friends done by painters of reputation. In 1637 Vandyck's portrait of Strafford in armour was already displayed in Lord Northumberland's gallery at Sion House.* The way was clear for Lely and Kneller and then for Gainsborough and Reynolds. There was now present both the creation of a demand and the acceptance of the convention of one fashionable type.

Another characteristic of these quiet rich years of Charles I was the development of the hanger-on. One now meets for the first time the quasi-secretarial dependant (sometimes in Orders, sometimes not) who is the intimate of the women of the great households. He arranges the renting of London houses; con-

* Letter from George Garrard to Lord Deputy Wentworth, dated 9 October, 1637, *ibid.*, ii, p. 118.

ducts the lesser interviews for his lord; retails the gossip. Leaving town in the dog days the supporter of the family would settle through the summer in the country, sitting beside the screen in the with-drawing-room and humouring his mistress with playfulness and flattery.

In Church as in State the element of patronage was ever increasing. The presentation to a living by the local patron was becoming, as it would remain, an element in the rural scene. The interest in church ornament and in the furniture of privilege was now apparent. Lord Dorchester, when Secretary of State, wrote to the Bishop of Oxford about the construction of a pew for his wife in Brightwell church.

There was* [he explained] anciently one for the Mistress of Brightwell in the chapel where my father's and grandfather's tombs lie, but that is in decay and too much out of hearing. The place where a woman's pew already stands is the fittest for a divided pew, one for my wife and the other for her women, and it would be more convenient if the pulpit were removed to the other side.

The letter is worth pondering, so common sense and Erastian.

There was now no lack of candidates for the country benefice. The clients, lay and clerical, had come to press about the patron. The great clerical world of the Church of England was folding into its strata. The vocation was compelling and secure. Young clergymen poured out in these peaceful years from both the Universities.

The machinery of preferment was in process of construction. That corporate grouping of the Cathedral close, which would ripen into the world of Barchester, could now be discerned. Such a group was already formed in the peaceful see cities of the south of England, at Wells and Salisbury and Winchester. The Nicholas Papers, to quote one instance, throw a light upon the ecclesiastico-legal circle which centred upon Salisbury. Mr. John Nicholas was tenant of the diocese for the parsonage house and manor of Winterbourne Earls. Mr. Recorder Sherfield lived in the same village and on the Chapter it was Mr. Precentor Henchman who stood his friend. It is true that it is in the reign of Charles II that the loyal Church of England received her golden shower. Yet in the earlier portion of the century she had entered into her high place and to her grave devotion.

George Herbert's approach, with its evangelical and sunlit peace, marks yet another point upon the Salisbury compass. "Wherefore," he wrote, "he (the Parson) hath one Comment at

* Letter from Secretary Dorchester to Bishop Corbet, dated from the Court at Farnham 9 August, 1630, *State Papers, Dom. Chas. I.*, vol. clxxii. 40.

least upon every book of Scripture, and ploughing with this, and his own meditations, he enters into the secrets of God treasured in the holy scripture."* In the midst of his complex inheritance there is found in Herbert a note which resumes all the spirit of the Evangelicals.

But thou shalt answer, Lord, for me.†

This would meet with response as long as men turned for sustenance to the Bible and rode or trudged each Sunday to the country churches across the breadth of the Anglican counties.

From this period of the Stuart reigns there also date certain changes in the general lines of the population. On the one hand the more prosperous inn landlord emerges as the representative of a true *middle* class in the country towns. This calling tended to become hereditary and soon the innkeeper was without roots in the ordinary rural unit of landowner and tenants. On the other hand, it becomes from this time possible to trace the outline of that great parasite trade of every oligarchy the household servants of the rich. The oligarchic structure gave to them freedom of movement within its limits and their own place.

The organization of travel was taking shape, the first signs of those facilities which were to mark the eighteenth century in England and on the Continent. The expression "Ordinary" is now first met with, as in the reference‡ to "an Ordinary of six shillings a meal kept at the bowling place in the Spring Garden". The hiring of vehicles was becoming customary. "One thousand nine hundred,"§ we read in a news letter of 1634, "was the number of Hackney coaches of London, base lean jades, unworthy to be seen in so great a city". Coaches could also be hired for journeys into the country.

At the same time the English hostelry was coming into its own. The trade carried more profit and the innkeeper more independence. The landlord could become a man of substance and a class of licensee was gradually forming. The constant hospitality which gentlemen had been accustomed to afford to one another was fast going out of fashion. The Civil Wars were to give the *coup de grâce* to this miscellaneous entertainment of strangers. Constant travel now meant the use of inns and not of private houses. Edward Nicholas going down to the West

* "The Parson's Life", chapter iv, *Complete Works of George Herbert*, ed. Canon F. E. Hutchinson, p. 229.

† *The Quip* by George Herbert, *ibid.*, p. 111.

‡ Letter from George Garrard to Lord Deputy Wentworth, dated 3 June, 1634, *Strafford Letters*, i, p. 262.

§ Letter from the same to the same, dated 20 June, 1634, *ibid.*, i, p. 266.

as Secretary of the Admiralty would always stay at Staines at the *Red Lion*. He would go to the *Maidenhead* at Basingstoke on journey after journey.

One of the consequences of greater independence and privacy in travel was the growth of the public fame of different inns. So many separate parties must converge to make their fortune. Landlords were no longer forced to rely on a narrow and linked circle of patrons as had generally been the case in Tudor times. Travellers riding with their servants, great family coaches and new private chariots would throng the roads. From these the innkeeper made his profit and the economic status of the whole body of inn servants became more tolerable. There was opened up a wide new livelihood.

The custom of "tipping" was well developed, and the sums paid were substantial considering the then value of money. The comparison of a series of accounts would seem to show that in regard to such gifts fixed rates were already established. A party journeying to London* at the end of December 1638 gave a shilling to the chamberlains at Barnet where they stopped for dinner. The next day at St. Albans, where they stayed the night, 2s. were given to the chamberlains and 2s. to the ostlers. The latter seems the regulation gift to ostlers for a night's lodging. Chambermaids appear to have received rather less than the men servants.

Two other items have a special interest. The musicians who played at St. Albans on New Year's Eve received 3s. 6d. from a single party and the steward's accounts for the same journey contain a note that 4s. had been placed in the poor-box kept in the *George* at Loughborough. From other sets of accounts it is made clear that large sums were given to friends' servants.† One of Lord Worcester's grooms received a pound for guiding a party of gentlemen with a retinue of twelve attendants to London from South Wales; Sir Kenelm Digby's coachman got 10s.; the gardener at Hampton Court a florin; 5s. was given to a footman for engaging rooms in St. Martin's Lane. Men thus favourably placed could add a calculable sum to their year's wages. This system of high customary remuneration would endure till it became established as the solid rake-off for the staffs controlling the great Victorian country houses and the shooting and the Scottish moors.

It is more difficult to establish a standard for direct payment for

* This particular detail comes from the *Hastings MSS*, i, pp. 384-5.

† A very comprehensive account of expenses of this nature is contained in an account of payments made by Mr. Burgess, servant to Lord Conway, between 7 July, 1634 and 19 March, 1635, *State Papers, Dom. Chas I*, vol. cclxxv, 19.

occasional work. A chimney-sweeper was paid 2s. 9d.* for sweeping 22 "tunnelles" at a house in Middlesex. As a means of comparison it can be noted that the current price for ale† was 2d. the pint.

These are, however, only indications. Yet they suggest that growth of custom and the increase of an insular and English solidarity. London prices and southern ways were making headway. In another sphere the educational arrangements foreshadowed very dimly the coming dominance of the great schools. Sons were sometimes sent to Winchester, for instance, because their fathers had been at school there. "I was last week at Winchester,"‡ wrote the Rector of West Dean in 1637, "and spoke with the schoolmaster concerning John and made the proposal of sending him thither. He made the offer that John should table in his house. The rate that he takes of his boarders is £20 a year." Four years later a similar staid exchange of letters took place between this youth's father and the senior tutor of Queen's College.

Very gradually the Inns of Court were being superseded by the Universities as a training ground for the landed gentry. The naval service was still indeterminate in its character and undefined in its length of duty. Yet already the recommendation system had come into force and the captain took responsibility for the acceptance of each young gentleman. This system of interlocked recommendation was of the very essence of the English polity. The character of entry into the Navy, as an example, was hardly to change until after the Crimean War. The domestic note predominated in a society which was never unaware of its initiative and its strength and was very confident in its own security.

At the same time there could be traced a new temperate and diplomatic approach to general questions. There was a reaction against the imperious gestures and the flaring overt subtlety of the Elizabethans. The horse-play and the laborious cumbered jesting which Strafford had brought with him out of Yorkshire was beginning to look old-fashioned. A widespread courtesy was the new note at St. James' and the custom of gentle flattery found favour far beyond the circle of the Court.

A remarkable development in the usages of politics was the birth of understatement. This can be found in the optimism of the official letters of Sir Henry Vane the elder. Even before the

*From household expenses of the Countess of Derby from 15 May, 1634 till 23 April, 1635, *Hastings MSS*, i, pp. 375-6.

† *Journal of Sir William Brereton*, Surtees Society, p. 3.

‡ *State Papers, Dom. Chas. I*, vol. ccclv, 143.

Civil Wars there was a recognition among the ruling class that their underlying accord was a possession that they must never lose. This was a lesson taught them for all time by that bitter experience. In such circumstances Vane's statements and letters in the eighteen months before the outbreak of hostilities have an especial value not for their content, but for their form. Understatement commonly has for its object the avoidance of embittered quarrel. It came in this instance from a recognition of the fundamental unity of the English polity. If we except for certain purposes the Catholic minority among the peers, there was so much that was held in common by all those who sat in either House of Parliament.

English life was becoming marked not only by a certain composite solidarity but still more by ease. A restricted circle had been influenced in the reign of Elizabeth by Giordano Bruno and by *Gli Eroi*, and the conception of the Magnifico had obtained a wider currency. So much was required to maintain the grandiose display, consciously lavish and Italianate in inspiration, which had been the setting within which the whole life of the Earl of Essex was played out. The great house in its Elizabethan guise had embodied the magnificence of a single statesman. The images of power and the distinctive marks of personality were alike repetitive and heavy.

On another plane there was a high-wrought quality about the Philip Sidney standards. These were individualistic and purely personal, the perfection of knighthood and the last flickers of Bayard. The late Elizabethans had rejoiced in the many facets of their diamond as did all the inheritors of the jewelled words and of the elaborated strained conceptions of the high Renaissance. Now after thirty years an entirely different mood, and one incomprehensible to earlier generations, was coming to the fore. The fear of publicity, which was to mark the national character, came slowly creeping in.

The clear romantic individualism which belonged to the *Astrophel and Stella* sequence was at length in this calmer age becoming channelled. Experiences were now related to a general background. In this connection the very quiet approach of Drayton's *Ideas Mirrour* was equally remote from all conception of the Institution. Yet it is just the institution of marriage which provides a frame for those *Epithalamia* which belong essentially to the English seventeenth century.

The mould into which English life was now setting placed a half spiritual and half mundane value upon the state of marriage. The disturbed Elizabethan period had tended to concentrate attention almost wholly upon the financial terms of the marriage

settlements. Under the Stuarts a welcome had been given to the ministrations of the Church of England which had come to make sacrosanct the national and private ceremonies. The christening and the Anglican blessing upon men's marriages and the harvest festivals had come to be established as among the enduring values of the English polity. On the personal side the way was open to George Herbert's quiet religion and high in the official hierarchy there sat the Bishops in their wide lawn sleeves. There they sat so grave and yet assailable.

There is here no opportunity to consider the complicated influence of the Tridentine world which seeped throughout all Western Europe slowly and by so many channels. Besides, in general the Catholic life in England was little affected by the specific changes of this period. In the same way the Puritan deeps were barely stirred by the thought-forms or the moods of the Stuart reigns. The men of the preciser sort remained aloof within the hard clear lines of their oft-proclaimed integrity. Yet Puritanism, apart from its avowed adherents, appeared throughout the texture of the thought of the Church of England as is shown by the documents which bear upon the life of the Ferrar family at Little Gidding. Regarded from a different angle the Puritan section of the nation was to be found among the main supports of the new idea of capital. Still beyond these closely related worlds there were other elements which would shiver the mirror of the seventeenth-century English life if that were possible. Apart from the men who would arise in the changes of the Civil Wars there were those whose attitude to religion could not be brought within a Cavalier or Parliamentary synthesis. This can be best expressed by the comment of George Fox made when he had first "espied the great steeple house in Nottingham". "When I came there,"* he noted down laboriously, "all the people looked like fallow-ground, and the priest, like a great lump of earth, stood in the pulpit above."

DAVID MATHEW.

* *Journal of George Fox*, ed. Norman Penny, p. 24.

THE MASS-ARMY

ON 23 August, 1793, the French revolutionary government, hard-pressed by interventionist armies, ordered the *levée en masse* on the principle, *tout citoyen doit être soldat et tout soldat doit être citoyen*. The great masses of the French people, the liberated peasants and the workers of the towns took up arms and fought successfully against the mercenary armies of the continental feudal monarchies. During the Napoleonic wars other continental countries re-enacted the *levée en masse*, and at the return of peace the principle of national armies recruited from the masses of the nations was generally acknowledged on the Continent. The mass-armies of the twentieth century are recruited on the same principle. The 500,000 men formed into the Greek Army were in this sense a mass-army not different from the more than 10 million men constituting the mass-armies of Nazi-Germany. From 1800 to 1940 Europe's population increased from 178 million to 531 million. Armies numbering millions instead of the hundreds of thousands of the Napoleonic period became thus a possibility. Modern industry provided their equipment and railway transport could move them for strategical purposes. From a political point of view, the great continental nations thought to strengthen their security or striking power by continually increasing their armies. During the Great War the leading continental rivals, France and Germany, mobilized for their mass-armies 19.5 per cent and 20 per cent respectively of their total population. Frederick the Great, the most aggressive monarch of the eighteenth century, commanded at the end of the Seven Years War an army numbering roughly 200,000 men, equivalent to some 4 per cent of the total population of Prussia. An army recruited by press gangs could hardly be increased beyond this maximum. Mass desertion, the limited resources of mercantilist economy, and, above all, the type of planned military tactics, called linear tactics, restricted the size of armies.

The mass-armies engaged in the totalitarian wars of the twentieth century are technically complex organizations and almost an exact replica of the industrial organization of their respective countries. Even if they should be inferior in numbers the armies of an industrialized country are superior to the armies of less developed industrialized countries, let alone those of agricultural countries. This difference hardly existed during the wars of the early nineteenth century, that is to say during the early period of modern mass-armies. At that time the morale of the armies was frequently more important than the equipment.

The formal political freedom gained by the citizens serving in the French revolutionary armies made them superior to the mercenary armies of the feudal monarchies. Their individual skill, their political consciousness created the *tirailleur*, the skirmisher who defeated the serried ranks, firing salvos according to plan at the word of command. The new national spirit displayed by nations suppressed by Napoleon created not only mass-armies but also guerillas, who either acted independently or in support of the new armies until they were merged with the national armies. In fact political consciousness is a most important factor in the fighting power of mass-armies. If it combines with technical superiority mass-armies are as near invincibility as possible. The wars of the nineteenth century, the Great War and the present war demonstrated this fundamental truth.

During the 150 years which have elapsed since the Great French revolution, national mass-armies have been created for national defence as well as for national aggression. The classic examples of national mass-armies for defence are the revolutionary armies of France and Soviet Russia. It is in defence that national mass-armies display their greatest strength if the masses feel that their political régime and their economic institutions are worth fighting for. The outstanding example of a mass-army organized for national aggression is Nazi Germany's Army. Apart from mere numbers and weight, its technical and political superiority over Poland and France was undeniable. But the fighting power of the French Army would have been poor even if the equipment had been up to the German standard. Totalitarian tendencies had undermined the political and military integrity of the country. The army lacked political cohesion. It was beaten before the attack of the German Army began. The German armies attacking Soviet Russia are in a different position. From a mere military point of view Soviet armies have received crushing blows, but they display the unbreakable political spirit shown by the revolutionary armies of France in 1793. Inferior in equipment, Russian armies are able to fight on, because they are superior in morale.

With the advent of mass-armies a serious problem arose in all countries forced to maintain them. Mass-armies cannot be kept continuously. During periods of peace a system had to be found that enabled the Government to raise a *levée en masse* of trained soldiers if the international situation required it. In 1798 the French Government introduced conscription, which made men between the ages from twenty to twenty-five liable to military service. Since then France has never abandoned conscription.

The actual terms of conscription were, however, changed frequently. Service with the colours lasted at the beginning for nine years and was gradually reduced to two years. In 1818 a law was introduced fixing the annual contingent to be conscripted at 40,000, which remained in force until 1868. Wealthy conscripts could, however, purchase exemption from military service. The small contingents naturally left a great number of men untrained. The strength of the army decreased accordingly. A second contingent was trained during short-term service, and the remainder of the physically fit men served in the *Garde Nationale mobile*. This meant that they were called up for 15 days' training annually. The war in 1870-71 showed clearly that this limited conscription was inferior to the general conscription practised in Prussia and other German countries since 1814. In 1872 France reintroduced general conscription for service with the colours for three years. Every man remained liable to military service for twenty years. In 1889 all exemptions were abolished and the service time increased to twenty-five years. The perfect peace-time system which made the *levée en masse* possible by mobilization at the outbreak of war had been found.

In Central Europe, Prussia took the lead by introducing general conscription in 1814. The military reforms arising out of the war of liberation created two different armies, the standing army to be conscripted from a contingent of the physically fit young men, and the separate *Landwehr*, which had the character of a militia. Service in the standing army lasted three years with the colours and two years in the reserve. The *Landwehr* comprised men up to the age of thirty-nine. The idea of the *levée en masse* was maintained in the *Landsturm*, which made all men from the age of seventeen to fifty liable for military service at the outbreak of war. The dualism of a standing army and a *Landwehr* made Prussia militarily weak until the reforms of 1859-61. After 1814 Prussian absolutism based upon the Prussian Junkers came under the political pressure of the democratically inclined middle classes, whose economic influence rose with the beginning of industrialization. The standing army was exclusively officered by the Prussian aristocracy, whereas the *Landwehr* retained its officers of middle-class origin. After the abortive revolution of 1848, Prussian absolutism abolished this dualism, and the Prussian aristocracy officered almost exclusively the reformed army. After the Franco-German war general conscription was extended to all parts of the new German national State. Service with the colours lasted three years. The conscript remained then five years in the Reserve. After 1888 men remained in the Reserve until the age of thirty-

nine. In war, liability to military service was extended from the age of seventeen to forty-five. There was, however, a limit to the strength of the standing army, which was fixed every seven, and later every five, years. The militarist ideal of training the whole population was not even achieved in Prussia-Germany. The rising democratic and labour opposition prevented the unlimited recruiting of the available man-power. In spite of the rapid industrialization the Prussian aristocracy retained its position in the officer-corps of the German Army. Ordinary citizens having attended a secondary school could become officers of the Reserve if their families had a certain social standing. Among the generals and the colonels of the Prussian Army the middle-class element increased, however, considerably, from 14 per cent in 1860 to 48 per cent in 1913. The militarists wishing to organize a mass-army naturally had to be content with the changing social composition of the army. Industrial workers opposed to the patriarchal hierarchy of the Prussian Army constituted the bulk of the new army, and their political opposition broke finally the Imperial German Army in 1918.

The remainder of the continental countries without exception adopted conscription. The system of standing armies and reserves was general practice at the turn of the nineteenth century, but the fighting power of the different armies depended on a number of factors which were different in different countries. The necessary combination of equipment, training, and morale based upon political consciousness was undoubtedly highest in the French Army. There was more than in any other army equality of opportunity. Most important of all, there were no national minorities living in France.

The Imperial German Army was at the beginning of the world war superior in training and equipment. Its military striking power was formidable, but the political consciousness of the army was not uniform. The political contradictions between the officer corps dominated by the aristocracy and the ranks, among whom there was a strong liberal and socialist opposition, could only temporarily disappear by the frantic nationalism revived at the beginning of the war and sustained as long as complete victory seemed possible. Small national minorities, such as the Poles, the Danes, and the people of Alsace-Lorraine, became dangerous to the morale of the armies wherever they served. The armies of Austria-Hungary were weak because of their composition of many nationalities.

Tsarist Russia, commanding unlimited resources of man-power, was actually the weakest military power. Equipment was totally deficient for a sustained war, and the great masses of

peasants and workers were violently opposed to the political régime. The armies, moreover, were composed of members of a great number of different nationalities suppressed by the Tsarist régime. The Anglo-Saxon powers were traditionally opposed to conscript armies. The principle of the *levée en masse* had never been contemplated. Actual war on a large scale was solved by improvisation, and the system of small professional armies supplemented by volunteer territorial armies had been sufficient until the Great War. The United States came very near the *levée en masse* during the civil war, but no attempt was made to perpetuate the principle by conscription. The Anglo-Saxon countries had, however, the advantage of economic superiority, which gave them the possibility of training conscript mass armies in a relatively short time. That conscription is the only possible solution for the training of modern mass armies was clearly demonstrated by the failure of Kitchener's attempt to mobilize the nation on a voluntary basis.

Modern mass-armies in their full strength are possible only during actual war and must be studied in their activities in war. The outstanding major wars of the last 150 years provide ample material to show how modern mass-armies were used in war and how their tactics have been changing in accordance with the advent and development of modern industry. The limited wars of the eighteenth century were mostly rigidly planned affairs. They were executed according to agreed tactical principles, which had to be applied without much difference by the opponents. Their armies were mercenary armies dependent for supplies from prearranged magazines. Winter campaigns were almost impossible. Marches and counter-marches with the purpose of manoeuvring for favourable battle positions took up the greater part of the campaigns. The principle of attrition was applied in besieging fortresses. Massed infantry equipped with the flintlock rifle, cavalry, and primitive artillery composed the armies drawn up according to plan for battle. The actual battle movements were complicated evolutions. The German goose-step, the marching and counter-marching in battalion formation, were essential in these battles. Infantry advanced and charged in lines and hand-to-hand fighting decided the battle.

In the American War of Independence and in the revolutionary wars of France the citizen soldiers broke down all rules of the orthodox warfare of the eighteenth century. But it was left to Napoleon to form the available citizen soldiers into efficient mass-armies capable of operating wherever political and military aims demanded. It was physically impossible to operate the new mass-army as one single unit. Napoleon created, therefore,

the divisions comprising from two to three infantry brigades, each two to three infantry regiments strong, and allocated to each division a detachment of light artillery of twelve guns. Two, and sometimes three, such divisions were combined to an army corps, usually 30,000 men strong. The mass of the cavalry he combined with horse artillery to form divisions and cavalry corps. Each army corps was allotted a reserve artillery detachment of heavy guns. The crack troops of Napoleon's army were the army corps of Guardes numbering 56,000 men, which constituted Napoleon's main battle reserve. Napoleon's field armies were supplemented by territorial formation for the purpose of guarding the country as well as for training recruits. It seems to us today quite natural that Napoleon at the same time created a general staff divided into two departments, the tactical-strategical and the administrative department. Each army corps leader also got a general staff. These are the fundamental principles of the organization of mass-armies still in use today. Several army corps could easily be combined to army groups. Each army corps or army group could move independently. They could combine after converging marches for giving battles and could, after the battle, separate for the pursuit or for the occupation of conquered countries. The cavalry divisions and corps Napoleon used not only as thrusting power in battle but also for strategic reconnaissance. The modern tank divisions are being used by the Germans for the same purpose. Napoleon's strategy, aiming always at the annihilation of the opponent, was based on movement and speed. He remained superior until his different national adversaries had learned his principles for the use of national armies. It must seem surprising at first sight that in subsequent wars until 1939 no general and no army was able to achieve the spectacular movements and victories of Napoleon. Men like the Prussian officer Clausewitz have become famous for evolving from Napoleon's military campaigns the theory of modern war. Whole generations of generals and officers grew up with Clausewitz's theories on strategy and tactics, but actual warfare remained hazardous. War is still an art, and a gamble.

The Prussian Army was the first to make use of Napoleon's inventions and the Prussian General Staff has served as a model for other armies. The last country to set up a general staff was Great Britain under the reforms effected by Haldane. In spite of the establishment of permanent general staffs, war academies, and officers' training schools, all wars fought during the last 150 years reveal the astonishing phenomenon that generals as well as statesmen failed to realize that modern industry and

modern mechanical transportation constantly changed the means of warfare, the normal composition of armies, and tactics. The permanent general staffs, it is true, were quick enough to appreciate that the percussion rifle was superior to the flintlock, that the rifled barrel of a gun enabled accurate fire over greater distances, that the explosive shell increased the destructive power. There were even generals who grasped the enormous power of the machine-gun. Yet at the beginning of each new war armies went into battle as if nothing had been changed. The lessons of such improvised modern wars as the American Civil War from 1861-65 were hardly studied by the professional soldiers on the continent.

The French and Prussian Armies, however, realized at once the importance of railways not only for the concentration of troops at the beginning of the war but also for the movement of armies during military campaigns. Up to the beginning of the Great War professional soldiers could not understand the simple truth that industrialized countries had to industrialize their mass-armies if they wanted military victories. Every German soldier and statesman knew that Clausewitz had framed the opinion that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with different means. But they could not conceive that modern war meant the use of the entire industry of a nation for these different means. Thus the Great War came to a deadlock in tremendously fortified positions, where mass-armies vegetated in deep trenches and dug-outs.

During the long years of trench warfare the mass-armies slowly changed. The uniformly trained masses of infantry were split up into groups of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. Small groups of shock troops were trained solely for assaulting sections of the enemy's trenches. Other groups were trained for maintaining the conquered sections. Behind the trenches millions of men were formed in labour corps, continually building fortifications, roads, and railways. Armies no longer marching and counter-marching for battle positions naturally had no use for cavalry; the horse disappeared from the fighting line. Science and industry, on the other hand, combined to find the means of breaking the deadlock. The break-through became the obsession of the opposing armies. Slowly the infantry, armed almost exclusively with the rifle at the beginning of the war, increased its machine power. First the number of machine-guns per unit grew, then the trench-mortar appeared; after that the infantry was equipped with a light gun. The engineer detachments grew in numbers and amassed a great variety of industrial equipment. The artillery, on the other

hand, developed the technique of mass fire. Firing a gun changed into a science. At the same time an infinitely small part of the immobilized mass-armies, the air forces, attained full freedom of movement. But the deadlock could only be broken by a movable fortress able to move at will over trenches—a fortress, moreover, relatively invulnerable against machine-gun fire, to which the change into a war of position has usually been ascribed. This is, however, a partial truth. It is true the machine-gun prevented attacks by massed infantry. After the heaviest artillery barrage there remained always some machine-guns preventing an undisputed advance of infantry emerging from their trenches. Yet the most important and more general cause for the war of position is different. The armies, having prepared for the war, had only limited supplies of ammunitions and equipment when the war began. The carefully prepared supplies were almost spent during the first weeks of the war, during which mass-armies covered great distances, fighting several large-scale battles. The opposing armies exhausted not only their physical energy during these short weeks but also their ammunitions and equipment. Neither side had prepared for adequate supplies from current production. Physical exhaustion and shortage of material were almost equal on either side. The opponents were evenly matched, and the material superiority sufficient to attempt a break-through could not be reached for some time. In the end the mechanical instrument, the tank, a vehicle which can be manufactured only in a highly industrialized country, effected the desired break-through of fortified positions. Again, a small number of men in the mass-armies had been turned into technical specialists.

At the end of the Great War completely industrialized armies returned, or tried to return, to their civilian occupations, only to find that hundreds of things they had learnt to handle could be used also in civilian life. The war of position had advanced modern industrial mobility by leaps and bounds. Mass production, which is among other things an increase in speed and mobility, became almost general.

After the Great War victors and vanquished alike, having experienced the first taste of a fully industrialized war, faced a dilemma similar to that of the continuous *levée en masse*. The mass-armies of the Great War required a portion of the nation's industrial output which was incompatible with the provision of the absolute minimum of supplies necessary to support the civilian population. Generals learnt that the nations would not stand for such a reduction of their standard of living in peacetime. Generals also learnt that it was impossible to stock the necessary material for a future war. There was only one way out, which was

tentatively evolved by Ludendorff—that is to say the totalitarian preparation for a totalitarian war. The Anglo-Saxon Powers, however, discarded even conscription. France retained it. Soviet Russia reintroduced it and all the new States formed on the continent built up conscript armies. In Germany conscription was prohibited and the small *Reichswehr* became a professional army forbidden to use the most potent weapons—acropplanes, tanks, and heavy artillery. Then the most curious thing happened. Generals who had learned to use mass-armies thought that small but highly industrialized armies would be the armies of the future. Nearly all the belligerents had also learned that modern mass-armies can easily break if the political situation creates opposition to the continuation of the war or if the political consciousness of the mass-armies is opposed to the political régime which forced them to serve in the army. The militarily and politically beaten German generals were thus frantically searching for new principles. They were firmly convinced that they would be able one day to wage another war and they were studying first of all the war of movement with mechanized armies; in other words, they were trying to evolve principles that would prevent another war of position. One thing became clear: an attacking force would have to be vastly superior in engine-power as well as in fire-power to achieve a break-through of the continuous fortifications which were contemplated or in construction around Germany's frontier. The break-through obsession was still there. Confronted by countries which had maintained their mass-armies, they also realized that they would need mass-armies if they wanted to exploit a break-through for the annihilation of the opposing forces.

Yet everything remained theory as long as they were unable to find a government willing to prepare the nation's economy and population for a totalitarian war. In fact it was felt that an entirely new economic and political régime was necessary. For various reasons which cannot be discussed here the militarized mass-party organized by Hitler and a host of demobilized officers came to power in Germany. In the new totalitarian régime the German *Reichswehr* found its opportunity for organizing, equipping, and training the industrialized mass-armies. Naturally, old-fashioned conscription was absolutely essential. The new problem to be solved was, however, the economic *levée en masse*; in other words, the use of industry in such a way that mass-armies could be equipped in the shortest possible time, which meant the diversion of an unusually high percentage of the national income to war purposes in time of peace. At the same time the economic resources of the country

had to be organized in such a way that full war production could start at once at the beginning of the war for the supply of the fighting armies from current production. Only the dictatorial régime based upon a mass-party could achieve this aim. Only the ruthless suppression of all political and economic opposition could guarantee the ambitious dreams of Germany's generals. They knew they had to submit politically to the ideas of the Nazi party. But they knew also that without the mass-party of Hitler their dreams would never be realized. The totalitarian *levée en masse* began. Every activity in Hitler Germany changed its aspect by prefixing the simple word *Wehr*, which has come to be used in its widest sense: "for war". First of all the economy was changed into *Wehrwirtschaft*—near-war economy. Politics became *Wehr-Politik*. *Wehrerziehung*, *Wehr-psychologie*, *Wehr-geographie*, *Wehr-propaganda*, *Wehr-statistik*, etc., are now common knowledge in Germany. In short, every activity was conscripted for military service. Military conscription was supplemented by labour conscription of men and women. Military training was extended in the form of pre-military training to all boys between the age of ten to eighteen years. The economy was changed into a centrally controlled economy planned for maximum production in peacetime and prepared for full mobilization into a war-economy. Meanwhile, the new totalitarian mass-armies took shape, and as they grew one section after another of the nation's economy was conscripted. Manœuvres and the military occupation of Austria, the Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia were the first tests for handling the industrialized mass-armies of a totalitarian State. The war against Poland revealed the tactics of this new army.

There were first the highly skilled technicians, the tank divisions, and the air force. These movable fortresses in combination with the flying artillery—the Stukas—easily broke through the fortified positions in Southern Poland. The speed and fire-power of the tank and motorized divisions made deep thrusts possible, which prepared not only the way for the following mass of the armies but also the encirclement of the opponent as a prelude to battles of annihilation. The pattern of Napoleonic principles is clearly visible. Speed and fire-power of this industrialized mass-army seemed irresistible. Large armies composed of labour corps came behind, repairing railways, roads, and bridges. In fact, the men engaged in repairing communications and the men supplying the fighting units were decidedly larger in numbers than the fighting armies.

The war in Holland, Belgium, and France followed the same pattern—break-through, deep thrusts, encirclement, annihilation,

and there was still another repetition in Yugoslavia and Greece. Every time the same tactics and every time the same success—the strategic aim of annihilating the opposing forces—was achieved. The new industrialized mass-armies seemed irresistible.

The opening phases in the summer campaign against Soviet Russia seemed to promise the same results. But a combination of highly interesting factors prevented the German armies from achieving the annihilation of the Russian armies. For the first time the totalitarian German armies attacked the industrialized armies of another totalitarian Power. The wide open spaces of Russia certainly were of some importance. But the most important point is that the Russian armies employed the same tactics as the German armies. The defence against a deep thrust, executed with a mechanized wedge, was the attempt to cut off the wedge from the slow-moving supporting mass. Encirclement was not accepted as defeat. Big towns did not surrender but fought on even after being encircled. Defeated several times, the Russian armies fought on. Inferior in numbers and in material because of the surprise, the Russian armies remained in the field. The reason is obvious. The centralized Soviet régime had been preparing economy and population for totalitarian war. Soviet Russia could, moreover, resort to the original *levée en masse* by forming guerillas in the rear of the advancing German armies. Yet it is hardly likely that the war in Russia will change into a war of position similar to the trench-war in France during 1914–18. Strategic positions like Leningrad and Moscow may be besieged for a long time, but a continuous line of trenches from the Arctic Sea to the Black Sea is physically impossible. The war in Russia will remain a war of movement until the armies of one of the opponents are annihilated, or defeated in such a way that the war cannot be continued.

The problem arises whether a democratic country like Great Britain or the United States of America will be able to achieve the totalitarian *levée en masse* necessary for the formation of the modern industrialized mass-armies. The first and very important point is that the industrial resources are certainly sufficient for the formation of modern industrialized mass-armies. Military conscription for getting the necessary man-power is already in force in both countries. Conscription of women for auxiliary military forces and for war production has been accepted in Great Britain. Pre-military training of boys is possible. The existence of a Home Guard shows that the *levée en masse* has been effected. There nothing is wanting. The question remains whether a democracy is able to create the necessary political consciousness for the mass-armies in spite of rival political parties.

Secondly, can the economic system of a democracy achieve totalitarian war production necessary for equipping and sustaining the industrialized mass-armies? The Great War of 1914-18 convincingly proved that the allied democracies were superior to the half-feudal Central Powers. Then, as now, Germany had a long start. But during 1914-18 the strength of the Allied democracies in the political sphere was the weakness of the Central Powers, which were undermined in their military power by the growing political opposition centred in the liberal and socialist parties. In this present war the situation is different. The totalitarian régime in Germany prevents the formation of political opposition into organized political opposition. The mass-armies can thus not be weakened in their military strength by political opposition. The Anglo-Saxon democracies, however, having achieved national unity by formal consent of the rival parties, cannot entirely prevent political opposition in organized form if they want to remain democracies. This democratic system is a weakness in totalitarian war when compared with the totalitarian German régime of mass-party dictatorship. This weakness, dangerous as it is, is, however, compensated by the fact that the democracies are capable of political progress towards complete unity of rivalling political forces, whereas the totalitarian régime is final in the political sense of the word. An evolution of the régime into a different form is impossible. Military reverses can evoke still greater efforts, but military defeat, or even a protracted stalemate as a result of successful military resistance and attack by the allied Powers, will probably start a disintegration of the totalitarian régime. At the first sign of disintegration the former weakness of the democracies and their mass-armies changes into overwhelming strength for the final defeat of the totalitarian régime.

J. SCHLEITER.

THE SOCIAL STATUS OF THE ENGLISH MEDIAEVAL ABBOTS

(NORMAN TO TUDOR)

THE English Abbot in the past held two distinct positions simultaneously. He was the religious superior of his Abbey, and he was the feudal baron of England holding his lands directly from his Prince, and therefore under all the obligations (unless dispensed by charter) which feudal law demanded of the baron and the fief. When we have understood his twofold character, we have gone a long way to understanding the attitude and manner of life adopted by the mediaeval Abbot—a life so seemingly inconsistent, even if we allow for normal developments, with the simplicity and retiring ways of the founder of their Order. The reason for this is of course that the founder of Benedictine monasticism was not himself a feudal lord, and never foresaw what power and privileges Princes would put in the hands of his sons in a later age. Since he never legislated for such a contingency, the mediaeval Abbots were left to themselves to reconcile their double character of baron and prelate as best they could, and adapt their lives accordingly. They would shape their lives naturally according to their own mental attitude, influenced by contemporary environment, temperament and behaviour, and not to the letter of their rule written in the sixth century. But the mentality of a past age always appears extraordinary to modern notions, like past customs and costume, so that if we want to criticize the actions of these men, we must not lift them out of their own century, either to put them back into the sixth or to bring them forward into the twentieth. Leave a man where he is, and you will understand him better.

When the election of an Abbot had been confirmed by the King, the temporalities were restored to him. This meant that all the revenues coming in from the abbatial lands and manors, which were retained by the sovereign during the vacancy, were now given back to the new Abbot for his use, until his resignation or death should create a new vacancy. These temporalities were more or less considerable. A great baronial Abbot might have four or five manors in the country with over five thousand a year, not counting his palace in the Abbey precincts and a house in London or the nearest provincial town. The Abbot of St. Albans had a fine house in London (*instar magni palatii protendentem*), provided with a chapel, sitting-rooms, a pomerium,

a court, a garden, stables and a well.* The Abbot of Battle had town houses in London and Winchester; the former was in Southwark on the Thames embankment, and gave its name to Battlebridge close by.† In Stowe's time, it was a pleasant place with walks and gardens called The Maze, but it had by then become an inn known as The Flower de Luce. The Abbot of Winchcombe set himself up in Fleet Street in the fourteenth century, with a great hall on the ground floor and solars above.‡ The Abbot of Lesnes was at Paternosterchurch, and the Abbot of Abingdon at Westminster, close to the river.§ The Abbot of Meaux had a town house at York at the end of the fourteenth century.|| Their country manors would contain a small gabled house built of stone and timber, with a large hall on the ground floor and several small solars above. It would be surrounded by a park filled with oaks and beeches and a good stock of deer; a busy farm, fish ponds, orchards, and game preserves.¶ The Abbot's apartment in the Abbey precincts was not merely one dignified room, or set of rooms, it was rather an entire house, complete with chapel, hall, study, a huge kitchen as at Glastonbury, and stables. The early Cistercian statutes bound their own prelates to sleep in the dormitory among the brethren, but these were interpreted with magnificent broadmindedness. At first, the statutes were literally obeyed; then, as at Valle Crucis, the abbatial bedroom was placed not in, but adjoining, the dorter and communicating with it; later, in other Abbeys, this semi-detached bedroom grew into a suite of rooms, containing solars and a chapel, but still connected with the common dorter by means of a passage, as at Fountains; after that, they were away.**

It was not until the reign of Edward III that the list of Parliamentary Abbots was formally fixed, and their number settled at twenty-six, excluding the Abbots of Leicester and Northampton and the Prior of Coventry, who are doubtful cases. To these twenty-six, one more was added by Henry VIII, namely the Abbot of Tavistock; and the Abbot of Tewkesbury also appears on the Parliamentary Rolls.†† They were frequently summoned. The Cistercian Abbot of Roche was called to Parliament at Lincoln in 1301, at Westminster twice in 1302 and again in 1305, at Carlisle in January 1307, at Northampton in October of the same year, once more in 1309, at London in 1311, twice in 1312

* *Gesta Abbatum*, R.S., I, p. 289.

† *Landboe*, II, p. lviii.

‡ *Chronica de Melsa*, III, p. 227.

§ *Letters and Paper of Henry VIII*, R.S., X, p. 164.

¶ *The Abbot's House at Westminster*, by Armitage Robinson, p. 37.

†† *Cartulary of Flaxley*, p. 100.

† *Chronicle of Battle Abbey*, 1851, p. 30.

§ *Chronicon de Abingdon*, II, p. 15.

¶ *Monasticon*, I, 11-12.

(after which he received a passeport from the King and left England for a general chapter at Cîteaux), and three times when he returned in 1313.*

Since the mediaeval Abbots were feudal lords and barons of England, they considered it necessary to maintain a household of servants at home and a retinue of horsemen when they rode abroad. The number of these retainers was a source of anxiety to Bishops and Papal Nuncios who might descend upon an un-exempt monastery at any moment with visitatorial faculties. They tried to cut down the number to a bare necessity, but not without some difficulty. "I keep the barony of St. Edmunds and his kingdom," said the famous Samson of Edmundsbury, "and thirteen horses are not sufficient for me, as they may be for some Abbots, unless I have more to do the King's justice".† After a visitation of St. Peter's Abbey, Gloucester, in 1301, the Archbishop of Canterbury allowed the Abbot to keep only five squires, of whom one was to be marshall, another senescal, a third cook, and a fourth chamberlain. Besides these, he was allowed a butler, a pantler, a sub-cook, a footman and an errand-boy; with four grooms or more, if he thinks it necessary; only one carriage was permitted for his use, the other must be sent away; eight hounds for the hunt (*canes fugantes*) and four beagles (*canes leporarii*) may be kept, but they must on no account be allowed to enter the hall while the Abbot is at table. When the Abbot of Gloucester visits his subordinate priories, his retinue shall not exceed nineteen horsemen.‡ The Abbot of Westminster promised the Prior of Great Malvern, a dependent house, that he would not make a visitation of his monastery with more than twenty horses in his train.§ But the most magnificent of all seems to have been the saintly Richard Whiting of Glastonbury, who was accompanied by a retinue of a hundred horsemen whenever he rode out in state.

Besides their knights and squires, there were also pages to be seen in the palaces of the Abbots. In the days when Eton and Winchester were still schools for poor boys, it was the custom for the nobles and gentry to place their children in the household of some great peer or prelate, where they would serve at table, and learn to shoot and ride. The Abbot of St. Albans received these boys into his service as early as the thirteenth century.|| The Abbot of Hyde in 1450 kept "eight gentle boys" in his house, and there were as many at Westacre. When Sir John

* *Roche Abbey*, Aveling, pp. 44-47.

† *Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond*, Clarke, p. 82.

‡ *Historia et Cartularium Gloucestriae*, R.S., I, p. lxxxvi.

§ *Register of Monks of Westminster*, p. 47.

|| *Cisterciensis Abbatis*, I., p. 397; III, p. 411.

Stanley made his will in 1527, he made provision for his son to be kept by the Abbot of Westminster until he attained his majority.* "I have set your young gentleman with my understeward," wrote the Abbot of Reading to Lord Lisle in 1534, "that he may be well seen to by a woman for his dressing, as he is too young to shift for himself. He is the most towardly child in learning that I have known. As your Lordship offers to send me wine and herring, I beg to have four tuns of red or claret, for which your Lordship shall be paid, and also one barrel of herring for my own eating, how dear soever they be."† The Abbot here was no other than Cook-Farringdon, the saint and martyr. The next year Lord Lisle's agent wrote from Reading to the child's mother: "Master James is in good health. My Lord of Reading makes much of him, and plieth him to his learning both in Latin and French. He shall lack no shirts or hose. My Lord of Reading is as tender of him as if he were the King's son."‡ It was said that Richard Whiting's House at Glastonbury was like a well-disciplined court, where the sons of noblemen and gentlemen were sent for education "and returned thence excellently accomplished". He educated in this way nearly three hundred boys, besides others of the poorer classes whom he fitted for the universities.§

These mediaeval baronial Abbots served their country in many ways. Statesmen were chosen from their number both by the Kings and the Popes.|| Soldier Abbots were naturally fewer, but there are some examples. In the fourteenth century, the Abbot of Battle and the Prior of Lewes joined the army, and aided in the repulsion of the French from the coast of Sussex.¶ In 1386, when the French fleet was sighted off the coast, the Abbot of Westminster and two of his monks volunteered for the army, and fitted themselves out with horses and military accoutrement. The Cellarer paid £6 for a suit of armour for Dom John de Canterbury, one of the party. When they returned, he sent the armour to a London shop for sale, but he was a man of such great stature that there was nobody in England who would buy it from him. Nor did the Abbot sell his, for in his will are mentioned gifts of armour, bows and arrows, and catapults.** The stouthearted Abbot of Edmundsbury went to the siege of Windsor during the captivity of Cœur de Lion, "where he appeared in armour with certain other Abbots of England, bearing his own standard and retaining many knights

* *Archaeological Journal*, XXV, pp. 81-82.

† *Letters and Papers*, VII, p. 544.

‡ X, p. 482.

§ *Monasticon* I, p. 7.

|| *Matt. Paris, Hist. Angl.*, R.S., p. 642, and *Rymer, Foedera*, I, pp. 873-876.

¶ *Chronicle of Battle Abbey*, p. 204.

** *Register*, pp. 86; 107.

at heavy charges.”* In 1087 the King translated the Abbot of Malmesbury to Peterborough Abbey, because the countryside there was so infested with robbers that there was need of a military Abbot able to defend his monastery against freebooters.†

It is, however, above all in his capacity of landlord and ruler of his barony that the mediaeval Abbot most interests us. Was he a success? Green, the historian, says that the churchman was at least a better landlord than his contemporary layman, and even Coulton grudgingly admits this. Viollet-le-duc, who knew his Middle Ages well enough, puts the question: “Will those who reproach the Benedictines with their immense riches and the enormous power they had been able to acquire, ask themselves if their earthly and intellectual goods could, in those days, have been placed more usefully for humanity in other hands?”‡ That is the point. Could anyone have done better *at the time*? Viollet-le-duc thought not. For mediaeval notions of social justice were not the same as ours. Their minds had not been stirred by the great revolutions of our modern era, nor guided by the great encyclicals of the modern Popes, adequately to consider the poor man’s point of view. Their use of serfdom, for instance, shocks our own notions of liberty, but we cannot expect them all to have been men before their time. They found themselves entrenched in the feudal system, and tried to make the best of it. At any rate, they gave generous employment and contributed vastly to the building up of that English culture of art, music and literature, the beauty of which is our heritage. The Abbots were rich; they squandered their money, but they squandered it well. Not only did they employ scribes, artisans, artists, masons and labourers of all kinds, but they paid well. Their servants were well-to-do. Many of them held hereditary posts, granted them by letters patent from the monks in Chapter. At Westminster, the porter, butler, beadle and tailor, all held their posts by right of heredity.§ There was a hereditary family of goldsmiths employed at Ely; they were well-to-do landowners, whose sons could become Bishops and Archdeacons, or marry heiresses and become chief laymen of the town.|| Serlo, the butler of Bath, was a landowner.¶ In 1278 the mason of Winchecomb received a charter under the convent seal allowing him to build a house for himself in the precincts, and the monks provided stone and timber for it at their own cost. If the mason fell ill at any time, he was granted two loaves of

* *Chronicle of Jocelin*, p. 82.

† Mabillon, *Annales*, V, p. 220

‡ *Dictionnaire de l'Architecture*, art: “Architecture Monastique”, p. 252.

§ *Consuetudines Westmonasterii*, H.B.S., p. 73.

|| *Sacrist Rolls of Ely*, I, p. 151, et seq.

¶ *Two Cartularies of Bath Abbey*, II, p. 22.

bread, two tankards of beer, and two dishes from the Abbot's kitchen every day, with food, clothes and provender for his two servants and his two horses; moreover, he was entitled to one new suit of livery every year, and when incapacitated by old age, he was to receive the same allowance, but might be content with only one servant and one horse. He remained in the Abbot's service thirty years, and grew rich.* Payment in land was very common. The porter of Abingdon was paid chiefly in land, besides receiving an ample daily ration. The larderer and cooks of the same monastery were also paid in acres.† Monastic servants were always clothed and fed at the monks' expense. At Christchurch, Canterbury, they wore white camlet or green sendal *foncée*; the squires were given vermilion suits with black and white satin, and the domestics were fitted out with yellow stuff trimmed with black or red satin, and furs of white lambskin.‡ At Eynsham, the valets wore serge with lambskin.§ At Abingdon, they wore mixtillion.||

It was a picturesque age. The feudal Abbots of England were benefactors to society and patrons of the art, music and literature of our culture. They built almshouses, hospitals, bridges, causeways, river-embankments; they were the employers of our artists and craftsmen—architecture, painting, sculpture, illuminating, embroidery, enamelling, alabaster, ivory and metal-work of all kinds; they were in part responsible for the cultivation and afforestation of English soil; they were hospitable even to munificence; and they were a great deal responsible for the development of law and for that respect for judicial proceedings which they had so much interest in promoting. In many of the monastic chronicles we find that litigation plays a very prominent part in the secular affairs of a monastery. The great Abbot de la Mare was the most litigious of Abbots. During a period of more than forty years, he kept up a continual round of lawsuits. No one was too exalted or too humble for him to disregard. He sued the King and his Princes, he sued the Bishop, he sued the Earls and Countesses, serfs and villeins, ladies of high rank down to little prioresses and retail dealers in London.¶ The very merits of a great Abbey seem to have made it the object of attack to those in high places (who benefitted by its existence), and it was the Abbot's duty to fight for the rights of his house. He invariably met an attack by an appeal to the law. He made the law-courts his field of battle, when his lay compeers were sometimes only too ready to have recourse

* *Landboec*, II, p. 138.

† *Chronicon de Abingdon*, II, p. 237.

‡ *Litteræ Cantuarienses*, III, pp. 381-2.

§ *Cartulary of Eynsham*, I, p. 378.

|| *Accounts of the Obedientiaries*, p. 148.

¶ *Gesta Abbatum*, III, p. x.

to wanton force. The King extracted war subsidies from them, and borrowed their money; he pensioned his worn-out servants on them, and demanded their hospitality. The Bishop jealously watched for an opportunity of exercising his prerogatives over them, and endeavoured to waive their papal privileges. The local baron was jealous of their wealth and influence. The burgesses of the towns which grew up round them, and their serfs, were naturally constantly trying to shake off the feudal obligations which the Abbots, as their manorial lords, demanded of them. In all these affairs, they heaped lawsuit upon lawsuit and thus promoted legitimate arbitration against wanton force.* There were saintly Abbots, in whom we glory; there were Abbots steeped in sin. But between the saints and hardy sinners, there stood the great number of gallant and lovable men, human like ourselves, but men who framed the beauty of our English mediaeval culture. On the whole, they were fine fellows.

When Abbots retired from office, they were granted a pension and a room in the Infirmary, or even a manor house or two. When they died, they were buried with great pomp, and alms were lavishly thrown to the poor at their funerals and subsequent anniversaries. The great ones would leave property for the maintenance of these anniversaries: masses to be said, candles to illuminate their tombs, food to be given to the poor, and nuts and wine to be distributed to the monks of the house. When Abbot Estney's grave was discovered at Westminster, he was found lying in a chest quilted with yellow satin; he was wearing a gown of crimson silk, girded with a black girdle; on his legs were white silk stockings, and over his face, which was black, was spread a clean napkin.†

ALBAN LÉOTAUD, O.S.B.

* Bond, *Chronica de Melsa*, II, pp. xlix, lv.

† *Westmonasterium*, 1793. Dart. II, p. xxxiii.

ISABELLE RIVIÈRE

TO be the wife of Jacques Rivière and the sister of Henri Alain-Fournier would seem to be in itself a sufficient claim to distinction.

Isabelle Rivière has added to that distinction by forming a third in a trinity of writers, not only acclaimed and brilliant, but which has served the best interests of our time. The three writers had a high-mindedness, a delicacy of perception, a fineness, in the sense of their native *finesse*, which can seldom have been found in such exact proportions in such a trio.

Jacques Rivière and Alain-Fournier were sacrificed in the immense holocaust of the Four Years War, Isabelle Rivière lived to perpetuate their memory in writing as distinguished as their own. Probably her outstanding service to the truth which was the supreme passion of her husband's life is her editorship of, and her preface to, his correspondence* with Paul Claudel. It has become a textbook for the seeker of the same realities.

Jacques Rivière had been in the van of those who acclaimed Claudel as France's greatest modern poet, but it was the writer's Christianity which first amazed and then, if only intellectually, attracted the boy of twenty. He wrote off to Claudel in China. The longest, the most patient series of letters from such a man to a disciple, and the most exasperating of disciples, followed. The charity of the teacher Rivière had sought, half across the world, survived, and six whole years later bore its first tangible results.

It has been said that Jacques Rivière was not a thinker. In the most exacting sense of the term it may be true. He was, however, only thirty-four when he died from the results of three years in a German prison camp followed by three of strain and overwork in Paris. In his last and most mature period, as a director of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, he was too much engaged with the writings of other people to have time for work of his own. His wife's task has been to make good, as far as may be, that loss and that of her brother. Besides *Correspondance* she has edited the letters in four volumes of the two writers and friends to each other (Gallimard, Paris); *A La Trace de Dieu* (her husband's *Notes of Captivity* in Germany), besides other writings, and prefaces to those of other authors, concerning them. Her book *Le Bouquet de Roses Rouges* is perhaps unfortunately named for a novel that is practically an autobiography, and a biography of Jacques Rivière.

Pierre Charlot, in his study *Jacques Rivière*, called him "*Un des hommes les plus vrais de sa génération*". Isabelle Rivière is,

* *Correspondance*. Plon-Nourrit. Paris. First published 1926.

at the least, as "true"; her book is scrupulous and exhaustive. From it we *know* both husband and wife. It is so intimate a human document that the sensitive may wonder how so super-sensitive a writer could give it to the public and with little more disguise than the alteration of names and place-names. The fashion of our time for self-revelation would have influenced the author as little as any other literary fashion, the three writers of her family made their own atmosphere, their own "movement". The object of the book is simply to amplify and continue the history of Rivière's "conversion" and her own, to record the story of a profound and perfect love and consequent attainment of what should have been happiness—and its inadequacy; to tell others, as anchorless as she and he had been, that one cannot, do what one will, in the long run make anything of a life that has no opening on eternity. Jacques Rivière's return to the Faith was filled with revolts, and hers with halts and delayings, but both he and she had a crying need for truth, for reality, for God. It underlaid their most intimate and passionate moments. It haunted and pursued the arrogant young intellectual, and the no less intelligent, highly educated, ardent girl he had married. The book is her further gift to the pagan, unhappy world she had known, and to a wider world. Pietistic is the last word that can be applied to the book; it might appear, in a sense, scarcely spiritual, the search for truth of the seekers seeming to arise from a mere intensity of human need. The most materially minded reader might, indeed, forgive the supernatural element for the sheer interest of the drama, its realism, the sureness of the psychology, the charm of the book and its wit, if wit is not too caustic a term for humour so lightly touched and delicate.

The author's *Chemin de Croix du Pécheur* was qualified as *surprenant*, and surprise is a sensation often evoked by her so daring is her matter in the simple sense, once more, of being so profoundly true. *Maria Blanchard* is a little book, "A portrait," says Edmond Jaloux, "model of human interpretation, of style, of composition." Madame Rivière did not share the passion for writing which was the very stuff of her husband's life. His five published volumes of private letters were written before he was thirty; she wrote very few, "exquises" as they were said to be. One of the most characteristic of her shorter writings was a contribution to Charles Du Bos' review *Approximations*. The article ran counter to every French domestic tradition. Chesterton would have endorsed its defiant common sense. "In praise of Waste" might have been its title. Isabelle Rivière, who had never known easy circumstances, wrote in favour of ignoring prudence, or at least, the meticulous parsimony extolled in the

French bourgeoisie. Her husband, of a rich middle-class family which disapproved his choice of a dowerless wife and left him to its consequences, suffered and made his wife suffer, from a lack of a hundred things he believed he despised. Yet he had written to her: "One of the dearest things I shall find in you is that indefinable simplicity . . . that reserve of yourself before the little material demands of life by which so many women let their souls be stifled, reserve which, confronted with the essential, becomes magnificent abundance." Madame Fournier's simple plan for her only daughter was for her to avoid marriage and any "material demands". The bride, in consequence, had no idea when she married what even that essential of French existence—*La Soupe*—should, or should not, contain! Nor had she an idea how to cope at first with the wild Breton maid who knew less than herself. She could only suffer vicarious agony for the "savage's" imprisonment in their microscopic kitchen, while Jacques, forgetting his theories, suffered agony in the study. . . . Yet years later, when that idolized husband was dead, and sentiment might have dictated a retrospective regard for the small economies that should have governed their life, Madame Rivière wrote in derision of saving. Sit light to money, trust in God, *wear your best dress every day if you want to!* Hardly anything is so typical of the essential sanity and valour of one so "clinging" and so almost offensively feminine as Madame Rivière seemed.

Isabelle Rivière played an immeasurable part in the lives of her husband and brother, very small in inches, very quiet and very young as she then was. She had been first the shadow and companion of Alain-Fournier. He and Rivière met as students at Lakanal when both were about eighteen. She was no more than fourteen but "The first time" (her brother) "had talked of this new friend, so intelligent, so different from the others, all inflamed with enthusiasm and contempt, with great ideas and splendid ambitions, she had known it was *him*." She was grown up before they met, and all those years the quiet, determined little sister waited. . . . If her destiny were not to fuse with *his*, "Then it was that life was evil . . . it is then, O unknown God, that one was not made for happiness! But for what, for what then was one made?"

Isabelle Rivière was born in 1890, and grew up at Epigneuil-le-Fléuriel, a village of the Sologne so small as to be on no map, and sharing with her only brother, as Jacques Rivière wrote of him later, "the precious ignorance of any scenery other than that to be seen from the school windows"; their parents were the State school teachers. It was a gentle countryside of no outstanding charm, but the children loved it then, and Alain-Fournier, always

with passion; it was the scene and inspiration of his masterpiece *Le Grand Meaulnes*. Their childhood was happy, if children so sensitive to each smallest impression can really have been happy. School, at any rate, had no terrors for them, it was concerned with books, and that invested it with all interest. It was also their home, a long red house with five glass doors opening under a virginia-creeper on to an immense courtyard. In the salon, used as a bedroom when the old countryman grandfather came to stay, were the few, so to say, authorized story-books; so long as they did not spoil them they were free of them. In the vast and shadowy attics, in the summer, were stacked the "prizes" to be distributed to the school in July; there, hours were spent snatching a fearful joy, for at any moment Madame Fournier might call up to know what they were doing, "Not reading by any chance?" Isabelle's timid, "Only a little . . ." somehow sufficed as reassurance. Far worse was the children's other escape from reality, the brook at the garden-end, with its enchanted islet amid-stream, where school overalls might at any moment be torn or stained. They must have had freedom, however, for, on Sundays, seated on an ancient rocker in the neglected Archives "filled with dead flies" of the Mairie, they read interminably. Henri would push the heavy table against tall book-cases and perilously hand down books to the little sister, while Madame Fournier, "who never expected anything but misfortune", called at intervals from her bedroom. In that haven on her day of rest she *rafistolait d'humbles toilettes* her son wrote later with nostalgic affection for years he called "the dearest and most tormented" of his life.

Childhood for Isabelle had meant Henri. "She had learnt all that she knew from him." They were fellow-conspirators, but he was her model, her ideal. Claude Aveline speaks of her as "his sister who is like him". Indeed, it is hard to separate the three writers of the family, they are so interwoven in each other's destiny that what is written of one draws in the others. In a sense, however, Alain-Fournier is someone apart. He has left his legend. "I hardly dare speak his name," Aveline wrote.* "He was proud, of a great reserve, a surprising purity (*pudeur*) . . . Tall, well-made, he would have made a fine *cuirassier*. . . . The splendid comrade whose inner riches one scarcely suspects. . . . And no riches have surpassed his." When Isabelle was sixteen, Henri had just left Lakanal after failing to pass his final as he and Rivière always failed to do. He was going on to Louis-le-Grand. Isabelle was allowed to go with him to Paris with a view to her professorship, and their grandmother joined them in a

* In preface to *Miracles*, Alain-Fournier (13th edition) Gallimard.

"very poor and tiny entresol of the rue Mazarine", with all its windows on to a well-like courtyard, on the left bank of the Seine. Before long Madame Fournier, unable to live far from "the children", unbelievably obtained a transfer to Paris to a Maternity Centre. She was with them when at last Henri brought to the flat *l'intime, le frère* Jacques Rivière, escaped from bourgeois luxury in Bordeaux, and whom Henri loved, sometimes reviled, never dreamt of doing without.

The last thing Jacques wanted was to get married, least of all, perhaps, to his friend's sister. She herself wrote of their poet friend, René Bichet, that he was "like us of the people, a poor, almost peasant" (*campagnarde*) "family"—it was not a marriage that would be approved by a fashionable lawyer for his eldest son. Even a greater obstacle, Jacques was full of great ambitions, of "false visions"—the plain facts of marriage were not for his haughty spirit. Yet at the very first meeting, as the door closed, he could not help saying, "*Comme elle est intelligente, ta sœur.*" She was so unlike silly seventeen, so grave, so kind; she *said* hardly anything, with no "little poses, those provocative defences usual to young girls who feel themselves becoming women". His defence was long and "hard and cruel", she says. She made no sort of move, no sign, just, at the worst, cried in bed at night. At long last the defence broke down, in the street of all places, where he so often (of course unknown to Madame Fournier) brought her back from the Cours she still followed. They were married about two years later.

Jacques Rivière had, at the least, the temperament of most men of genius, its nervous tensions, its fatigues and sudden glooms; his wife had her irritating inexperience, yet it may reasonably be doubted whether any marriage was more complete, more impassioned in feeling, more intensely aware of itself. "And yet, and yet, it must be owned," she wrote, "*il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas.*" They had happiness and yet they were not happy. . . . Neither would say so to the other, it was too incredible. "They were one" but they were still separate, thrown back on themselves—some great unifying principle was lacking.

Marcel Proust, when he had finished his great book, had sent it to the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, and it was refused there as it was by other publishers even when Proust offered to pay for publication; André Gide had partly read it and then thrown it aside. Rivière was the youngest of the directors and the only one to want the book accepted. Rivière was one of Proust's two literary executors. Madame Rivière had not then begun to write and it might have surprised her husband to know that, leagues apart from Marcel Proust as her work would be in taste

and selectiveness, it might none the less recall him in certain aspects. Proust could have taught her nothing in sincerity, little in meticulous analysis of thought and feeling or of life lived from day to day. If *Le Bouquet de Roses Rouges*, her most important work, seems sentimental, as other people's love stories are apt to do, she does not mind—it was what happened. Love, for her, had been the first, the only thing, yet taken on its merits and as a mere human passion, love is a vast deception—that is what she wants to tell her generation. The world of books—which was the Rivières' world—the *romans chastes* of college days, poetry, erotic novels, all, she writes, lied and misled. And what of the conspiracy of deceit surrounding the mere *acte charnel*? "Against all this what arms had been given them? . . . They had wasted all their youth in study—all the stuff they had in their heads!—they know Histories and Philosophies and Sciences and the Arts and they know nothing, they do not know how to live."

On the night of their entry into their future home Rivière had amazed his wife, given over to the emotion of such a moment, by producing and hanging up the Beau Dieu d'Amiens, the only Crucifixion he had thought bearable in a search of the shops. Though Isabelle had not liked the print, and had not looked at it again, before long they were "two in future to search for God, to pray to Him each night for light", kneeling beside it. Neither knew at all clearly what they believed. Isabelle's instruction, scanty as it must have been, had left no imprint on her mind. Jacques had had the Faith till he was eleven and his mother died. In manhood, religion became to him "the great temptation", "his strongest objection to Catholicism was, perhaps, the fear that it would make life too easy, that it would give him everything cleared up in advance".*

Slowly, inexorably, through all the cross-currents of their life of feeling, of Rivière's exhausting "teaching" which he hated but which was then their income, of contacts with an exclusive and arid literary society which, for all their poverty, discovered and entertained them, Faith forced itself upon them. Belief in, and love of, God being implicit in them, Claudel had shown its concrete application so clearly that it had needed Jacques' inexhaustible powers of argument and criticism to hold out against it. In pages of a poignant realism Agathe (who is Isabelle) in *Le Bouquet de Roses Rouges* reaches a deadlock. She wakes at night. Michel, her husband, is so quiet he scarcely breathes. Is he dead? No, *but he will have to die some day*. So will she and it will be as if they had never been . . . that simply

* *Correspondance*, Preface, p. iv.

cannot be the case. "Michel"—she wakes him—"I cannot go on, I cannot live like this."

So the end was reached. At Christmas, 1913, Claudel had materialized in the full sense of the word; from Tien-Tsin where he was the Great Unknown, he had returned to France; they had all met. "Je suis bien tranquille sur votre compte," he had written in May, "You will end by escaping from narcissism and epicureanism, from that hall of mirrors which will never show you anything new but only the images which you yourself supply." Claudel had never flattered his disciple's not inconsiderable pride! At the end of the year the long trail ended, the Rivières, first Isabelle and then Jacques, came back to the Catholic Church. She had need of all the fortitude the fact could give her, for in less than two years, at the outbreak of war, her husband was taken prisoner and Alain-Fournier was killed. Three years after the Armistice Jacques Rivière died.

MRS. GEORGE NORMAN

SOME RECENT BOOKS

Man on His Nature. By Sir Charles Sherrington, O.M. The Gifford Lectures 1937-38. (Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

IN these lectures an excellent statement of the results and present position of the natural sciences is combined with a philosophy, a natural theology, if such it can be termed, which no Christian, indeed no genuine theist, could accept. And the former is employed to guarantee the latter. This makes the book dangerous reading for those who cannot disentangle good science from bad philosophy.

Sir Charles rejects vitalism. In his view living matter does not differ essentially from inorganic. The latter is nothing but a more complicated chemical arrangement, and vital phenomena can be explained without residue by chemistry. This does seem in fact to be the verdict of the most competent modern scientists, and we can hardly maintain vitalism any longer, as Driesch understood it—the vitalism which postulates the insertion into the physico-chemical series of an "entelechy" to supplement at a given point the insufficiencies of the inorganic. But it does not follow that the vital is no more than a continuation of the inorganic. Sir Charles admits that it is not the mere addition of chemical factors. It is a new scheme, a novel pattern of them, which is a new integration of them. Since he regards the physico-chemical, as in the last resort electric energy, in which we believe he is right, he speaks of an energy pattern. It would surely be more accurate to speak of a pattern of energy, a patterned energy. And this pattern, which Sir Charles is disposed to assimilate to Aristotle's form, just because it is a new integration of its physico-chemical material, is a new and a higher form and therefore brings into existence a new and a higher kind of energy.

In this case the difference between the living and the inorganic, though in a sense one of degree, the difference between a higher and a more integrated and a lower less integrated energy is also one of kind. Something qualitatively new and something higher has supervened, namely the integrating pattern or form of the living organism. That is to say on his own account of it the distinction between the living and the non-living is greater than Sir Charles allows, and he should have accepted a vitalism intermediate between that of Driesch and the view that life is just chemistry, a continuation of inorganic chemistry. Further, this new and higher form must have come in the last resort from the Divine Wisdom. Otherwise the lower would of itself produce the higher, a cause and effect which exceeds itself. And the fact remains that if not impossible, which cannot be proved, it is at least so difficult for the inorganic to receive this higher integrative form of living matter that up to the present scientists have failed to produce living matter artificially. Sir Charles tells us that chemical

compounds peculiar to the living organism can be synthesized in the laboratory. He fails to notice that this means that these compounds can be produced only by the action of a vital form or of a being not merely living but intelligent. They are not produced apart from either. Nor has he even mentioned the fact that the organism, so long as it lives, resists the process of dissipating energy to which the inorganic is subject. The advent of the vital integrating form has produced a reversal of direction.

Sir Charles leaves, however, an insoluble dualism of mind and energy. He admits that experience proves that mind and bodily energy interact. Yet we cannot understand how such a thing is possible. Though in any case the nexus between mind and body eludes us, it might seem less anomalous if Sir Charles did not confine energy to the physico-chemical energy which science can measure. Consideration of mind, however, shows that it also is an energy, albeit of a higher order than the physical. The analogy between the conation of desire and will and the exercise of physical energy shows that even here the diversity of kind can be resolved into a diversity of degree. The lower, the physical energy differs, we hold, from the higher, the mental, in that the form which constitutes it what it is, is less integrative and the energy it constitutes less real.

Sir Charles should the less object to such a view, since after all he is disposed to regard the electric energy which from the electron upwards builds up the physical world as nothing more than a mental construct, a working postulate. To this we cannot subscribe. That it does work consistently over so vast a field is surely proof that the electric energy is not a construct of mind but a real object. And this *volte face* from an approach to materialism to an implicit idealism does not dispose us to attach too great importance to Sir Charles as a philosopher as contrasted with the authority he may justly claim as an exponent of science.

He is also inclined to reject the entire notion of cause as superfluous. Superfluous it may be for the purely descriptive treatment by the sciences of measurable phenomena, whose end is to establish equations. But it is an immediate certitude of experience which also assures us with the same self-evidence that, if not electrons or even atoms, at least the physical objects, whose constitution they explain, are objective realities. Indeed Sir Charles is constantly using the indispensable language of causation.

He believes in an impersonal Deity. It is not clear whether he means by this equivocal term less or more than personal. If the latter, he accepts after all a personal Deity in the sense in which Catholic theology accepts it. But we fear he does not, at least not clearly and consistently.

If, however, impersonal is understood as less than personal, to

speaking of subliming personal Deity to Deity wholly impersonal is as though we should speak of subliming the personality of the living man into the impersonality of his corpse. It is not true that the personal God of Catholic theology is a projection of the human ego. How can the Godhead of the negative theology, the Deity beyond every concept to which the Catholic mystics point us, be an anthropomorphic projection? Significantly Sir Charles says nothing of this traditional and orthodox Christian theology. It does not fit his picture of Christian theism. In two passages indeed Sir Charles hints at a truer view. He makes nature observe that "perhaps in knowing me you do but know the instrument of a Purpose, the tool of a Hand" (a gross anthropomorphism), too large for your sight to compass. And he suggests that to listen to the harmony of nature may be "to commune with its Composer". Here he seems to understand his impersonal Deity as superpersonal.

Nevertheless he is sure that we cannot commune directly with any Divine Power or be helped by it. We must look only to our fellow men—whose present behaviour, we may add, is hardly an encouragement to do so. Sir Charles refuses to believe anything, directly or indirectly, that we do not or cannot establish by the evidence of experience. A sound principle but applied too narrowly. We must accept all forms of experience, including religious. But we can hardly expect such acceptance from a man whose scepticism refuses to accept the evidence of our immediate experience that the world of physical objects is certainly real, not a mental construction. And if we should accept all forms of experience why must we accept only what we ourselves do or can experience? Why not accept the experience of the Saints and the experience of those men who were channels of God's public revelation, above all of the God Man?

Sir Charles' refusal to go further towards theism is evidently influenced to a considerable extent by his acute sense of the dysteleology and suffering in nature. He gives us a detailed account of the malaria germ and its exquisite adaptation to reproduce itself at such a hideous cost of human suffering and mortality.

The difficulty is of course very grave. But this misapplied design cannot invalidate the fact of design and its testimony to Intelligence as its ground and cause. We might as well say that the apparent anomaly of interacting mind and body invalidates the fact of it. Rather it presses us to look further for a hypothesis which explains both the design and the dysteleology. Such a hypothesis is that which ascribes the latter to the intrinsic limitations of the material in which the design must be executed. This does not mean, as in one passage Sir Charles suggests, that the faulty matter is therefore stronger than God, but simply that not even God can accomplish the intrinsic impossibility of making this material more perfect than its nature

admits. Provided there is a balance of good over evil in creation the Creator's wisdom and benevolence are justified. As regards the brutes, since, as Sir Charles shows, pain increases in ratio of nervous organization, there is good cause to think there is a balance of pleasure in life over suffering. And man, for whom alone there is reason to suppose the contrary, is able to reach an everlasting bliss. This of course Sir Charles flatly denies, because there is no *direct* evidence of it. If, however, reason proves the existence of a wise and a good Creator—that is a first cause more not less than human wisdom and goodness, and if the suffering of humanity is consistent with His existence only if man's soul survives bodily death, this is an *indirect* proof that the hypothesis is correct unless of course it can be positively disproved. But it cannot be disproved. Sir Charles has to admit mental activity directly imperceptible to us, also that the self somehow survives the apparent extinction of consciousness in deep sleep.

So confident, however, is he that man's mind must be inseparable from his mortal body, that he insists with the utmost emphasis that he is and must be earthbound, of the earth earthy. In this connection he adopts an attitude of reverence towards the earth, and nature, hardly consistent with the struggle to subdue the earth and purge nature of its evil in which he sees the task of the human race. Moreover, he has to account for the strange fact that man has so persistently refused to be earthbound, that he has looked beyond and conceived himself immortal, that so many of the noblest representatives of humanity have been convinced that his goal lies in a higher world, and that the belief has inspired so much of his greatest literary and artistic achievement. "Seek the things that are above, mind you are come to the heavenly Jerusalem." "We look for a city whose builder and maker is God." This is not the utterance of an earthbound spirit. The civilization of Europe was rescued from the anarchy which destroyed the Roman Empire by men convinced that their citizenship was in heaven. Against all this Sir Charles can but appeal to the fact that we can imagine the next life only in terms of this. What of it? Our imagination is admittedly bound to sense and mortal. What is significant is that this "earthbound" creature should strain his earthly images as though to compel them against their nature to express spiritual realities. And Sir Charles has himself pointed out that we do so to express the sole spiritual reality whose existence is undeniable in our own mind.

If we will accept the total evidence of human experience, we shall reach a philosophy and a theology even natural which the natural sciences by the very restriction of their method and scope cannot directly attest, but which equally they cannot refute, the answer to the why beyond their how. Indeed the teleology to which they do

in fact witness, whose extent and exquisite elaboration are shown in these lectures, sorts ill with Sir Charles' rejection of teleology because it does not enter into their quantitative descriptions of co-ordination and sequence. Rather does it point us above the descriptive domain of the sciences to a philosophy which frankly accepts this teleology, the philosophy of theism.

Man's Suffering and God's Love. By the Very Rev. Monsignor J. Messner. Translated by Sheila Wheatley. (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 2s. 6d.)

THE test of any such book as this is whether one could send it, at a time of suffering, to one's lover, one's friend, one's son. It is saying a great deal for Mgr. Messner's sincerity and energy of style to allow that his comes anywhere near passing that test. It is, of course, meant for Christians; it assumes at least the intention of faith; it is designed, that is, to awaken an operation. It is we in operation who are called faithful; inoperative, we are connoisseurs of religion, or at best amateurs. Alas, that we must be called to be professionals. The phrase "profession of faith" implies no less. It is the skill of that profession to which Mgr. Messner directs us.

He stresses, one way or another, the sense of union. Suffering, for a Christian, involves that intention of making it a means of union with God and with man through the God-Man. Mgr. Messner does not (I think) claim, as some rash teachers have tended to insist, that suffering is the only way to that; for he quotes St. Thérèse of Lisieux—"to see God's will in everyday life and to do it with our whole strength, that, she says, is perfection." Delight may be as much that as pain; the fact that the Jews could even think of calling our Lord a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber must at least, I suppose, mean that He exhibited a certain enjoyment in His food. And the Eucharist itself hints that He gives us something beyond rather than this side wine. But we cannot be certain of the recurrence of delight, and we can be certain of the recurrence of pain. When that dark prospect is offered now, as always, to so many and so dear, must we tell them to be glad of it?

It is at least possible that, in the Christian economy, they suffer so that we may, and, so doing, may dreadfully commit ourselves. They suffer then indeed for us. If we send them this book, or any, if we encourage them to bear, we are pledged to bear as much. They suffer perhaps in order that we may pray. That prayer itself will be of the nature of suffering, and blessed so. "Others he saved; himself he cannot save" is the maxim of prayer.

It is to this union in pain that Mgr. Messner devotes his pages. "Suffering is life." Death-in-life is to become life-in-death. He is

concerned to instruct us again how the Cross exhibits the old classic phrase in its reality: "dying each other's life, living each other's death". The alternative is hell—"perishing everlastingly". It is a too terrible choice? Perhaps; but at least He who desired it endured it: *mysterium fidei*.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Poverty and Progress. By Seeböhm Rowntree. (Longmans. 15s.)

IN the haze of generalizations, ideologies and -isms that obscure so much of our social thinking, it is refreshing to come upon a straightforward factual analysis which describes a situation on the basis of evidence, not wish-fulfilment, and offers conclusions for which there are carefully sifted statistical grounds. Mr. Rowntree's book will be read with gratitude by all students of the social sciences and, it is hoped, by a much wider public, whose views on the social structure of their country tends to be onesided or flatly ignorant.

This survey of working-class conditions in York, when compared with a similar survey made in 1899, gives evidence of the solid measure of progress that has been achieved. In 1899 one-sixth of the working-class population of York lived at the level of bare physical necessity. By 1936 only one-fourteenth could be said to be living in that state. Real wages had risen by one-third. One-quarter of the working-class population was living in houses better than the very best in 1899. In 1899 the annual death rate was 72 per 1,000. By 1936 it had fallen to 11.6, while infant mortality was down by two-thirds.

Now all this represents a solid measure of improvement which has revolutionized the position of hundreds of families condemned before to live below the poverty line, and has opened up to them new possibilities of life and hope. The progress has been achieved by the steady methods of democratic reform. It has not been sensational—or rather it has not been sensationalized—but it is there. And it points towards a line of advance that must be followed in the future.

For while admitting the progress, we must also admit and deplore the continuance of dire poverty. Taking as the poverty line the rather meagre wage of 43s. 6d. a week for a man and his wife and three dependent children, Mr. Rowntree discovers that over one-third of the working-class population in York live below it. One person in fifteen lives in conditions of "obvious want and squalor". The causes of this poverty are easy to ascribe. In the case of one-third of the families examined, it was due to insufficient wages; about one-quarter was due to unemployment; about one-seventh to old age. In this regime of extreme poverty, children suffer most, since the larger the family the more insufficient the wages or unemployment relief. Nearly one-half of the working-class children in York in the first

five years of their life live in what Mr. Rowntree calls "primary poverty", that is, well below the level at which full physical efficiency can be maintained.

These facts give a line of approach to future social reform. Minimum wages and family allowances, higher unemployment benefit, better provision for old age, better provision for the health of the community—these are the steps that must be taken to raise every citizen in the country above the level of unremitting and abject poverty.

Poverty and Progress is not confined to the material conditions of life. There is also an extremely valuable section dealing with the leisure hours of the working-class population in York and analysing the various ways in which the great increase in leisure is being used. There can be no doubt that it presents a far from satisfactory picture. Many of the pursuits are idle and even dangerous, and although on the whole the Rowntree Survey is strictly confined to analysis rather than comment, the author does allow himself some words of warning about the standards which can be expected from those who grow up in this new atmosphere of pleasure-loving irresponsibility. There is little evidence to suggest that the more serious pursuits have kept proper pace with the increased facilities for leisure, and it does seem that the extension of leisure time has led to the superficializing of the citizen's activities; extensive development has taken the place of intensive development. The trend should not, of course, be exaggerated. It has always been a question of a small élite—the serious steady responsible adults who have been the pillar of the Church, of the Trade Union Movement and of civic life. But now this élite has a far wider mass to leaven and there are signs, too, that it is decreasing in size, not only relatively but absolutely. No amount of improvement in the material conditions of the people, overdue and entirely justified though it undoubtedly is, will create a sane, healthy and free community unless the quality of life in the spiritual and intellectual sense is improved as well. The Church and the school are the great instruments of this deepening of man's attitude towards reality, and much will depend upon the energy and devotion with which their workers take up the task.

In many ways *Poverty and Progress* is a model of what a survey should be. But two criticisms are, perhaps, permissible. First of all, it cannot be said that York is typical of the modern industrialized community of this country. Until recently it was not a town into which industry had penetrated very deeply, and much of its poverty is of an almost mediaeval character—the poverty which springs up in the market town dependent upon the surrounding countryside, and living by an immediate exchange of goods and services. Nor—unhappily—can it be said that the enlightened industrialism of the great Quaker firms—which is the industry of York—is typical of the

country at large. Mr. Rowntree was, of course, justified in studying the town in which his facilities for study were greatest, but it would be invaluable if a similar survey could be undertaken for, say, Manchester, a centre of the old industrialism, or Slough, of the new.

The second criticism is perhaps more serious. The reader leaves the survey knowing an immense number of facts about the people of York, even to details of their houses and leisure hours. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that he will know the people of York themselves. They obstinately remain "digits", statistical digests, heads of population. Nor is the reader able to conjure up a vision of the community itself. The municipal balance sheet is there, but not the life of the municipality. The criticism will be met, no doubt, with the reply that the book set out to be a survey and not an imaginative reconstruction. But the survey itself might have gained in point and bite if the imagination had been given more to work on.

BARBARA WARD.

The Theology of Politics. By Nathaniel Micklem. (Oxford University Press. Pp. xvi + 164. 7s. 6d.)

It is a conversational commonplace that the average Englishman is not philosophically minded. By contrast, he is often credited with considerable ability in practical affairs. In the political sphere he has succeeded in developing a system of government which in the past aroused the admiration of many foreign observers and was widely copied abroad. If continental parliamentarianism proved, on the whole, disappointing, this was partly due to the fact that it was based on political abstractions supposed to be of the essence of English political theory, whereas Englishmen as a whole were quite unconscious of holding any political theory at all. Compare the effect of Montesquieu and Rousseau, for example, on political development in France, with that of Hobbes and Locke in England. England has left "The Leviathan" to be dissected within the walls of the Universities, and, if Locke's analysis of civil government seems not unlike British practice, it is because he was chiefly concerned to provide the Whig Revolution with a philosophy after the event. In France, on the other hand, the influence of French theorists on political practice has been as strong as it has been harmful.

Are we then to conclude that on this side of the Channel we enjoy a not too unsatisfactory political system without any philosophy behind it, while on the Continent an addiction to theorizing has produced a habit of frequently upsetting the political apple-cart? Is it best to dispense with all general theory and to concentrate on the concrete and the empirical?

Of course, in spite of appearances, this is as impossible in politics

as it is in personal life. Whatever we choose deliberately we choose in the light of some general principle which we hold consciously or unconsciously, temporarily or lastingly. Dr. Micklem is perfectly correct when he maintains as the main thesis of his new book that politics and theology are inextricably bound together, taking "theology" to mean a system—or at least a sum—of ideas about the meaning of human life, the value of man and the existence (or non-existence) of God. Perhaps this is to give too wide a meaning to the term, but it is the meaning Dr. Micklem attaches to it for the purpose of his book. The average Englishman may be rather vague in his ideas about God and not very articulate about the value of man or the meaning of human life; but there does seem to be at least one firmly-held English political principle, viz., that there are certain human rights which the State has a duty to respect, and in this principle there is implicit a whole philosophy of God and man, even though there may be doubts and differences of opinion as to what those rights are. Those who hold it can never accept the totalitarian theory of State absolutism. Consciously or unconsciously, they are maintaining that there is an authority higher than that of any civil government, whether dictatorial or democratic. To say that this authority is "nature" is obviously only a half-answer which raises the great fundamental issues of theology and philosophy.

The conviction of the value of the human person which is expressed in the principle that there are inviolable natural rights of individuals and nations, and which is at the bottom of what Dr. Micklem calls "burning moral indignation" and a "sense of transcendent righteousness outraged" when internationally might prevails over right, he attributes to a British inheritance of Puritanism, resting upon the theology of John Calvin. This, he considers, accounts for our desire to liberate the oppressed nations on the Continent. But surely this is much too narrow a view. The French revolutionary armies which set out to liberate, as they believed, oppressed continental nations were not inspired by Calvinism. Switzerland, the home of Calvinism, has not produced what Dr. Micklem calls "a crusading people". If, like the Scots, the Swiss have shown a firm determination to defend freedom, this has not been peculiar to the Calvinist cantons; and certainly no one would suggest that Poland's fight for freedom had its source in Calvinism. The fact is that a belief in natural rights, so consonant with human reason, has always been supported by the Catholic Church. That Puritans should hold it, too, causes us nothing but rejoicing, but they should not be credited with a monopoly of its defence.

Dr. Micklem, an admirer of the *philosophia perennis*, accepts its teaching about natural law, the social nature of man and the State; and his programme for economic reconstruction is, in general outline.

that of the social encyclicals. He is particularly interesting in his treatment of international relations, quoting with approval *A Code of International Ethics* (Catholic Social Guild) and upholding the application of the moral law as between sovereign peoples. As he wisely says, "The doctrine of national sovereignty is true and necessary provided it be correctly stated." In a chapter on pacifism, which does not lack appreciation of the pacifist's position, he makes a good point when he asks what the Good Samaritan would have done had he appeared when the bandits were at work. Would he have resisted them, or passed by on the other side?

There is so much in his book to command the agreement of Catholics that one regrets finding him critical of our belief in the indissolubility of marriage. He suggests that Pius XI (called, by an oversight, Pius VI, an error repeated in the Index) should have distinguished, in *Casti Connubii*, between the indissolubility of marriage and its "indissolvendibility", the former implying a fact, the latter a duty. Although he does not express himself quite clearly, he seems to say that marriage *can* be dissolved, but that it *ought not* to be. Yet his distinction does not help him, for on one page (149) the "indissolvendibility" of marriage appears as "a law of nature and therefore of nature's great original", and on the next page he says "the indissolubility of the marriage state is the will of God and the law of nature". What then is the difference from the ethical or theological standpoint?

The fundamental problem in politics, whether theoretical or practical, is ever the same: whose will is to prevail—the will of man (and which man) or the will of God? "The question is, which is to be master—that's all," as Humpty Dumpty told Alice. Needless to say, Dr. Micklem's answer is identical with our own: God must be master, and there will be no lasting peace or happiness for the world until at least the Great Powers recognize Him as Supreme Lawgiver.

LEWIS WATT.

Benedict XV. By the Rev. Henry E. G. Rope. (John Gifford, Ltd., 7s. 6d.)

It was probably no small trial to Father Rope to have to wait more than two years for the publication of his life of *Pope Benedict XV.* Yet, in the event, the renewal of the Great War has made his book now more topical than when it was written. What he said in 1938 of Benedict XV as a would-be peace-maker during the struggle of 1914–1918 answers many of the questions that the world has been asking about the pronouncements and silences of Pius XII during the struggle that began in 1939.

For the situations confronting the two Popes have much in common.

Now, as twenty-five years earlier, a world war is in progress. Now, as then, one group of belligerents can fairly claim to have entered upon the war to vindicate a simple principle of international morality and, on this ground, have some reason to hope for a Papal pronouncement in their favour. On the other hand, neither group can claim to have carried on the war from altruistic motives pure and simple, so that a Papal pronouncement would in any case have to contain many reservations. Moreover, in both wars, illicit violence in diplomacy and in the conduct of operations had been conspicuous on one side but not confined to it. Most perplexing of all, on both occasions the Catholic world has, by the test of numbers, been engaged predominantly against the side which the head of the Catholic world might have been expected to support on moral grounds and, at the same time, international atheism (Masonic on the first occasion but now mainly Marxist) has been prominent on the side that has claimed this support.

As for the two Popes in question, both are regarded by the world (and, *pace* Father Rope, fairly regarded) as, in contrast with their immediate predecessors, "diplomatist Popes". Finally, each of them has, in these perplexing circumstances, confined his moral pronouncements in the main to generalities, giving only the slenderest indications of how he would apply the generalities to the particular cases on which the several belligerents impatiently demand, or threateningly refuse, his moral judgement.

Materials for the study of one of these two parallel situations may be found in abundance in Father Rope's pages. We may find also some aids to the formation of a judgement, though it hardly helps matters to dismiss as "amazing" a journalist's dictum "that the Vatican had allowed the terrible slaughter to go on for four years without effectively raising its voice or asserting its authority". It is surely not unreasonable to hold that Benedict's appeals for peace were not in point of fact effective and were not supplemented by the exercise of his authority over consciences. Neither in his case nor in that of our present Holy Father are real difficulties met by overriding the objector in this manner.

It would be pleasant to be able to add that this dismissal is the only blemish in Father Rope's book. In fairness to the reader, however, it must be added that the author has done little to arrange his materials helpfully, either by grouping them under topics (as did Fr. Philip Hughes in his admirable life of *Pius XI*) or even by dividing his chapters on any intelligible principle. Indeed, the same criticism might be passed on his division of the text into paragraphs. These may run to as many as six to the page and be followed by one of nearly three pages; and many of them, both short and long, introduce new topics in their very last sentences.

There are irritating defects (aggravated by the absence of an index)

from which the reader of a book on a topic of this importance may reasonably expect immunity. The same description applies to the numerous lapses from clear, or even correct, English: ("With the beginnings of Catholic Action the future Pope was also associated, then taking form at Florence"; "Since the Holy Father took no part . . . in the terms . . . a biographer may be excused from discussing them, which would raise a needless digression"; and there are many sentences without a main verb). We regret, also, the absence of illustrations such as would have helped to make a little-known personality more real to the reader. The absence of these may perhaps be attributed to the publisher, but this cannot be said of the absence of explanation of such terms as "the *non expedit*".

It remains true, none the less, that there is no other book in English that describes in equal detail, and accuracy in essentials, the situations with which the Vatican is confronted during a world war under contemporary conditions. This biography should be consulted by all who wish to learn the kind of considerations that a Pope must weigh before intervening on the side of either group of belligerents.

F. R. HOARE.

The Vatican and War in Europe. By Denis Gwynn. (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 7s. 6d.)

MR. GWYNN'S comprehensive survey of the part played by the Vatican during the most momentous years of modern European history should be read by all Catholics confronted by two questions frequently put to them at this juncture, and by those among their questioners who desire a far better answer than most people are qualified to give. These questions are: "If the Pope had made a better use of his unique position in Christendom would Europe be at war? And why does he not exert his authority over Catholics of all nations now, and thereby restore the peace he failed to maintain?" Mr. Gwynn's book not only gives a cogent reply to these but solves other perplexities caused by that imperfect knowledge of the mainsprings of Papal policy which gives rise to them.

Milton wrote *Paradise Lost* in order to justify the ways of God to man. He failed in his high endeavour, but it resulted in one of the masterpieces of English poetry. Mr. Gwynn set out to write an informed and trustworthy history of the part played by the Vatican during the years between 1914 and the present day, and has not only given a masterly account of Benedict XV's farseeing efforts to end the war in 1917 and of the work done by his successor to remedy the blunders of Versailles, but has justified the ways of God's Vicar to those who demand from him a leadership they repudiated four centuries ago as well as to those whose modified form of loyalty allows

them to criticize actions whose motives their incomplete grasp of the Pope's problems render them unfit to appreciate.

Many who thwarted Benedict XV's brave attempt to promote peace negotiations in August 1917 and those who in this country treated Lord Lansdowne as almost a traitor for advocating a similar course of action on our part, will now see only too clearly how terribly they were mistaken, and why. The account he gives of *L'Action Française* and of the reasons why Pius XI forbade its circulation among Catholics makes it clear why "ce malheureux Pape" (as a young French Catholic said to me at the time) chose to ban it even though M. Maurras's paper had already brought back many of her contemporaries to the practice of their religion; and the Catholics who fear that Pius XII is either tainted with or intimidated by Fascism will find consolation in Mr. Gwynn's exposition of the Axis propaganda responsible for such baseless alarm. In his excellent translation of the passages he quotes from various encyclicals known, unfortunately, to a very small percentage of the Catholic laity, he gives convincing proof of the stand made against anti-Christian ideals and actions—whether their exponents be Bolshevik, Nazi or Fascist—made with courage, knowledge and statesmanship by Popes Pius XI and XII successively.

It will be new to many that the France of 1914 was so bitterly anti-clerical that to many Catholics abroad a military alliance with her seemed as unbecoming to Christian men then as our comradeship with Russia on the battlefield does now. In reminding us of this Mr. Gwynn surely warrants a belief that it is not too fantastic a dream that Pius XI's foresight in having priests specially trained to take up work in Russia may be justified sooner than most of us dared to hope. He makes us see too a new application of the old proverb which says "Where the King is there is his Court, and where the master sits there is the head of the table." Just as Rome took the place of the captive Jerusalem as the City of the great King, the wise provision made by the Vatican will enable a new Rome to arise in whatever country may prove most worthy of the honour, should the Eternal City be once more laid waste by barbarians such as even she has never seen. Preparations in view of such a catastrophe began as soon as the danger became clear to the prescience of Pius XI.

As a historical summary it is of the utmost value; its character studies make it of absorbing interest. But it is far more than that. Published at a time when men are looking for spiritual leadership, and non-Catholic prejudice against the Papacy has become so modified that a newspaper as Protestant as the *Morning Post* gave "The Pope leads Christendom" as the title of its first leading article ten years ago, it may well be anticipated that some of Mr. Gwynn's non-Catholic readers may learn from his book why the questions referred to at the beginning of this review spring so naturally to the minds of

many whose forefathers expected the Pope to do so. They will see too that the true reason why the Holy Father cannot always take the line which seems to them a short cut to the just and lasting peace for which they know that he, like them, so ardently longs (with a zeal even more according to knowledge than their own, with all their good will and charity, can ever be) is that while "the compassion of man is towards his neighbour the mercy of God is towards all flesh". And, therefore, His Vicar, as loyal Catholics acknowledge him to be—the Shepherd and Bishop of all Christians as he styles himself—also "hath mercy, and teacheth and correcteth as a shepherd doth his flock".

GERTRUDE DONALD.

Japan in the World Crisis. By C. J. Stranks. (Sheldon Press, Northumberland Avenue, W.C.2. 1s. 6d.)

THE importance of Mr. Stranks' book on Japan is out of all proportion to its size and price: it should be read at once by all those in any sense interested in attempting to understand that perplexing nation. It is a penetrating and sincere attempt to sum up the position of Japan in the face of the general, spiritual and material unrest of the moment, and is so fair and balanced that both Europeans and Japanese must benefit equally from it—neither is spared just and discerning criticism.

The starting-point of Mr. Stranks' argument comes in this sentence towards the end: "One of the hardest things for English public opinion to do is to realize that a nation which has never known Christianity cannot be expected to act upon the diluted Christian morality which we imagined so fondly, until a while ago, was the norm of conduct between nations." This is, of course, the first thing to understand when considering Japan, and yet such is the bashful and timid nature of our adherence as a nation to Christianity that few, if any, writers on Japan have cared to express this most obvious fact—the Christian morality has, in fact, become so diluted that the nation as a whole appears unaware of its leaven. Again, "where the totalitarian powers of Europe had first to create a non-Christian philosophy in order to provide the stimulus and the justification for the deeds they contemplated, Japan had all that she needed lying more or less dormant within her. She had not to commit the great apostasy as Italy and Germany had to do, she had not to create a false God, for she had never accepted the true one. She had only to re-emphasize and re-state in more urgent and modern terms her own national philosophy." More correctly, Japan never had any notion or conception of God in however debased a form, for the Japanese are materialists in a sense so far-reaching that it is to be doubted whether

a true European can well grasp it; they accept the world in the most literal sense and look for nothing beyond it. (Here one would like to suggest that the word "Kami", concerning the meaning of which Mr. Stranks makes interesting observations, might be taken to be the equivalent of the Greek "Hero".) Isolated from the rest of the world—the Straits of Tsushima are eight times as wide as the Straits of Dover—race became of paramount importance to them and the Head of the Japanese race the highest being known to them. It is therefore not altogether fair—though commendably objective—to state that Japan at the time of her opening to intercourse with the West "had at once gone to the heart of the matter when she saw that power and material success were the two gods of the nineteenth century; these she had immediately taken for her own objects of worship . . ." since she had always worshipped them. It would be truer to say that she was encouraged in her worst tendencies by Western example. The worship of the Race or Tribalism is the very essence of the Japanese system, and it is to Tribalism that the Japanese cling in the face of the dangers of the modern world. They do not lust after power as individuals, but it is self-evident to them that their divine race should rule the world—or, as they would put it, that all nations should share in their benefits. Mr. Stranks' exposition of the way of the Emperor (or "The Tenno's Way" as he prefers it), which is the lofty title given to their tribalism, is beyond praise; it is profoundly depressing to all who have the welfare of the Far East at heart.

Materialism begat tribalism; isolation magnified tribalism and brought about that "steady spirit of calculation and a seemingly impregnable conceit" which now characterizes the race; Western methods have made the often expressed dreams of unifying the world under the sway of the Emperor of Japan appear realizable, while the suicidal war in Europe has made it appear to the naïve in Japan that "the salvation of the entire human race is the mission of their Empire". This is appalling, and, in a sense, even worse than the pretensions of Nazi-ism, since Nazi-ism is an apostasy and might return to the fold, whereas Japanese tribalism has been ingrained for perhaps two thousand years. Tribalism admits of no element of universality whatsoever; the head of the Japanese race can only be the supreme being to a Japanese. No criteria of universal application are even imagined by the Japanese. Mr. Stranks is guilty of under-statement when he says that "any idea of absolute truth is something which a Japanese finds particularly hard to accept"; if he were capable of accepting the idea of absolute truth, he would, from a Japanese point of view, be a traitor and an apostate. Expediency decked out with all the trappings of Confucianism is the sole criterion of general application to the actions of the members of the tribe; the actions of the aggregate of the tribe must, from the point of view of a member of it,

inevitably be right. Hideous though the prospect of being ruled by a race imbued with such limited notions as these must be, there is even worse to come: the Japanese is taught that in contradistinction to other mortals he alone is innately good, and that though others have need of moral codes, he has only to consult his own heart. His emotions are kept well within bounds by the rigid structure of society in Japan itself, where life is so systematized that there is little necessity to have recourse to reason, but those who have experienced Japanese rule in China will know to what enormities his emotions will lead a Japanese, far from the restraint of his police-state. Let us hope that the enforced contemplation of the pagan states of Germany and Japan will achieve, while there may yet be time, what the study of their equivalents in the past have failed to do, namely, make us really aware of the true basis of our civilization. We must, in fact, realize that, without Christianity, we are as nothing. We think that the reading of Mr. Stranks' book may help a little to that end. A. WILSON.

Berlin Diary. The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent. 1934-1941. By William L. Shirer. (Hamish Hamilton.)

MR. SHIRER was an American press correspondent on the continent for fifteen years and, during the greater part of this war, worked for Columbia Broadcasting from Berlin. Trustworthy reports from inside Germany are rare. Therefore these extracts from the notes of a well-informed eye-witness, covering no less than 473 pages in print, are bound to rouse considerable interest. An easy and agreeable style adds to the attraction of the subject.

Few things Mr. Shirer has to say are staggeringly new. Here and there there is some well-documented inside story not known before, or at any rate not widely known, such as the gruesome story of the "mercy deaths", the murder of many mentally deficient Germans by the Gestapo. But on the whole the value of the book, which is considerable, is not to be found in these revelations. Its interest is almost wholly due to the author's ability to convince the reader of his balance and sound judgment. It is his interpretations, not his facts, which are primarily valuable. Out of many versions of the more important events of the war, he picks out one, and in a few words gives his reasons for accepting it in preference to others. In the absence of most of the ordinary means of checking information about Germany, one is glad to feel oneself in the hands of so honest and intelligent a guide.

For this very reason the first section of the book, dealing with the pre-war period down from 1934, is the least interesting one. English readers who remember the main events of that period may skip the first 150 pages (they may be more interesting for Americans, who are

farther removed from the European scene and for whom, after all, the book is primarily written).

Out of his remarks on the war his view about France's collapse is perhaps most interesting. It is summed up in the words: "The French didn't fight." It is not an isolated view, but I never saw it so well substantiated. Taking for granted French inferiority in numbers and material, Shirer yet brushes aside the plea of *ultra vires* and proves, convincingly to my mind, that the French let slip an endless number of opportunities. No fighting except on the highroads; no fighting, even on the roads, except in the towns; no attempt to build tank-traps or to construct artillery positions to close the roads; no serious attempts at counter-attacking! It is an endless list of shortcomings, amounting to absolute inertia. Chamberlain, of course, is charged with complete inadequacy in preparing for the onslaught, as in supporting Poland and Norway. One must read this American's day-to-day impressions of the first nine months of the war in order fully to realize what havoc was worked in America through the Chamberlain policy. It needed all the tough heroism of the battle of Britain to live it down.

By contrast, the achievements of the German High Command look most impressive. But Shirer is only partly impressed. He confesses, over and over again, to having been staggered himself by the swiftness, efficiency, and by the incredibly thorough preparation of the German offensives, as well as by the astuteness of Hitler's policy and propaganda, and the success of Goering's rearmament drive. Yet all through his account there runs like a red thread a tale of Nazi disappointments. Chamberlain and Simon (whom Shirer both describes as intolerably and ridiculously vain men) haughtily underestimated the power of the Nazis, even after Poland. But Hitler and his lieutenants also haughtily underestimated their adversaries. The difference is this, that the glib optimism of the democracies could be remedied, by a change of leadership, whereas the vanity of Hitler is irremediable. Hitler, according to Shirer, did not expect England and France to fight for Poland; did expect them to make peace after the fall of Poland; did not expect the Norwegians to resist; did expect Britain to capitulate after the fall of France; did expect to destroy the R.A.F. within two to three weeks, and then to invade and conquer Britain; did not expect the British to bomb Berlin; did not expect Roosevelt to be re-elected. If the diary had been continued into 1941, the author would have had an opportunity to add to this list of disappointments one or two of the greatest importance. From the angle of a well-informed observer inside Germany it does apparently not look as if all went according to plan for the Nazis.

He has some interesting remarks about the strength and weakness of the latter. He very pertinently does away with the idea that the

Nazi regime is no more than a continuation of the old Prussian regime, pointing out that as a result of Nazi rule caste distinctions have nearly disappeared in Germany, particularly in the army and navy, where officers and men eat the same food from the same table, and meet on socially equal terms. Might we not take a leaf out of Hitler's book?

The chief weakness of the Nazis, in his view, is the absolute indifference of the masses to even the greatest victories, unless these victories seem to hold out a prospect of immediate peace. German greatness, apparently, is no concern of the ordinary man in the street. The psychological effect of even mild air-raids seems to be considerable. Nobody outside the Nazi ranks seems to want or have wanted war. German troops, as distinct from Gestapo butchers, show no hostility to the populations of the occupied territories (though they strip them of most of what is left to them by means of purchases at a fantastically advantageous exchange rate of the mark).

Shirer is puzzled by the contrast between all this (and the many signs of personal decency on the part of average Germans) and the implicit trust Germans, even anti-Nazi Germans, have in their government. It is a crucial point for the understanding of German psychology, and apparently one difficult to grasp for all Westerners. Oswald Spengler, no bad judge of German character, once expressed it in the extreme statement that every Balkan dock-worker was cleverer at disentangling a political intrigue than a well-educated German. The Germans, I believe, are not by nature more cruel than other people, nor more war-loving. They do love, however, to trust those in authority, provided the men at the top do not appear to waver, but understand how to command (which the republic never did). An average German believes all he is told by his parents, his schoolmaster, his lieutenant, his trade union or co-operative organizer, his newspaper and his government—and is flabbergasted at nothing so much as at a lie; also constantly feeling that he is really not clever enough to look through any intelligent piece of deception, and gullible precisely on account of this inferiority complex. Shirer, it seems to me, need not have been puzzled so much at German political psychology.

The material he submits is absolute proof that once the Nazi machine is broken Germans will prefer anything to a continuation of war; anything, that is, short of total physical destruction. He believes that many are beginning to be afraid of the retribution in store for all Germans in revenge for the Nazi atrocities, and he thinks that this fear may become the one firm tie binding the German masses to their government, and thus help Hitler to maintain himself, even when the tide of war turns. He suggests that the Allies should pledge themselves in time to limit retribution to the Nazis proper; a suggestion worth all attention on the part of those responsible for British propaganda.

FRANZ BORKENAU.

Scum of the Earth. By Arthur Koestler. (Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d.)

MR. KOESTLER's earlier works have already shown that he is one of the most penetrating writers of his generation. His latest book, *Scum of the Earth*, has a double interest in that it is both an account of the development of French opinion between September 1939 and June 1940, outstanding among the varied impressions of the French tragedy already published, and an autobiographical record of the author's own experiences during the period in which his remarkable novel, *Darkness at Noon*, was conceived and written. *Scum of the Earth* tells the story of Mr. Koestler's imprisonment in the French concentration camp at Le Vernet in company with other alien, although not mainly enemy alien, suspects; of his release in January, 1940; of his flight before the German advance in May, 1940, during which he enlisted in the Foreign Legion in order to protect himself from the Gestapo; and of his subsequent escape and arrival in England. The outline of the story is not new, nor, unhappily, is it unusual. It derives its gripping interest from Mr. Koestler's powers of observation and interpretation, which enable him to come nearer to analysing the forces which underlay the French collapse, and more generally the impotence of all democratic forces in Europe, than any other writer, with the possible exception of Mr. D. W. Brogan, who however, relies on the historical rather than the empirical method. There can be little doubt that history will regard French treatment of its alien enemies of the Gestapo as the most serious blot on Gallic honour sustained during the swift tragedy of the defeat. The abuse of the *Loi des Suspects* by the imprisonment, ill-treatment and starvation of passionately anti-Nazi foreigners fed the power of a semi-Fascist police and introduced a system of denunciation and terror months before the arrival of the Gestapo. That much of the ill-treatment of the refugees of Fascism, of the "scum of the earth", was due to muddle, incompetence and negligence is obvious, but that does not obscure the fact that it was a criminal negligence which nourished an element in the French state far more dangerous than the prisoners at Le Vernet. The tacit understanding in high places to regard the left wing opponents of Nazi Germany as, literally, more sinister than the Hun behind the Maginot Line, encouraged the French to prefer surrender to resistance *à outrance* where this might have taken on a revolutionary flavour. Moreover, it accustomed the French public to condone the inevitable crimes against the individual citizen common to a police state so that the true issues of the war were obscured and the Frenchman, both before the German attack and while waiting for demobilization, surrendered himself to an access of *Je m'en foutisme*. In the light of the general failure to see what the war was all about, or to care whether or not it was fought, the ultimate crime of handing over to certain torture and death the men

who for eight years had fled from the German secret police, was a foregone conclusion. Yet this is probably the element in the French record which the civilized world will find most difficult to forgive.

Mr. Koestler's story succeeds because it is restrained, curiously unembittered, and veracious. As a record of personal suffering and a tribute of respect and pity for the many thousands who failed to escape to this country, it is painful to read. Yet it is always more interesting than terrible, because Mr. Koestler's intelligence and powers of analysis remained the dominant elements in his mental and spiritual make-up. Thus, *Scum of the Earth* describes in detail the most ugly symptom in French life before the occupation, a symptom which goes to the root of the French decay. Today, the author is in the British Pioneer Corps. He declares that he is satisfied with his lot. But it is perhaps opportune to inquire whether writer and journalist of his qualities, knowledge and experience is being used, even by this country, to the very best advantage.

PAMELA O'MAHONY.

Second Wind. The Autobiography of Carl Zuckmayer. Translated by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood. With an Introduction by Dorothy Thompson. (George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.)

WRITING of the first World War, Herr Zuckmayer says :

Those who went into the field from Germany, France, England were really the future of the world. They were the flower of Europe. They were mown down, destroyed.

But in this, his autobiography, there is none of that self-pity which has been so prevalent in the wailings of the "lost generation". He would have little patience with those who called him or his fellows "lost". He puts in no claim on the future for the sufferings of "disillusionment", and for that, if for no other reason, his book is stimulating, genuine, valuable. "Home," he writes, "is not where a man is born, but where he wants to die"—and he has carried into his American exile a zest for life, a readiness to accept his destiny which goes far to support his contention that the men of his time, the men of middle-age who faced and used the disasters of 1914-1939, were the salt of the earth. Of these disasters he had more than any man's fair share. The war, the inflation, Nazi persecution, struggle, starvation, transient success, and ultimate flight. From all these things he has built a philosophy which still looks to the future, refusing to despair, not much liking to regret, eager to reconstruct, and always ready to enjoy. In vivid pages of reminiscence he tells of his many adventures in war and peace : of Germany flown with pride and prostrate in defeat ; of

personal determination to succeed ; of desperate refusal to be cowed either by failure or by tyranny. Seen through his eyes the feverish vitality of post-war Berlin takes on a character of new birth, of adventure in experiment, of hope in a brave new world. Men such as he wrote a chapter all too brief in German history. Men such as he might have saved Europe from catastrophe if only they could have fortified their good will with political wisdom. By birth a Rhineland, he enjoyed a short-lived triumph in the theatre, retired to Austria when the Nazis banned his plays, fled from Vienna, only just in time, on the morrow of the Anschluss. We do not need Miss Dorothy Thompson's assurance that he has the gift of laughter. A Rabelaisian gaiety and passion for living give light and colour to his every page. He has the precious gift without which no planned future for mankind will benefit the world—the gift of taking what comes and, by sheer force of enthusiasm, turning it to account. There is more hope for humanity in this book of his than in all the intellectual blueprints for the future, for it is the testament of a man who is in love with existence. It is a tonic for hard times, and we close it with feelings of affection and good will towards its writer.

The translator has been peculiarly successful. Herr Zuckmayer is a practised writer. To render his prose cannot have been easy, for it is considered and personal, and to say that from the English version there emerges the figure of a man speaking intelligibly, forcefully, and with an individual note, is to pay deserved tribute to Miss Hapgood's endeavours. In the two "set pieces" of the book—the story of Alexander and Angela, which might come straight from Van der Meersche's great novel of the last war, and the description of the Breughel-like feast which the author gave at his home in the Austrian mountains, she has triumphantly succeeded. This book deserves wide reading.

GERARD HOPKINS.

Between the Acts. By Virginia Woolf. (Hogarth Press. 7s. 6d. net.)

It is too often written—or said—with professional glibness, that "Mr. So-and-So" (or Miss, or Mrs) "has made something new out of the English novel." More often than not what is meant by this too-easy phrase is that such and such a writer has applied to the normal intention of fiction a technique that is more or less original. A story has been told, but in a new way. In very few hands does the novel become, in any serious sense, something new. In Virginia Woolf's it did. Her later fictions established her in a field that was notably and wholly her own. It is impossible to imitate Virginia Woolf. She perfected a design ; she did not lay down a formula. Only a writer possessed of her own peculiar sensibility, of her feeling for language,

of her response to impressions, could produce a literature remotely comparable to hers, and with her death a genuine and personal note has vanished from the complex of English Letters.

She told no story; analysed no motives. In her "novels" the primary interest attached to no conflict of character, to no play or circumstance. She sought and achieved a form that presented in verbal equivalents an intensely individual response to nervous stimulus. "Novel" is, by convention merely, the word to apply to the main body of her fictional writings. They are lyrics, they are ecstasies, they are visions, they are music. They are, in short, anything rather than what is normally regarded in this country as fiction. It is almost impossible to divorce their content from their form. Nothing could be more fruitless than to attempt an abstraction of their "story" from the manifold of words and imaginative overtones that give them form. She belonged to that very small body of English artists for whom the actual "writing" has been, in prose narrative, as important as the initial, the fruitful, "idea", and even within that small body she stands alone.

That she died by water is fitting, for water, with its shifting play, its shimmer, its movement, its refusal to endure in immobility the appraising eye, haunts the mind that feels in sympathy with her view of the world. In many of the earlier books water plays a named and definite part; in *The Waves*, for instance, and in *To the Lighthouse*, but in all of them, from *Jacob's Room* to *Between the Acts*, the sense of water is pervasive. Time, that central fact of all her imaginative work, flows like water, and, like the play of light on water, the sensibilities of her "people" flicker, emerge and vanish—bubbles rising to the surface, bursting, reforming, vanishing. Here, in this last book, the process is taken one step beyond even the extremity of *The Waves*—that seemingly most abstract, most difficult of her compositions. With all its glinting play of time on life, *The Waves* did present a certain human continuity. The characters of that book did at least move along a traceable, if broken, line, from birth to maturity. Their stories, if not told in the ordinary sense, succeeded in emerging from the instability of the breaking, ebbing, flowing years: the human pattern is detachable. But *Between the Acts* shows little more than a glancing medley of sensibilities set against a background of something overwhelmingly constant that for ever escapes the full grasp of its recorder. With none of its characters are we allowed to follow through a single line of development. As in *Mrs. Dalloway* the action is confined to a single day, but there is no mosaic of "stories" as in that earlier work. We catch the reactions of Isa, of old Mr. Oliver, of Mrs. Manresa, of William, of Mrs. Swithin. We get glimpses of their preoccupations, we learn something of their lives. But the movement remains a phantasmagoria. Not one of their existences is presented at full length, but

merely the play in them of momentary states which emerge and retire, making us privy to a little of their experiences, their hopes, their torments, but never hardening into a full focus. Mrs. Woolf's mastery of her intensely difficult material is here superb. The adaptation of means to end never falters. The sensibility is, as ever, acute, the selection and recording unfaltering. It is only in the integration of all this flickering light on water that one becomes conscious of a certain failure. The "play", the village pageant, that curious, ominous gathering of time into a condensed presentation of English history, is clearly intended to contain the key to this curious experiment. In its "Orlando"-like breaking down of time, in its concentration of the processes of centuries into a moment "outside time", something dominant, something that overwhelms and threatens the personal is indicated and made uncomfortably present to the imagination. But what precisely that is never succeeds in getting itself clearly expressed. The solid reality which should balance the endless movement of individual response is never wholly established; becomes, indeed, little more than another form of sensibility that constantly eludes the will to grasp it. It is as though Mrs. Woolf had been feeling her way towards some central faith which her basic scepticism, reared on foundations of an exquisitely cultivated responsiveness to mood and suggestion, forbade her to attain. In true response to the pressure of her own genius, she had here abandoned even so much of structure as the continuity of individual lives gave her in the earlier books. The reader feels that she is between, rather, the Tides than the Acts, of creation, and that some ultimate form of integration has still eluded her seeking intelligence. Whether, had she lived, she would have found it, is a fruitless enquiry, and fruitless, too, in a short space, to attempt a ranking of this book with its fellows. What Mrs. Woolf could do to perfection is here to perfection done. The curious effect of exaltation produced by all her best work upon the sympathetic reader is operative as ever when, after a somewhat slow start, the heart of the book is reached. The novel teases by its inconclusiveness, but it moves the mind to a rare activity of beauty, and marks with poignancy the sense of a genuine loss to English literature.

GERARD HOPKINS.

At Odd Moments. An Anthology selected by Bernard Darwin. (Oxford University Press. 5s.)

It seems that Mr. Bernard Darwin resolved in early life to be "as unlike a Darwin as possible", and it may be to emphasize the contrast between his family and his own interests that he prints at the end of this very personal anthology the famous account of his intellectual development given by his great ancestor, the author of *The*

Origin of Species. Yet, after all, this collection of personal preferences bears witness to a certain kinship in the literary interests of the Victorian scientist and his descendant. Charles Darwin reported his lively enjoyment of novels, "books on history, biographies and travels" and "essays on all sorts of subjects". Among the authors represented here Dickens, Thackeray, Scott and Borrow take first place. For the rest, as might be expected, there is a great deal about sport; and extracts from "essays on all sorts of subjects" acquaint us especially with the peculiarly English sporting traditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Hazlitt on Cavanagh the Fives-Player, "Nimrod" on Jack Mytton, pages from Lamb and Stevenson and Cobbett conjure up the England of prize-fighting, racing and cricket: a self-centred boisterous world filled with the enjoyment of its own deep-rooted energy.

Within these pleasant limits room has been found for a surprising variety of curious things. A selection of authors or passages which are merely odd will suffer from an atmosphere of abnormality in which nothing seems surprising. But Mr. Darwin's anthology is built up out of his own daily interests, and the odd things he has enjoyed and collected stand out in all their singular detail. It is possible to mention only a few of the most unusual. There is an admirable account from the Rev. Whitwell Elwin's *Some Eighteenth-Century Men of Letters*, of why we must admire Dr. Johnson. There is a strange and vivid anecdote of a "lapse from sobriety" of the abstemious Erasmus Darwin. But even more remarkable, and suggestive of further investigation, is an extract from Mrs. Beeton's *Philosophy of Housekeeping*: "A mistress should rise *at latest* at seven o'clock. This will appear dreadfully late to some notables, but will be found to be a good hour *all the year round*. . . . When it is possible to get the master to enjoy an eight o'clock breakfast, household matters go charmingly." With its reminiscences of faded social standards the whole of this delightful extract has an interest which is typical of an essentially "documentary" collection.

FRANK PRINCE.

The Dry Salvages. By T. S. Eliot. (Faber & Faber. 1s.)

ACCORDING to a note, the Dry Salvages "is a small group of rocks, with a beacon, off the north-east coast of Cape Ann, Massachusetts". This long poem is the third to be published of the four poems which we are told Mr. Eliot has written on the pattern of *Burnt Norton*. The themes of this group of poems are time and timelessness, "the point of intersection of the timeless with time", and "the hint half-guessed, the gift half-understood" which "is Incarnation". *The Dry Salvages* represents these themes in terms of the sea, the fishermen

who live upon the sea, and those who travel by sea. There are five movements in this meditation, of which the fourth is a brief prayer to the Blessed Virgin :

Lady, whose shrine stands on the promontory,
Pray for all those who are in ships, those
Whose business has to do with fish, and
Those concerned with every lawful traffic
And those who conduct them.

In the formal brilliance with which this lyric interrupts, yet seems to flower from, the more discursive level of the poem as a whole, we have a typical proof of Mr. Eliot's rhetorical skill.

It is worth considering the forms this skill has constructed in the present group of poems, for one may in the process discover a good deal concerning the tendency of Mr. Eliot's later poetry and more particularly concerning the connection between his religious beliefs and the changes in his verse. Characteristic of *Burnt Norton*, *East Coker* and *The Dry Salvages* is a certain unity of discourse which is achieved at the expense of the brevity and brilliance found in earlier poems: the verse strikes one in many passages as almost prosy, while even the lyrical movements are subdued to a certain level of prolixity. One misses in particular the quality of memorability which was crystallized in many phrases and lines in earlier poems—a quality which depends on the unusual placing of surprising but accurate words, on a combination of music and idea which seems to be both inevitable and strange. This quality, which Mallarmé, for instance, brought to a perfection of his own, Mr. Eliot must for long have consciously cultivated, for he points to it in the work of one of his first masters, Baudelaire. But that he no longer pursues phrases, *nés pour d'éternels parchemins*, seems clear from their absence in general from his poetry since *Ash Wednesday*. There are of course exceptions, such as the lines in *Burnt Norton* on

The crying shadow in the funeral dance,
The loud lament of the disconsolate chimera.

In spite of this change of tone, however, Mr. Eliot has not entirely discarded his technique of suspense and surprise. By means of many small devices too numerous to analyse, he keeps his reader in expectancy of the moment of vision which he is striving to evoke. But since he is able to evoke it only by indirect approach, since the vision itself is, if not ineffable, eventually another matter than the avenues and perspectives which are focused on it, the reader must in the end be disappointed. It is a new thing for Mr. Eliot to devote whole poems to an experience which he declares cannot be expressed,

even by those who possess it completely, and which he does not claim to have possessed. Since he is too honest to consider cheating us with a poetic substitute, he candidly lets us down in elegiac apologies, admitting that he is one of those

Who are only undefeated
Because we have gone on trying ;
We, content at the last
If our temporal reversion nourish
(Not too far from the yew-tree)
The life of significant soil.

Candour and humility are disarming ; but we feel that the poet has played us a trick, and it is a trick which I think he is bound to play as long as he attempts his present themes. The difficulty of the matters he is handling seems to have induced in Mr. Eliot, even before he begins to write, a sense of defeat. There is an attitude of accepted inadequacy in these poems which is reflected in their stylistic qualities and is a poor substitute for the lively self-dissatisfaction and the critical ferocity of the earlier work. It is an odd thing that Mr. Eliot's tendency towards prosiness should be due not to a relaxation but to an excess of self-criticism. As his preoccupations have increased in scope and depth, he has evidently felt that it would be pretentious to attempt to render his poetic methods adequate to their expression.

"Their music is successful with a dying fall" ; but there can be no question of speaking, in Dryden's phrase, of Mr. Eliot's "dotages". He himself might be too ready to admit the hypothesis of failing powers, but this would be a superficial explanation of the changes that have come over his work. A full explanation may be impossible, now and in the future ; for the present we should suppress any impulse to blame the poet or his beliefs for developments which we may regret. However many difficulties he may see in the path he follows, a writer may not be free to choose another line of advance. There may be certain problems which interest him more immediately and profoundly than all others. Although he should fail to solve them, it is on these he must concentrate, for the refusal to attempt their solution would be a more disastrous failure. Mr. Eliot has attached big talent to those themes which have the power to engage and move his whole mind, perhaps because he feels that no fine poetry can issue except from the labour of the whole mind, and that poetry, written on such terms, even if its success should be but partial, will have its value. He is justified by the interest we must feel in all he produces. *The Dry Salvages* does not disappoint that interest.

FRANK PRINCE.

Poems of a Decade. By A. L. Rowse. (Faber. 6s.)

MR. ROWSE'S poems leave one with the faint sense that he has been anticipated, which is not at all the same thing as to say that he imitates. But the distinction has to be made. His title explains the variation; it recalls past time, and so do the poems—and not only past time, but our own past time. Yes; we once felt like that—or at least enjoyed feeling like that; and the recollection makes us wonder. Yes—the German lines and the French (*O mon semblable ! mon frère !*); yes—the contempt of the unpolitical wage-earner; yes—the sense that war makes things different, and even in some strange order does away with the question of whether Sunday cinemas are wished. This is an odd rejection of the intellect, but one must not demand intellect from all poems, nor from these. They are poems of moods, and of past moods.

They have a sincerity of their own, and yet one is conscious of a kind of limitation. Their openings again and again invite one to poetry; it is, I think, their epithets that are uncertain: that is, the epithets raise a doubt rather than an apprehension. In such a personal poem as "The Revelation", it may be unfair to obtrude one's own awareness. Mr. Rowse, seeing a military parade, speaks of "all the people in the street happy to see them pass". Happy? Alas, this was the mood of other wars. The poems of "disillusionment" are, I think, poetically the best; that is, they do their job most convincingly, though Mr. Rowse, writing "The answer to all this hate is only love", besides writing his truest line, has dismissed their job as negligible. The poems that profess a common humanity are less successful; the word "girls" does not really re-create love (of that particular kind), but only marks a division. Yet the honesty of the poems pushes through; it is to Mr. Rowse's honour that he has not pretended anything but his own wish; anyone who writes verse would be glad to have as much said.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

The Dickens World. By Humphrey House. (Oxford. 10s. 6d.)

MR. HOUSE has posed a most interesting question, and if he has not fully answered it he has, what in some ways is better, given his readers abundant material for answering it themselves. What, really, is the relation of the world created by Dickens to the world in which he lived? Or to put the same question in another form—how far, and within what limits, can the historian treat Dickens as an authority or a source?

Now, I do not believe there is anyone living who has a profounder admiration for Dickens than I have, or—which is not quite the same

—who reads him more often or with more delight. (I have compared him with Homer and with Aristophanes, and I do not withdraw the comparison.) But all the same, when I read on page 15 of Mr. House's book the judgment which he quotes from Professor Dobrée and Miss Batho: "This giant never grew up intellectually. Whenever he begins to think, he falls below the level of the second-rate", I hear my own voice speaking: "He never grew up." What do we mean by this facile phrase? I cannot answer for the writers I have just quoted, but what I mean is this. When Datching has finished his dinner at the "Crozier" he sets out to call on Mrs. Tope and loses his way entirely. I know Rochester almost as well as Dickens did, and I assert with confidence that it is quite impossible for any grown-up person to lose his way between the "Crozier" and the Gate House. Dickens is thinking like a child, indulging the delicious self-bewilderment of a little boy, losing his way for the pleasure of losing it and knowing all the time that someone will find it for him. It is an adventure, serious—as all the adventures of childhood are—but not dangerous. If he were really and truly lost, then, like Pip in Coling Churchyard, he would begin to cry.

The grown-up, in other words, has in his mind some kind of pattern, into which the different bits of Rochester can be put. The child has none—or (and this I think is nearer the truth), if he has, he can keep it in the background, and absorb himself in the game of playing with the pieces and making them go into a pattern of his own. But this little boy has all the child's sense of what is fair and unfair; a treble measure of the child's self-centred self-importance; and such gifts of observation and recollection as have rarely been bestowed on any mortal man. And this outfit, this make-up, he will carry with him all his life, singularly unmodified; protected, it might seem, by its own intrinsity, against any interference or deflection from what we, who have grown up, must call the real world.

Thus, over and over again, the reader of Dickens, if he happens to know something of the history of the time, catches himself saying, "How wonderfully that is observed! How well he has caught the look, the colour, the cadence of that moment! But when was that moment? When did that happen?" And the answer is that it happened in Dickensland at Dickenstime, and the time and the land bear only the most wavering and uncertain relation to this realm of England in the days of Victoria or her uncle. What was the Jaradyce case all about? What is Inspector Bucket's position in the official hierarchy? When did Mr. Podsnap say, "Centralization. Never with my consent. Not English!"? No one knows. You might as well ask in what year Mr. Jingle saw confessional boxes in Rochester Cathedral. Dickens did not know. Kingsley, Trollope, or George Eliot could have told you to a month. But they were grown

up. They knew the social map, the political pattern of England. Kingsley understood exactly how a Chartist thought, and what a Chartist riot was like. To Dickens, as Mr. House most truly shows, it was all a delicious horror, as much like the real thing as Cruikshank's comic nightmare of a church in *David Copperfield* is like a Victorian place of worship.

Let us try another approach. To which of the main currents of English thought and feeling in the years from 1830 to 1870 does the set of Dickens' mind most nearly conform? To the Radical—yes, till you think of the New Poor Law, that great achievement of the unswerving, ruthless, Radical intelligence. To the Protestant? Memories of Mr. Chadband and Little Bethel? The Philanthropic? Echoes of Mr. Honeythunder! The Anglican?—well, he has a certain kindness for the unobtrusive gentle Anglicanism of Mr. Milvey and Canon Crisparkle, neither of whom, of course, is in the least danger of going over to Rome. But at the Oxford Movement he bristles, Pre-raphaelism sets him screaming, and for Parliament he has nothing but a noise—something between a roar and a snort of contempt. No—for history go to Trollope, go to Kingsley. Indeed you may go lower down the list, and still find matter for your purpose. You will find it in *John Halifax, Gentleman* and, unless an early fondness has deceived me, Mrs. Henry Wood knew far more about Worcester than Dickens ever knew of Cloisterham. True, this Leviathan cannot help feeling the tide: Mr. House shows with great accuracy how he passed out of the age of really individual enterprise and the counting house into the age of companies and shares. But he takes the currents in his surge, heaving and lashing and spouting like the great sea-baby that he is.

But it is in no fairy ocean, no gulf beyond the world's end, that he disports himself. The pattern of his world does after all bear some relation to the one his contemporaries knew, because the pieces of which it is made are the pieces which they too saw. Only—with what eyes he saw them! With what volcanic exuberance of recollection and combination he made them into shapes! And, wherever his hand may have been, his heart was where theirs was—in progress, education, better houses, cleaner bodies, a kindly independence, a brave sympathy; all animated with a spirit not very easy to define, which, though, as Mr. House observes, expressed itself most readily in Christian language, is not easily adjustable to any definite mode of Christian belief, as his age understood it. But that age, I have always thought, was moving forwards, trying to find its way, through the increasing darkness cast by science upon the old beliefs, to a Natural Christianity, and it was somewhere there—with Little Emily and the Prodigal Son as figures in the same compassionate scene, that Dickens' heart was most at home.

G. M. YOUNG.

I too have lived in Arcadia. A Record of Love and Childhood. By Mrs. Belloc Lowndes. (MacMillan & Co., Ltd. 15s. 6d.)

THE sub-title of this delightful book of combined family history and personal reminiscence is the clue to its unusual charm. Records of childhood had been so much in the fashion for some years past that most writers include a volume of autobiography amongst their works. As a rule they follow the example set by Edmund Gosse, E. F. Benson, and, under the guise of fiction, by Samuel Butler, and record a childhood in which filial love, towards one's father at any rate, is submerged by criticism. Mrs. Belloc Lowndes, however, as befits one born and brought up during her mother's sojourn in Arcadia—"the five years with your father and the further nine summers I spent with his mother at La Celle St. Cloud" (*Foreword*)—strikes a different note. It was her happy experience to learn from the very first that love, like manners, is the fruit of noble nature and of loyal mind.

She herself exemplifies the result of that upbringing in her magnanimous comment—"I think Barbara was justified in what she did"—on a letter written by her mother's friend, Madame Bodichon, to Madame Belloc in a last-minute effort to prevent Louis Belloc's marriage to Bessie Parkes. Bessie Parkes, a woman of thirty-eight, of brains and character, decided to risk a marriage which the Belloc family, with most scrupulous honour, pointed out might be unwise for reasons of health, and she was amply rewarded.

A more beautiful record of the marriage of true minds and devout souls cannot be imagined ("neither of them would have missed going to Mass" we are told in their daughter's account of her father's last Sunday, p. 219). It invites comparison with the beautiful *Recit d'une Soeur*, consisting mainly of letters written in the France of Madame Belloc's youth, and is a mine of wisdom as well as wit.

Mrs. Belloc Lowndes's ancestors on both sides endowed their descendants with brains and ability. From the Parkes side came scientific and legal qualities—Mrs. Parkes was the granddaughter of the scientist Joseph Priestley, and married a lawyer—as well as that sturdy "Nonconformist conscience" which often proves, as it did in Bessie's case, a good soil for Catholic faith. Of the Belloc family and their intimate friends it might be said, almost without exception, that "to know her" (or him) "was a liberal education."

Madame Belloc's literary gifts, her husband's skill as a sculptor, and the charm they obviously both possessed in unusual measure, brought them in close touch with Parisian culture, and their family connections linked them with France's historic past. One of Madame Belloc's life-long friends was Barthélemy de St. Hilaire, whose "upright and honourable nature" caused him to destroy all records of "the shameful

truth" when, at the age of twenty, he discovered that his dead father was not one of Napoleon's officers but the Emperor himself; and among the Belloc relatives was an old cousin who had taken part in the retreat from Moscow.

Bon sang ne peut mentir, and the letters between Madame Belloc and those who remained in France show that the men responsible for the *Débâcle* of 1871 formed as bitter a contrast in their eyes to the leaders of *La Grande Armée* as the men of Vichy now present to the men who fought at Verdun. The vivid picture these letters give of France under the Prussian jack-boot and the evidence they contain of the aptness of the epithet "Blonde Beast" applied to its wearers is framed in a setting of heroic patriotism which even at such a price was not too dearly bought.

Madame Belloc's younger daughter, Lily, and Mdlle de Montgolfier, an eccentric but much-valued friend, were her most constant correspondents. Courage and cheerfulness in the face of their own severe privations, and loyal devotion to France, are accompanied in these letters by grave misgivings as regards France's rulers.

In a letter written after Sedan, Mdlle de Montgolfier says: "I hardly have the courage to write even to you. If my country is going to disappear, may I disappear with my country. I feel that nothing now matters. I am filled with anger, with pain, and with indignation. . . . I envy every soldier killed in battle"; and, three days later, "all the same I am proud of being a Frenchwoman. I love France because she is in so evil a case."

After Metz: "My greatest fear is that the Prussians will ask France to give up Alsace or Lorraine. I know that Lorraine would rather perish than have them as masters."

Lily writes from Paris at about the same date: "How terrible to know that there still live the men who put in their own pockets the money which should have provided their country with guns and cannon."

The balloon post, due to M. de Montgolfier's invention, was the chief link between besieged Paris and the outside world, a fact of which his daughter was justifiably proud. In March of 1871 it began to bring appalling news of the German Army's behaviour, of which an account as seen by the Belloc family is given in Chapter IX. "Germany has shown herself to be a nation of brigands, burning alive men who were defending their honour, sacking houses of every type, and committing innumerable acts of the most disgusting and filthy nature. If the world is wise, all humanity will now rise against Germany."

The second half of the book is intensely interesting, though except for a brief account of incidents during the Commune it relates to private affairs and family history. It seemed better to confine this review mainly to the events which led Bessie Parkes Belloc to write

to a friend in England soon after her return to France: "It is not only the untruth of the rulers that has ruined France. Believe me, it is the fearful power of Prussia and Germany which has suddenly grown up with Europe unheeding. I fear Germany would make mincemeat of England if she attacked us now. We have almost no army and the great courage of our common people and of those who are called the Volunteers would be of no avail against Prussian discipline. *If Europe is wise (my italics) she will keep herself on an armed footing.* Let me be clear. I detest not the old Germany but the Prussian military monarchy"—which, since those prophetic words were written, seems to have swallowed it up.

GERTRUDE DONALD.

Tudor Cornwall—Portrait of a Society. By A. L. Rowse. 462 pp., 8 illustrations, 4 maps. (Jonathan Cape, London. 18s. net.)

IN our age of scientific historical research, when the history of a country is no longer approached only from a political-constitutional-religious standpoint, it seems doubtful if a history of England covering even quite a short period, answering to all the requirements of modern scholarship, could be encompassed into one single volume, however large this might be. Even if one possessed the knowledge and genius of J. R. Green, it is doubtful that one would view or attempt to write the history of England in the way he did. A fairly complete historical account of a country, even for a single century, is well-nigh beyond the strength of one single man, however great his learning might be. It can still be done, it is true, in the case of a small country during the Middle Ages or, in the case of a large nation, for an obscure mediaeval period, Sir John Lloyd's *History of Wales* and Dr. Hodgkin's *History of the Anglo-Saxons* being typical examples of successful attempts of this kind at their best. But in the case of post-conquest English history, what could still be done with full confidence a couple of generations ago is no longer possible history. Such being the case now, the best way to present the history of a large country during a specific period consists perhaps in restricting one's own researches to a small part of it; in the case of England, for instance, to a small single county with well defined geographical boundaries. Moreover, such an account would probably provide a better picture of a given age than one only circumscribed in space by national boundaries.

The possibilities of the method indicated above are fully shown by Mr. Rowse's work. Already well known as a historian by his masterly biography of *Sir Richard Grenville*, Mr. Rowse presents us now with what might perhaps be described as a historical introduction to his *Grenville*. What he gives us is a most valuable description of

that remotely situated region, Cornwall, under Tudor rule, of its political, economic, and religious structure and struggles, of its society, and of everyday life there during the sixteenth century. As a county Cornwall is most interesting to the historian. In some respects it constituted practically a separate world, and it is particularly to be noted that its economic structure during the Tudor age was peculiar to itself. More industrial than many other parts of England because of its stannaries, the tenor of its life was strongly influenced by its mineral wealth. Of almost equal importance with the tin mines was Cornish shipping, which played a prominent rôle in the life of the county, and by no means solely in the economic sphere.

During the Wars of the Roses, Cornwall had sided with the Lancastrians, and once the Tudors came to the throne it often proved a dangerous problem to the rulers of this country. The rebellion of 1497, the aid given to Perkin Warbeck, the Prayer Book Rebellion, are indicative of the temper of the place. But by the accession of Elizabeth the era of risings was over. Like the rest of England, Cornwall settled down to the Reformation, and although the monastic landowners had been succeeded by a secular land plutocracy, the economy of the county had not been much disturbed. There is no doubt that the chief Cornish achievement in the Elizabethan age lay in its seamen, Sir Richard Grenville heading the glorious list. On the other hand, little was contributed by Cornwall to the Elizabethan literary Renaissance. Carew was the only Cornish writer of note, a tiny starlet in the Elizabethan galaxy.

Mr. Rowse's book includes a very interesting and fair, if not excessively sympathetic, picture of Cornish Catholicism. It is the usual depressing story of executions of priests and crippling fines on that section of the gentry which chose to conform with their ancestral creed, of misery and heroism.

All summed up, *Tudor Cornwall* is packed with valuable and interesting information, so that "the structure and character of Tudor society as it is to be seen in the microcosm of Cornwall" emerges clearly from its pages. Perhaps, considering the aims and nature of the book, the general effect might have been improved by a judicious thinning of the material. On the other hand, there is no doubt that such a suppression would have diminished the scholarly value of the book, unless, of course, it could have been successfully relegated to the footnotes or to an appendix. While avoiding the "heaviness" which only too often accompanies works of sterling scholarship, Mr. Rowse succeeds in providing attractive reading for the layman as well as a treasury of new information for the professional historian. Altogether an admirable piece of fine scholarly research and historical writing, it should not be overlooked by anyone interested in Cornwall or the Tudor age.

R. WEISS.

History of the Schoolmen. By E. Crewdson Thomas, M.A., LL.B. (Cantab.) (Williams and Norgate. 1941. 30s. net.)

ALL attempts at retracing the history of Mediaeval scholastic philosophy are undoubtedly praiseworthy. On this account the author of this ponderous volume of xxiv+677 pages of close print deserves our thanks. In it he has marshalled an imposing array of philosophers and has abridged and discussed their works and teaching, beginning with the Greek and Roman philosophers of the pre-Christian and early Christian era (pages 25-111), and only then entering into the vast field of the Mediaeval philosophical schools: Realists, Nominalists, Logicians, Mystics, Aristotelians (including the Arabs, pre-Thomists, Thomists, Scotists, etc.). The treatment of Thomism—the author terms it “Thomasism” and “Thomastic philosophy”—in Chapters XX-XXIV (pages 272-493), is perhaps the best part of the book as well as the most trustworthy.

After having written this much in its praise we think it is only just to warn the reader of the many deficiencies which disfigure this work. The author seems very seldom to have fully digested or assimilated, now and then not even to have fully grasped the meaning of, the doctrines he tries to summarize or explain. Take this example on page 31:

Further, from a consideration of the problems of contraries and reciprocal generation; e.g. contraries produce contraries but will not admit of each other, but that even such things as are not contrary to each other and yet always possess contraries do not appear to admit of that idea, which is contrary to the idea that exists in themselves, but when it approaches, perish or depart, e.g. three being odd will not admit of the idea of being even.”

There are still worse passages than this. Then, a great number of translations from the Greek or the Latin become quite unintelligible in their English presentation. One wishes that the author had left them untranslated; the reader with but small Latin and less Greek would have understood them much better that way.

The order of events, whether logical or historical, as presented in the book is rather hard to follow. Moreover, the whole work is simply bristling with misprints. The foreign names—and naturally enough this book is full of them—are more often than not wrongly spelt. For example: Zacharius, for Zachary or Zacharias (p. 112); St. Germaine, for St. Germain (pp. 113, 129); Aquitane, for Aquitaine (p. 113); Sigabert, for Sigebert (p. 193); Solerno, for Salerno (five times on pages 211 *sqq.*), etc. Sometimes the mistakes make humorous reading; for example, the notorious heresiarchs Eutyches and Nestorius become Eutychus and Nestor (p. 176). On pages xxiii-xxiv there is a list of “Some Mediaeval-Latin Geographical Names”: a great number of them are mis-spelt. The Bibliography, too, on pages xvii-xxii, is rather amateurish and can be of little help to any

class of reader. Again, the author's statements are not always historically accurate. For instance, on page 132 Lanfranc is made Abbot of Bec. Similar inaccuracies mar the book from beginning to end.

Indeed, having waded through this book, one cannot but deplore the fact that, after amassing such a vast amount of material, the author has so signally failed to weld it into a coherent and dependable whole.

ROMANUS RIOS, O.S.B.

The Heresy of National Socialism. By Irene Marinoff. Foreword by His Grace the Archbishop of Liverpool. (Burns Oates and Washbourne. 3s. net paper. 4s. 6d. cloth.)

ALTHOUGH it appears during wartime and is partly occasioned by the war this is no mere effort of propaganda nor a new attempt to prove that the Germans have been Nazis since the dawn of history. It is a serious and intelligent study of the origin and significance of National Socialism as a creed. This is certainly a heresy in the sense that its exponents choose amongst accepted truths those which appeal most to their own private view and then twist them to serve their purpose; nevertheless the reviewer would prefer to regard it as a false religion in view of its complete opposition not only to those beliefs which are particularly associated with the Catholic Church, but to the basis of all belief and the law of nature itself. This, however, is no more than a disagreement about terms and it must be acknowledged that the author has succeeded admirably in showing how National Socialism is opposed to truth.

The background, the reasons for Germany's spiritual and moral insecurity, the profound pessimism and sense of illusion amongst all things beautiful which are so much a part of the German's outlook, are well brought out. The political development certainly had a good deal to do with this and due importance is attached to it, but Miss Marinoff rightly insists on the *intellectual* roots. In a word, Nazism is older than Versailles, though it does not go back to Tacitus. More immediate causes are the actual insecurity of the post-war world, the need for a leader who would provide a kind of security and restore the physical and moral well-being of German youth lost in arid intellectualism. One of the most valuable chapters in the book is that on education, based on the author's actual experiences. While education under the Weimar republic concentrated almost exclusively on the provision of information for the intellect, neglecting character training, the Nazis place physical training first, the formation of character (in line with the official *Weltanschauung*) second, and instruction for the intellect definitely last.

The Church struggle thus takes its proper place, and Miss Marinoff rightly gives only one chapter to it; it is the inevitable and logical result of this false philosophy of life which itself emerges from deep-

rooted features of the German character. That character might indeed have been developed and shaped for good by Christianity and the only hope for the future lies in its being transformed under the same influence. Hitlerism put an end to the efforts of Christian organizations to restore the true dignity of the German people, but there is good reason to believe that they will rise again since Hitlerism at worst can only be a temporary menace to Europe. For man is still trembling and helpless even when he has tried to yield all responsibility to the Fuehrer, he needs God and cannot without doing violence to his own nature completely give way to despair. "The National Socialist theory makes no provision for peaceful days." Only the true Faith can do that and will do so when peace comes once again to stricken Europe.

EDWARD QUINN.

The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. (Oxford University Press. 25s.)

It is the belief of the compilers that "the volume as it now stands is the best dictionary of its kind". This is almost certainly true. The publisher adds that "a minute's reference to it will forestall many a charge of illiteracy", which seems an ignoble appeal to fear, and that "its constant companionship will be the best help to the activities of intelligence and taste", which seems somewhat improbable. Men of intelligence and taste quote from their own reading to fortify or to illustrate what they have to say, and if they doubt their memories they consult the original. It is not for them that this book is intended.

But for the multitude of those concerned with quotations the new dictionary will be a considerable treasure. The critics for whom a word changed or a false attribution is always an equal crime (though more reasonable men are tolerant in such matters of what is not absurd or misleading); the journalists and preachers who unashamedly look up a leading word in order to reap where they have not sown; the solvers of crossword puzzles, significantly flattered in the introduction and preface—these will all find themselves well served, though there is likely to be some dispute among them on the principles which have regulated inclusion and exclusion. Given that the compilers are considering "popularity and not merit", by what statistics of popularity have they been led to assign some five columns to Robert Bridges? If Victorian and modern comic and sentimental songs are to be quoted at all, why not quote far more? Or if space is too short, why list under Bunyan and Cobbett phrases which obviously belong to Ecclesiastes and Proverbs? Certain extremely quotable writers—Plato and St. Thomas, for instance, and among moderns Eric Gill and W. R. Lethaby—have won no foothold at all; but no doubt the responsibility for this lies with the compilers' public rather than with themselves.

The foreign section of the books falls beneath the generally high standard of accuracy elsewhere. Many quotations are clumsily trans-

lated; there is a curious reference to the "Order of Jesus" (p. 358); a bad version is given of one of Dante's most famous lines (*E for E'n*); and Ennius suffers horribly in both text and index.

WALTER SHEWRING.

Five Centuries of Polish Learning. By Stanislaw Kot, English version by William J. Rose, Foreword by Professor F. M. Powicke. (Basil Blackwell, 2s.)

As a result of the political downfall of Poland and skilful propaganda on the part of the governments, publicists and even scientists of the partitioning powers (Prussia, Russia and Austria) world public opinion took little interest in and knew little about the activities of Poles in the sphere of learning and education. People only knew of Mikolaj Kopernik (Nicholas Copernicus), whom the Germans persistently tried to appropriate, and of Marie Sklodowska Curie, the discoverer of radium. Even Napoleon treated Polish learning lightly. When, in July 1812, Jan Sniadecki, Chancellor of the University of Wilno, introduced to him his brother Jędrzej, a well-known geologist and chemist and described him as a professor of chemistry, the Emperor asked ironically: "*Et quelle chimie enseigne-t-on chez vous?*" to which Sniadecki replied: "*La même qu'à Paris, Sire.*"

Therefore Professor William J. Rose did well to publish in English three lectures on this subject given at the University of Oxford in May 1940 by Dr. Stanislaw Kot, who until recently was Polish Minister of the Interior and is now Polish Ambassador to Russia.

In exile, where the necessary materials and sources of information are lacking, few men are capable of giving such a masterly, exact, yet concise outline of Polish learning as Dr. Kot, Professor of "History of Intellectual Culture in Poland" at the Jagellon University in Krakow, author of many important works on the history of learning and education in Poland, and on the development of intellectual relations between Poland and Western Europe.

Professor Kot divided his outline into three periods: "The Older Kingdom", "The Nineteenth Century" and "Our Own Times".

In the first period, from the adoption of Christianity to the middle of the seventeenth century, learning and education in Poland developed in very much the same way as in other countries of Western Europe, drawing on a common Latin culture, mainly through Bohemia, France and Italy, and spreading it eastward even beyond the Dvina and Dnieper.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Poland possessed the University of Krakow, founded by King Casimir the Great in 1384, which early in the sixteenth century had 3,200 students, half of whom were foreigners. Also the University in Wilno, which was founded about the same time by Hetman Jan Zamoyski. It may be of interest to note that the first professor of Roman Law at this University was a Scotsman, William Bruce.

In addition to these main educational institutions there existed the humanistic academy at Poznan, founded in 1519 by Bishop Lubranski, an academy founded by Unitarians in Rakow, and many schools organized by Catholic orders and the clergy of various denominations. The number of printing presses increased rapidly and libraries were started. While the Poles of that time, although intelligent, were on the whole less inclined towards systematic work and specialization, especially in the sphere of exact sciences, Professor Kot enumerated a large number of schools which were well known at the time beyond the boundaries of Poland even in the sphere of astronomy and science.

A breakdown of the further normal development of learning occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century and lasted over 100 years, in the course of which Poland lived through two Swedish wars and occupations, Cossack insurrections, and attack by Russia and constant raids by Turks and Crimean Tartars. *Inter arma tacent Musae*. It was only after the first partition that scientific life revived. Educational and school reforms were started. The Universities were improved, special schools organized under the aegis of a Ministry of Education ("Komisja Edukacyjna", or Board of Education) probably the first in the world.

The second period—the nineteenth century, or, more exactly, 1795 to 1918—is very aptly named by Professor Kot the *via dolorosa* of education and learning in Poland which the partitioning Powers tried to destroy. They also tried to use the schools mainly as a tool for depolonizing the young generation. This pressure was not exerted everywhere at the same time with the same force, however. At times the pressure slackened and immediately the level of Polish learning and education rose in that particular region, just as a plant grown in the dark turns towards the least ray of light.

At first the greatest oppression in this respect existed in the Austrian partition and lasted until the sixties of the nineteenth century. In the Prussian and Russian partitions until 1831 the Polish language was not excluded from education. In Wilno the University continued to exist and develop very well, while a second university was opened in Warsaw in 1816 and permission was given to extend the activities of the Society of Friends of Science, for which the prominent Polish geologist and educationalist, Stanislaw Staszic, built a fine building in one of the main streets of Warsaw.

But after the suppression of the insurrection of 1831 against the Russians not a single college or university using the Polish language and not a single scientific body remained throughout the territory of former independent Poland. It was not until 1867 that in the Austrian part of the country the Polish character was restored to the University of Krakow and Lwow, in secondary and elementary schools, and a Polish Academy of Science was established in Krakow. On the territory of former Congress Poland from 1905 the Russian Govern-

ment permitted the establishment of private Polish schools and associations.

However, even in their darkest days Polish scientists of high standing were not lacking, neither were generous contributions for purposes of science and learning from both private sources and from endowment. Great sacrifices were often made in order to ensure secret teaching in the Polish language and spirit.

To the names of prominent scientists of that period mentioned by Dr. Kot one should add, in my opinion, the names of botanists—Father Jundzill, professor of the University of Wilno and founder of the botanical garden there; Antoni Waga of Warsaw; the philosophers Trentowski and Cieszkowski of Poznan; a professor of pathology, Brodowski; a professor of therapeutics, Chaubinski of Warsaw; a brilliant balneologist, Dr. Majer of Krakow; Father Kalinka, the historian of the Diet, who brought about the passing of the Constitution of 3 May; Romuald Hube and Professor Adolf Pawinski, who did research work on Polish law and the fiscal system in the Middle Ages; and up to the sixteenth century, the sociologist Limanowski, the polonist Krynski and various others.

Dr. Kot did well to bring back to memory many Poles prominent in the field of learning who, either for political reasons or because of the necessity of conducting higher studies in a foreign entourage and the impossibility of making use of their knowledge in Poland, worked abroad in many parts of the globe and are entered in the ranks of scientists of other nations.

Here again I might add a few further names, namely Przewalski and Grabczewski, the first explorers of Turkestan on behalf of Russia; Katski; one of the most energetic organizers of the colonization of Algiers after its conquest by France; Dr. Korzeniewski, who was professor of Surgery in Moscow; Jan Balinski, the first professor of modern psychiatry in the medical Academy of Petersburg. He was the son of Michael, the Wilno historian, who, together with T. Lipinski, drew up a history of all towns in ancient Poland up to 1772. Further, the brilliant lawyer, specialist in penal law, W. Spasowicz of Petersburg, specialist in the theory of State law; Professor Gumpłowicz at Graz; Ralf Modrzewski (son of Helena Modjewska, the famous actress), the well-known constructor of bridges in the U.S.A., and many others.

In the twenty-year period of Polish independence, 1918–1939, one may say that the Polish nation expended the major part of its energy—beyond the organization of the army—on the development of science, professional knowledge and education.

In view of the relations established with the appropriate circles of other countries, and especially Great Britain, the majority of the persons mentioned by Dr. Kot and their scientific work are known there. Dr. Kot notes that in 1939 Poland had over 20 higher insti-

tutions of learning. This number included five Universities, three technical colleges, a school of mines, two colleges of agriculture and forestry and two commercial colleges. There was also a very large number of government and private secondary schools of various types. In the institutions of higher education the number of professors was 907, the number of lecturers and assistants 2,852, the number of students 48,000, of whom about a quarter were women. The annual budget of the institutions of higher education in Poland was about 30 million zloty.

Dr. Kot is entirely right in pointing out that the majority of old endowments given to institutions of higher education had either been confiscated or undergone devaluation. The community was not rich enough and less inclined to create new endowments as it considered that this was now the duty of the Polish State. The author has failed to mention, however, that at the same time the community was by no means niggardly in gifts, contributions and work for the education and culture of the peasants, including the development and upkeep of elementary schools. First and foremost in this field was the Polish School Society (*Polska Macierz Szkolna*), founded by Henryk Sienkiewicz (the well-known author) and A. Osuchowski in 1906, dissolved by the Russian Government in 1911 and reestablished in 1916. This Society collaborated with the Government in the upkeep of elementary schools, certain secondary schools, it founded in towns and villages libraries and reading-rooms as well as mobile lending libraries, organized lectures, theatrical and film performances, etc. It was run by a Central Committee in Warsaw, a body formed by election, and its funds were derived solely from public contributions. In 1939 its property in buildings, school equipment and books was worth some millions of zloty. Street collections were organized annually on the Polish National Day (3 May) and on the day of the patron saint of school children, St. Stanislaw Kostka. Throughout the territory of former Russian Poland there was not a single rural or urban commune without some institution organized by the Polish School Society.

All that was built up, rebuilt and developed during the twenty years up to the war—all these universities, colleges, scientific societies, institutions, school libraries, public and private collections—have now been looted and completely destroyed. A large number of scientists, professors and teachers have been executed, imprisoned or exiled.

Nevertheless, as the author very justly says at the end of his review of the centuries :

"None of us has any doubt that even the present storm will pass, and that Poland will come out of its inferno purified and renewed in strength. When that happens, Polish learning will again take up its task and go forward with the other peoples of the world to greater and better things."

JAN BALINSKI JUNDZILL.